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Abstract 
In this thesis we contribute to the debate on how economic incentives affect crime. As 
shown by theoretical models, deteriorating labour market opportunities can shift an 
individual’s incentives to engage in legitimate or illegitimate acts. In the first chapter, using a 
panel data analysis, we empirically test the relationship between U.S. business cycles and 
burglary rates. We find that increasing benefits is more effective at reducing countercyclical 
crime than providing unemployment support for an extended period. The second chapter 
utilises a novel measure of income inequality and two measures to capture the incentives of 
the unemployed and low-income earners in a dynamic panel-data model to evaluate their 
effect on different types of crime in England and Wales. The findings strongly support the 
pervasive relationship between economic indicators and property crime, both in short- and 
long-run. Finally, the third chapter builds a predictive solvability model by examining how 
the presence and absence of factors, during the preliminary phase of the investigation, 
determine case solvability of fraud and cybercrime. The predictive capabilities of the model 
are assessed on an external validation sample and the findings show a high degree of 
accuracy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
1 
Introduction 
Advanced economies experience secular economic expansions, overlaid by transitory 
movements in economic activity. Changes in technology or positive supply shocks cause 
wide-ranging developments in social indicators. Likewise, short-term economic expansions 
and recessions, or so-called business cycles, might also cause fluctuations in criminal activity. 
Economic theory suggests that individuals are more likely to engage in criminal activities 
when illegal payoffs are high or legal compensation is low. It is further believed that 
incentives to commit crime are more likely to change when the individual experiences 
movements in permanent income than transitory earnings.  
The first two chapters use various econometric techniques to analyse the relationship 
between economic incentives and crime. In particular, we examine how changes in legal 
returns of at-the-margin individuals affect crime rates.  
Chapter 1 evaluates the effect of U.S. business cycles on burglary rates using a dynamic 
panel data model. To capture the effect of business cycles we use two economic indicators: 
unemployment compensation and income benefit payments. The model is estimated using 
the system GMM estimator. To account for the possible endogeneity of economic indicators 
and criminal justice factors included in the model, internal lags are used as instruments 
while also employing external instruments. Further, we take advantage of temporary benefit 
extensions during the latest recession to study how changes in the duration of 
unemployment benefits affect crime.  
The empirical findings systematically show that increases in income benefits can reduce 
countercyclical crimes, which are more likely to be financially motivated. On the other hand, 
we find that longer unemployment durations cause increases in burglary rates. Overall, the 
results show that disadvantaged groups who experience longer spans of economic 
deprivation, such as long-term unemployed and low-income earners, are more likely to be 
financially motivated to engage in criminal activities. Thus, the findings show that increases 
of assistance payments, during recessionary periods, can reduce countercyclical crimes. 
  
 
2 
Chapter 2 uses a panel-data system GMM methodology to examine the short- and long-run 
effects of economic indicators on different types of crime in England and Wales. A novel Gini 
coefficient is constructed using micro-level data from the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings (ASHE) to examine the relationship between crimes and income inequality. This is 
the first study to include an income inequality measure estimated at the same level of 
disaggregation as the level at which crime statistics are available. The chapter also uses 
unemployment and income benefits which we argue also affect the individual’s decision on 
whether to engage in a criminal act rather than just the state of unemployment alone. 
The empirical analysis provides tentative evidence in support of increasing income benefits 
to lower property crime rates. Also, higher levels of income inequality lead to increases in 
property crime. These effects are observed both in the short- and long-run. In fact, we find 
that the magnitude of the effect is larger during the long-term. From a policy perspective, 
these findings are particularly important as they uncover a dynamic relationship between 
economic indicators and property crime rates. The results suggest that contemporaneous 
small increases in benefit payments can have a considerable long-term negative effect on 
property crime. On the other hand, violent crimes do not seem to be affected by changes in 
economic indicators but violent offenders respond to changes in law enforcement variables. 
The development of information technologies has stimulated an unprecedented growth of 
criminal opportunities. That is, it generated new ways to commit traditional crimes while 
creating entirely new types of crime. In light of the dramatic rises in fraud and cybercrime 
offences, while acknowledging the implicit resource constraint faced by police forces, 
Chapter 3 develops a predictive solvability model that increases investigatory efficiency, by 
identifying preliminary investigative factors which forecast case clearance. The analysis 
utilises a rich, individual case-level dataset for fraud, administered by Warwickshire and 
West Mercia Police, to build the model. This is the first study to empirically identify 
solvability and case-limiting indicators for fraud and creating a forecasting model.  
The findings indicate high predictive capabilities and ensure no wastage of scarce police 
resources. The accuracy of the model is also externally validated using a separate random 
sample. Despite analytical models being more rigorous and objective than human decision-
makers, only rarely do police forces use statistical models to optimally decide investigative 
  
 
3 
resource allocation. Nevertheless, developing this type of predictive model allows police 
forces to identify cases which have a slim probability of solvability and thus, need to be filed. 
In turn, this allows for effective allocation of limited resources to cases which have a higher 
chance of case clearance, as determined by the information obtained from the stages of 
initial investigation.  
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Abstract 
The study examines the effect of business cycles on burglary rates by employing a dynamic 
panel data model which provides a multivariate explanation of burglary movements. The 
empirical analysis uses two economic indicators to approximate changes in business cycles, 
between 1983 and 2009. These are unemployment compensation and income benefit 
payments. Both variables better capture the financial motives of at-the-margin individuals. A 
system GMM is employed allowing for control of unobserved time and state fixed effects 
while also accounting for endogeneity issues. We also take advantage of temporary benefit 
extensions during the Great Recession and we re-estimate the model by restricting the 
sample between the latest business cycle, 2001-2009, and compare the results against 
previous business cycles. The empirical findings indicate that income benefits are negatively 
linked to burglaries whereas longer unemployment durations cause increases in burglary 
rates.  
 
Keywords: business cycles; economic incentives; unemployment; income benefits; crime; 
system GMM 
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Glossary G.1 
The following list of abbreviations, used in Chapter 1, is expanded below. 
 
AB Arellano-Bond serial autocorrelation test 
DIFF GMM Difference GMM estimator 
GMM Generalised Method of Moments estimator 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares estimator 
SYS GMM System GMM estimator 
UI Unemployment Insurance 
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1.1 Introduction 
Business cycles are inherently linked to economic opportunities and thus, indirectly induce 
changes to individual behaviour. As Cook and Zarkin (1985) point out, various social 
indicators are pervasively affected by movements in economic activity, ranging from school 
enrolments to legal labour force participation. Unsurprisingly, criminal behaviour is also not 
immune to economic changes.  
Historically, the literature finds this effect to be stronger for property crimes as they are 
more likely to be motivated by financial incentives (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Levitt, 
1996, 1997, 2001). That is, during recessions, property crime rates are expected to increase.  
This study demonstrates the countercyclicality1 of burglary and provides a multivariate 
explanation of burglary movements by empirically exploiting the relationship between 
business cycles and crime. The dynamic model is estimated using a system GMM (SYS GMM) 
estimator which accounts for the endogeneity of economic indicators and law enforcement 
variables included in the model.  
Economic theory (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973; Levitt, 1997) explains crime engagement 
through the lens of individual incentives, which depend on the costs and benefits of illegal 
activity2. In other words, under this framework, illegal markets are an alternative to legal job 
markets. Individuals decide whether to engage in criminal activities by comparing returns to 
legal and illegal activities. Returns to illegitimate activities depend on the expected crime 
payoff while also accounting for the probability of apprehension and being incarcerated 
(Draca and Machin, 2015).  
                                                     
1 Appendix A.1.2 presents a descriptive analysis confirming the countercyclicality of burglary rates. 
2 Consider for example two otherwise identical individuals, one is employed, and the other is unemployed. At 
that specific moment in time, the labour market offers lower payoffs to the unemployed individual. Thus, the 
unemployed has a decision to make, either commit a criminal offence by accepting illegal job opportunities or 
accept the lower return offered in the legal market. Economic theory predicts that the unemployed individual 
is more likely to accept illegal payoffs due to lower opportunity costs. On the other hand, although, the 
employed person faces the same dilemma because, higher legal payoffs are offered, the individual is less likely 
to accept illegal job opportunities (Becker, 1968).  
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By utilising data, collected from multiple sources, we build an empirical model based on the 
theoretical framework of Becker (1968) that includes variables aiming to capture economic 
incentives. In doing so, we extend the empirical work of scholars who use financial 
performance indicators, such as wages and Gross State Product (Gould et al., 2002; 
Arvanites and Defina, 2006), to assess the relationship between the economy and crimes. 
Although, unemployment rate is the most extensively studied economic factor, the literature 
is inconclusive about its relationship to crime3. Thus, we aim to provide an alternative 
perspective on the relationship between business cycles and crime. In doing so, we assess 
the link between monetary economic indicators, under a panel-data setting, which has not 
received much attention in the literature so far.  
Therefore, the main contribution of this study is to evaluate the effect of economic 
incentives, as measured by changes in government financial assistance and income 
inequality, on burglary rates, over the latest three business cycles. The model controls for 
law enforcement factors and includes time and fixed effects. Unemployment and income 
benefits represent the two measures of financial assistance included in the model. The 
former encompasses the economic incentives of the unemployed whereas the latter 
captures low-income earners. Both variables represent disadvantaged groups of the 
population which face lower opportunity costs and thus, more likely to engage in criminal 
activities.  
We believe that benefit measures are more equipped to capture incentives than other 
economic indicators such as, unemployment rate, as we argue that it is not the state of 
unemployment per se that increases the propensity of crime engagement. Rather, as 
advanced by the theoretical models, it is the expected illegal and legal returns that motivate 
an individual’s decision making. Thus, we suggest that if these disadvantaged groups receive 
enough benefits4 to offset the difference between legal and illegal opportunities, lower 
                                                     
3 Section 1.2 provides more details.  
4 As the decision to participate in a criminal activity is contingent on the returns to crime and employment 
(Witt et al., 1998; Machin and Meghir, 2004), it must also depend on the benefit system regulating transfers to 
low-income or unemployed individuals. These monetary transfers are important as they may act as an income 
effect (Bindler, 2017) while also influencing the ratio of returns-to-work against the returns-out-of-work 
(Machin and Meghir, 2004). 
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property crime such as burglaries will be committed. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first study to examine the effect of benefits on crime.  
Our second contribution is methodological. The literature raises potential concerns of 
reverse causality and simultaneity which may lead to biased estimates. This is usually tackled 
by instrumenting the endogenous variables. However, such instrumental approaches restrict 
the analysis to a static specification to avoid the Nickell bias5 (Nickell, 1981). Moreover, the 
literature usually instruments only either the law enforcement or socio-economic variables. 
Therefore, to address the endogeneity biases of both economic and law enforcement 
variables while accounting for the dynamics of criminal activity6, we use internal lags as 
instruments while also including other external instruments in a SYS GMM framework7. To 
our knowledge, this is the first study to include external instruments8 in this type of analysis.  
The empirical analysis provides tentative evidence in support of increasing income benefits
to lower burglary rates. Specifically, we find that increasing benefits, paid to low-income
earners, by 10%, leads to a 1.2% reduction in burglaries. Also, the model estimates that
higher probabilities of apprehension, proxied by police officer wages, lead to lower
burglaries. However, we find that unemployment benefits are positively linked to burglary
rates, contrary to our expectations. A closer examination of the findings demonstrates that
extended durations of unemployment benefits led to prolonged periods of unemployment
which positively affected burglaries.
                                                     
5 Nickell bias refers to the dynamic panel bias which is not eliminated using fixed-effects, FE, or within-groups 
estimators (Nickell, 1981; Bond, 2002). These estimators follow a demeaning process, which subtracts the 
mean value of the dependent variable and each regressor, for each observation in the sample. As explained by 
Nickell (1981), this results in a correlation between the independent variables and error, creating a bias in the 
estimate coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. The bias cannot be minimised by increasing the number 
of individual units or panels.  
6 By including a lagged dependent variable in our model.  
7 As discussed, in detail, in Section 1.4.3, SYS GMM jointly estimates in a system level and first-differenced 
equations by utilising internal lags as instruments for endogenous variables. The estimator also allows the use 
of external instruments.  
8 The external instrument list includes economic and sociodemographic factors. These are, Gross State Product 
(GSP), effective interest rate, loan-to-price ratio, House-Price-Index (HPI), disposable income per capita, 
average unemployment insurance (UI) duration, a dummy capturing whether the state has minimum wage 
legislation laws, personal tax revenue-to-GSP ratio, poverty and employment rates; median age, percentage of 
black population, and finally, a variable constructed to capture educational attainment. See Section 1.4.3 for 
more details.  
CHAPTER 1: BURGLARY RATES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
 
 
 
10 
This is shown by restricting the sample period to the latest business cycle, the Great 
Recession, where the U.S. government decided, as a mitigating mechanism, to temporarily 
extend the duration of unemployment benefits. Thus, we re-estimate the model by treating 
the latest business cycle as a separate event. As evident from previous empirical works, the 
policy, unintentionally, created longer spells of unemployment (Bradbury, 2014) and less job 
creation (Hagedorn et al., 2015), leading to higher job competition in the labour market and 
depreciation of human capital skills (Bindler, 2015). As a result, unemployed individuals 
experienced lower opportunity costs and thus, they were more likely to endure criminal 
behaviour9. That is, longer unemployment spells, partly caused by the extension of 
unemployment benefits, led to unemployment benefit exhaustion, even with benefit 
duration extensions.  
Our interpretation of the empirical results is that at-the-margin individuals positively 
respond to increases in income benefits as they increase the opportunity cost of offending 
and thus, they are less likely to engage in criminal activities. On the other hand, 
disadvantaged groups also respond positively to policies which perpetuate their distressed 
economic condition, making them more likely to commit crimes. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature. Data 
description is presented in Section 1.3 while explaining why economic indicators better 
capture financial incentives of at-risk adults. Further, Section 1.4 outlines the empirical 
model analysed whereas the findings are discussed in Section 1.5. In Section 1.6 we perform 
two ex-ante forecasts as a robustness check, testing the predictive power of the model. 
Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.   
 
 
                                                     
9 The findings confirm the results of Bindler (2015) who finds that increased criminal engagement is partially 
explained by increased durations of unemployment.  
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1.2 Literature Review 
Advanced economies experience secular economic expansions, overlaid by transitory 
movements in economic activity. Changes in technology or positive supply shocks cause 
wide-ranging developments in social indicators (Cook and Zarkin, 1985). Likewise, short-term 
economic expansions and recessions, encompassed by business cycles, might also cause 
social fluctuations. Thus, the vast analytical literature supports that both secular economic 
growth and short-term economic downturns provoke higher rates of crime. 
Therefore, over the years, empirical research has investigated the relationship between 
crime movements and economic conditions. There is a plethora of hypotheses, statistical 
approaches and indicators of economic activity employed to explore the relationship 
between business cycles and crimes. Although, empirical studies often reach contradicting 
conclusions, there is a collective understanding: just as economic changes affect other 
aspects of social life, they also influence peoples’ motives to engage in criminal acts.   
Thomas (1927) is one of the first to study the link between economic conditions and crimes. 
The work focuses on Britain between 1857 to 1913. He finds that de-trended measures of 
burglary and robbery are strongly negatively (-0.44) related to an indicator of business 
conditions. This countercyclicality, of mainly property crimes, has stood up well in more 
recent studies which account for a multivariate explanation of crime tendencies by including 
various measures of economic indicators, sociodemographic factors and proxies for criminal 
justice variables (Cook and Zarkin, 1985). 
From an economic perspective, the theoretical origins of this linkage are attributed to the 
seminal work of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) who characterise crime as a rational act. 
They suggest that individuals are more likely to engage in criminal activities when illegal 
returns are high or legal compensation is low. In other words, legitimate employment 
opportunities do matter when deciding whether to engage in a criminal activity and they are 
also considered procyclical as, the quality and quantity of legitimate job market 
opportunities is analogous to the state of the economy (Cook and Zarkin, 1985).  
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Hence, the literature considers employment as a significant determinant of crime. Not only 
because earning a fair wage discourages people from committing crimes due to a higher 
opportunity cost10, but also because it dictates a structure in their lives. Specifically, a 
deteriorated job market – determined either in terms of job loss, reduced working hours or 
wage cuts – can severely affect the overall health of the economy (Arvanites and Defina, 
2006. In turn, a deteriorating economy can negatively motivate other social attributes such 
as, crime engagement.  
The majority of empirical analyses use unemployment rates as a proxy for economy’s state. 
As the unemployment rate is considered procyclical (Cantor and Land, 2001), its 
employment aims to capture the uncertainty prevailing in the legal labour market. In an 
earlier study, Cantor and Land (1985), argue that it is unclear whether recessions generate 
increases in crimes since a slumping economy causes two opposing effects: the opportunity 
and the motivation effects. They support that the former has a negative effect on crime, 
since there are fewer opportunities to commit a crime during a recession. The argument is 
that more people are staying at home acting as a guardian to their property and themselves. 
They expect this effect to be contemporaneous. On the other hand, the motivational 
perspective refers to the increasing number of financially motivated offenders. The authors 
argue that the motivation effect is lagged by one period since people are not expected to 
engage into illegal activities as soon as the economy deteriorates. They believe that the 
existence of these two effects explains the inconclusive findings of the literature.  
Nonetheless, this study has been criticised (Greenberg, 2001; Arvanites and Defina, 2006) 
not only due to its methodological approach (Paternoster and Bushway, 2001; p.396) but 
also for the arguments made. Greenberg (2001) is one of the main critics of this work. 
Among other argumentative and statistical issues, he argues that it is illogical to assume that 
people who are unemployed will not immediately experience economic distress but rather, 
as Cantor and Land (1985) propose, they will have enough savings and receive satisfactory 
welfare benefits without any effect on their financial motives, at least for a year. He argues 
that although the latter might be true, it is unreasonable to expect people who are at-the-
                                                     
10 Earning higher wages increases the opportunity cost of, both spending time in the execution of a crime and 
in prison, if caught.  
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margin of offending, such as unskilled or young individuals, to have sufficient funds to 
support themselves financially for an extended period.  
Nevertheless, irrespective of motivational or guardianship effects, critics of unemployment 
rate argue that unemployment captures only a portion of individuals who are impacted by a 
deteriorating economy (Arvanites and Defina, 2006). Criminal motivation may spill over to 
under-employed individuals during economic strain (Chiricos, 1987; Paternoster and 
Bushway, 2001; Greenberg, 2001; Andresen, 2013). This suggests a potential 
underestimation of the impact of recessions on economy’s condition in general, and on 
employability in particular (Arvanites and Defina, 2006). Thus, to effectively examine the 
ramifications of changing economic conditions on crime, the empirical analysis must include 
variables capturing the whole population domain (Cantor and Land, 2001). Also, it is 
important to recognise that business cycles are about change, not levels (Paternoster and 
Bushway, 2001). Therefore, the chosen empirical methodology should encompass factor 
fluctuation11.  
In addition, despite unemployment rates being the most widely used measure of economic 
activity, the literature is yet inconclusive about its effect on crime. Most national-level time 
series12 analyses find a negative association between unemployment and crime (Cantor and 
Land, 1985; Land et al., 1990; Cohen and Felson, 1979), whereas cross-sectional and panel 
data13 studies generally conclude that there is a positive relationship between the two 
(Burdett et al., 2001, 2004; Gould et al., 2002), particularly for property crime rates (Raphael 
and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Levitt, 1996, 1997, 2001).  
Levitt (1996, 1997) finds that a 1% rise in the unemployment rate leads to a 1-2%, 
contemporaneous, increase in property crime rates whereas violent crime rates remain 
unaffected. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) reach similar conclusions using a U.S. state-
level panel dataset between 1992 and 1997. As unemployment is perceived to be 
endogenous, they instrument unemployment rates using prime defence contracts and state-
                                                     
11 As explained in Section 1.4.3, the SYS GMM, our preferred estimator, jointly estimates equations in first-
differences and in levels; allowing for business cycle fluctuations to be accounted for.  
12 Levitt (2001) suggests that national studies are ‘at least crude’ since all variation in the state/county level is 
removed.  
13 A panel data analysis is more appropriate for exploiting the effect of unemployment on crime since it allows 
for simultaneous variation over time and across sates; while controlling for year and state fixed-effects. 
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specific oil shocks. They find a strong positive effect on property crimes with a weaker effect 
on violent crimes.  
Although measures of income inequality and changes in wages have been less studied, the 
empirical findings are more compelling. Historically, wages have been negatively associated 
with crime whereas income inequality is positively linked to crimes. For instance, by 
considering the job opportunities of unskilled men, Gould et al. (2002) exploit the relation of 
unemployment and crime rates. As they explain unskilled men have a higher probability of 
engaging in criminal activities than any other population group. By studying the link of wages 
and crime, between 1979-1997, the authors find that half of the increase in crime rates 
(both violent and property) can be explained by wage trends. Also, although they show that 
both decreases in unemployment and increased wages contributed to the reduction of crime 
rates during the short-term (1993-1997). The authors suggest that raising wages is a more 
effective way to deter long-term crime trends than improving the employment prospects of 
unskilled men.  
Kelly (2000) exploits the link between income inequality and crime. The empirical results 
showcase that, although property crime rates are not affected by inequality per se, they are 
positively and negatively affected by poverty rates and criminal justice factors, respectively. 
In contrast, they find no association between violent crime and poverty rates or police 
deterrence activity. Rather, they support that violent crime is affected by income inequality. 
In other words, the greater the income inequality, the higher the violent crime rates. 
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1.3 Data Description 
This section describes data definitions and reports their sources; for more details see 
Appendix A.1.1.1. Using U.S. annual state-level data, a dynamic panel analysis between 
economic indicators and burglary rates is estimated. The empirical analysis covers the years 
of 1983 to 200914 for 50 states15, allowing for three complete business cycles to be 
examined.  
The dependent variable, burglary, is collected from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting 
Statistics (UCR), as issued by the US Department of Justice. A burglary is defined as: “the 
unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or theft” (FBI UCR, 2016). There is no need 
for use of force to gain entry for a crime to be classified as burglary. The analysis includes 
burglary offences as a rate per 100,000 state population.  
Further, we employ two economic indicators to approximate business cycles and test their 
link to burglary rates. First, weekly unemployment insurance (UI) compensation per 
unemployed recipient is used. It is a proxy for the number of beneficiaries, since not all 
individuals claiming unemployment compensation end-up receiving benefits – this is 
determined by the eligibility criteria set by each state. Both the amount of benefits paid out 
and the number of unemployed recipients is published by the Employment and Training 
Administration (ETA), part of the U.S. Department of Labor.  
Unemployment compensation aims to provide “temporary, partial wage replacement […] to 
involuntary unemployed individuals […]” (Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation, 1996). Further, according to Gabe and Whittaker (2012), reporting on behalf 
of the Congressional Research Service, UI payments aim to alleviate the poverty levels of 
individuals who receive them, particularly during or immediately after economic slumps. In 
                                                     
14 There is a twofold reasoning for choosing these years. First, state level data are unavailable for most of the 
explanatory variables in early 1980s. Second, we wanted to make sure that the sample captures three 
complete business cycles. Effectively, business cycles are defined from trough-to-trough, to allow for more 
recent data to be included in the dataset. That is, if instead peak-to-peak years are used, the latest data point 
available is year 2007 whereas by approximating business cycles by periods of trough, we are able to include 
data up to 2009.  
15 The District of Columbia is excluded as data were missing for many years.  
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addition, unemployment benefits are used as an economic stabiliser16 during recessionary 
periods.  
However, the US UI system has a unique structure17. Although it is a federal-state 
partnership, the UI system is mainly state funded18 with states having “a significant latitude 
to determine benefit standards” (Fischer, 2017). States oversee the administration of UI 
programs, set benefit eligibility rules and tax rates. Since different monetary and non-
monetary19 eligibility requirements are set by each state, benefit recipiency varies vastly 
between states, rendering national averages as misleading20 (Fisher, 2017; p.15). 
Fortunately, the panel data setting allows us to exploit these heterogeneities. 
On the other hand, the federal government has, primarily, a regulatory role as it provides 
standardised guidelines for UI implementation and administers the program. Nevertheless, 
these guidelines are only indicative as states are not compelled to follow them. For example, 
although the federal government recommends that the duration of UI is, at least, 26 weeks; 
only nine states follow this standard with the remaining varying UI duration based on 
previous work experience. Appendix A.1.1.3 presents the different durations offered by each 
state, between 1980 and 2010.  
We expect that higher unemployment compensation is negatively linked to burglary, as 
individuals who are at-the-margin of offending will be less financially motivated to commit 
burglaries.  
                                                     
16 Indicatively, during the Great Recession, it is estimated that the UI system, on average, generated $2 in 
economic activity for every dollar spent on UI benefits (Vroman, 2011). Part of this success is attributed to the 
system’s design to extend benefit duration, after federal action.  
17 For a more detailed description of the structure of UI system, see Bindler (2015) and Fischer (2017). 
18 Nevertheless, if a state system is insolvent, the federal government fund UI programs by lending states. 
Alternatively, states can seek finance in the bond market. Indicatively, during the Great Recession, 36 state 
trust funds became bankrupt with the federal government offering $7 billion worth of grants to the states 
which subsequently have been distributed to the unemployed, in an effort to provide adequate support, in the 
form of unemployment benefits and obtain economic stabilisation (Fisher, 2017).   
19 Monetary requirements include the earnings earned prior to unemployment and the base period which 
assesses earnings and work whereas non-monetary requirements consist of job search and availability.  
20 As explained in Section 1.4, we employ a few different methodological approaches to control for this 
heterogeneity in the analysis. Unemployment durations are used as external instruments for unemployment 
benefits, the regression is estimated using heteroskedastic robust errors while including state fixed effects in 
the model. Nevertheless, this heterogeneity reinforces the usefulness of a panel data setting as it allows for 
state-fixed variations across time.  
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Nevertheless, we acknowledge that due to the wide-range state variations in eligibility, 
many part-time workers21, who continuously work or individuals who are under-employed 
are discriminated against by the current UI program (Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation, 1996). Therefore, to effectively assess the impact of business cycles on 
burglary, we also need to account for other disadvantaged groups which do not necessarily 
experience unemployment (Cantor and Land, 2001).  
Thus, our model specification includes income maintenance benefits per $1k personal 
income as a second economic indicator. This measure aims to capture low-income earners 
who although they have a job, they may struggle financially, presumably lowering the 
opportunity cost of committing a financially motivated crime such as burglary. Income 
maintenance benefits consists of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), Additional Child Tax Credit, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP) benefits, family assistance, and other income maintenance benefits, 
including general assistance. The data are drawn from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA).  
Similar to unemployment benefits, income benefit payments intend to provide financial 
relief to disadvantaged groups of the population, reducing the likelihood of crime 
engagement motivated by economic difficulties. Both measures are adjusted for inflation 
and are used in the analysis as natural logarithms.  
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effects of unemployment 
compensation and income benefits on burglaries. Unemployment or under-employment 
translates into a loss of a stable income. Benefits paid out to these economically vulnerable 
groups help bridge the shortage of earnings created. Since theoretical economic frameworks 
predict that individuals engage in criminal activity when expected illegal payoffs exceed the 
expected gain from legal activities, we believe that these financial indicators are more 
appropriate in this type of analysis than economic factors (such as unemployment rates) as 
they better capture individual incentives.  
                                                     
21 In the US, part-time or low-income workers are often excluded from the UI benefit system. In 2016, 
President Obama, at the State of the Union Address suggested modernisation of the UI system by expanding 
coverage to this group, among other proposals (The White House, 2016). 
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To address concerns about variables being strongly correlated, leading to biased regression 
estimates, we perform correlation and multicollinearity tests which are presented in 
Appendix A.1.4. As shown, the results provide reassurance about the variables included in 
the model.  
Further, the model includes two law enforcement variables. To proxy police expenditure the 
total pay of full-time officers is divided by the number police officers. The data are obtained 
from the Annual Survey of Public Employment and Payroll, part of the Public Employment 
report series and published by US Census Bureau22.  State prison populations are 
approximated using imprisonment rates23. This measure is used as a proxy for the severity of 
punishment and it is estimated as the number of sentenced prisoners24, in each state, per 
100,000 US residents. The data are obtained from the National Prisoner Statistics Program, 
issued by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.  
Appendix A.1.3 presents the descriptive statistics.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
22 See, http://www.census.gov/govs/apes/index.html. To obtain data prior to 1992, we needed to contact the 
US Census Bureau to give us access to these historical data. No employment survey was conducted for 1996, 
since the base reporting period for measuring employment and payrolls was changed from October to March. 
This change became effective with the 1997 Census of Governments. Thus, the average number of police 
officers between 1995 and 1997 is used to fill in the gap for the missing data of 1996.   
23 The data are only disaggregated at the state level and not by type of offence. Although it would have been 
useful to know how many offenders have been incarcerated specifically for a burglary offence, we acknowledge 
that many criminals have been imprisoned for more than one offence. Thus, prison population calculations 
would have been magnified by the inclusion of individuals with multiple offences in different crime categories. 
24 Spending sentences longer than one year.  
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1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Model Specification 
To assess the relationship between burglaries and economic indicators, we estimate a 
dynamic model specification that links lagged burglary rate, unemployment and income 
maintenance benefits and relevant law enforcement variables. Thus, the empirical model is 
as follows:  
𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝐿𝑎𝑤𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑠𝑡 +  𝜏𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜖𝑠𝑡 
for s = {1, . . . ,50} and t = {1, . . . ,27}25 
𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑠𝑡 is the variable of interest for state 𝑠 in year 𝑡; 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑠𝑡−1 is the lagged 
burglary rate; 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡 denotes state-level unemployment and welfare benefits; 
𝐿𝑎𝑤𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑠𝑡 denotes two law enforcement variables – police officers’ pay, used as a proxy for 
police expenditure, and imprisonment rate, which captures the incapacitation and 
deterrence effects. The model also includes year (𝜏𝑡) and state (𝜇𝑠) specific fixed effects. 𝜇𝑠 
controls for time-invariant, state specific unobservable characteristics while 𝜏𝑡 accounts for 
common shocks that affect all states, such as those propagated through financial crises. 
Finally, 𝜖𝑠𝑡 is a time-varying unobservable idiosyncratic shock.  
The model specification includes a lagged dependent variable for two reasons. First, it 
captures crime persistence (Gould et al., 2002; Fajnzylber et al., 2002). That is, the crimes of 
yesterday are affecting the crimes of today. One of the main reasons is recidivism. Empirical 
research supports that prior crime engagement, increases the possibility of reoffending (Han 
et al., 2012) since ex-offenders are usually treated as such in the job market which in turn, 
lowers their legal labour opportunities and income. Second, accounting for crime persistence 
by using a dynamic specification is important as, it produces unbiased and consistent 
estimates (Bond, 2002). Also, according to Hale (1998) crime rates are affected over an 
                                                     
25 There are 27 years in total (1983-2009). The model is estimated on the whole sample period as well as by 
business cycle.  
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extensive period of time. That is, if economic hardships trigger increases in burglary rates, 
this effect will persist for more than the recessionary period26.  
A positive, statistically significant value of 𝛼 would support this dynamic setting. As 
demonstrated in Appendix A.1.5.2, we perform a simple first-order autoregressive model, 
AR(1), to examine crime persistence, as suggested by Blundell and Bond (2000) and Bond 
(2002). As shown in Table A.1.5.2.1, the burglary rate is highly persistent and thus, the use of 
a dynamic model specification is justified. 
The above model is estimated over the whole sample period, 1983 to 2009 and it is re-
estimated over the latest business cycle to examine whether burglary rates behave 
differently to changes in economic incentives across different periods. In turn, Section 1.4.2 
discusses the way in which the model is estimated.  
 
1.4.2 System GMM (SYS GMM)  
The dynamic panel data setting, the possibility of idiosyncratic shocks, and the potential 
endogeneity of economic indicators and law enforcement variables narrow our choices for a 
consistent estimator to examine the link between business cycles and burglary.  
Firstly, by construction, the unobserved state fixed-effect, 𝜇𝑠, is correlated with at least one 
of the regressors, 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑠𝑡−1. Effectively, an endogeneity problem arises. Using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) or Fixed Effects (FE) estimators to estimate equation (1), produces 
biased estimates since they fail to effectively control for this correlation.   
Secondly, economic indicators and criminal justice factors may be endogenous as well. For 
instance, higher unemployment rates may cause increases in crime whereas areas with high 
crime rates experience higher levels of unemployment. Wages can also be endogenous as it 
is highly likely that other factors – such as, education or parent’s background – are correlated 
with both crimes and economic determinants. For example, less educated individuals or 
people coming from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to earn lower wages 
                                                     
26 As shown in Table A.1.2.1, in the Appendix, on average, recessions last for one year.  
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(Freeman, 1991). This further suggests that these individuals may be in higher need of 
income support while being more susceptible to engage in criminal activities.  
Further, law enforcement variables might also be endogenous. For instance, we do not know 
in which way the causation runs between the number of police officers and crime (Witt et 
al., 1999; Machin and Meghir, 2004). On one hand, more officers can lead to more effective 
investigation and subsequently, less crime. On the other hand, higher crime rates call for 
more police staff.  
We strongly believe that not controlling for either or controlling for some potentially 
endogenous variables can still lead to biased estimates (Fajnzylber et al., 2002). In general, 
endogeneity arises either due to reverse causation between indicators and crime or due to 
omitted variable bias, or both (Field, 1990; Bindler, 2015). Not accounting for this possible 
endogeneity, produces biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. However, by 
controlling for endogeneity, the exogenous impact of these economic indicators on crime 
rates is isolated.  
Traditionally, empirical studies control for endogeneity by employing instrumental variable 
estimators27. However, as explained above, standard instrumental variable estimators are 
not suitable for this study due to the dynamic nature of the model. Thus, to address these 
challenges, the system GMM (SYS GMM) estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bond, 2002) is 
employed. This is the first empirical study, to our best knowledge, that examines the effect 
of business cycles on crime and treats both set of factors, economic indicators and criminal 
justice variables, as endogenous.   
                                                     
27 For example, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) instrument unemployment rates with Department of 
Defence (DOD) annual prime contract awards for each state and a state-specific measure of oil price shocks. 
However, their regressions also include an incarceration rate without addressing potential endogeneity 
concerns. Another study, Gould et al. (2002), uses state unemployment rates, income per capita and non-
college educated male weekly wages to examine the effect of changes on labour market opportunities on 
crime rates. Suspecting economic indicators being endogenous, they construct a Bartik instrument. The Bartik 
instrument averages national employment growth across industries using local industry employment shares as 
weights to produce a measure of local labour demand, which is not related to local labour supply. In other 
words, it isolates local labour demand changes. Nevertheless, their model also includes arrest rates, which are 
not controlled for endogeneity. Thus, it is possible that the estimated coefficients are biased. Other scholars 
account for the endogeneity of criminal justice factors but fail to control for the potential endogeneity of 
economic indicators and crime (Witt et al., 1999; Machin and Meghir, 2004). 
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SYS GMM allows to control for fixed effects and produces consistent and efficient estimates 
by addressing the inconsistency introduced by the dynamic setting (Nickell, 1981)28. The 
model jointly estimates first-differenced and level equations in a system. The estimator 
employs lagged levels to instrument equations in differences and uses lagged first-
differences as instruments for level equations29. Appendix A.1.5.1 discusses, in detail, the 
estimator’s specific characteristics. Also, Appendices A.1.5.2 and A.1.5.3 present various 
tests demonstrating that the set-out assumptions30 (Blundell and Bond, 2002) are satisfied 
and the use of the SYS GMM fits the purposes of this study while producing consistent and 
efficient estimates. 
Further, the SYS GMM enables us to control for any endogeneity issues by employing both 
internal and external instruments. The internal instrument set consists of lag values of 
endogenous variables, known as, GMM-type instruments. External instruments are also 
employed, i.e. they are not included as explanatory variables but rather they are used as IV-
type instruments. To our best knowledge, this is the first study to use the SYS GMM 
estimator by employing external instruments. Each type of instruments is explained in turn.  
The GMM-type instruments are simply a list of instruments containing internal lags. For 
burglary, 𝑡 − 3 and 𝑡 − 4 lags are included whereas for economic indicators and law 
enforcement variables, only lags dated 𝑡 − 3 are used. To test instrument validity and to 
obtain further evidence to support the model specification, the Arellano-Bond’s serial 
correlation test is used. Details are provided in Section 1.4.2.1.  
                                                     
28 Bond (2002) and Roodman (2009a, b) discuss in detail how system GMM deals with Nickell bias. 
29 Essentially, SYS GMM is an extension of the difference GMM (DIFF GMM), as it employs an additional level 
equation to estimate the model. That is, the DIFF GMM, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano 
and Bover (1995), estimates equation (1) in first-differences by using lagged levels as instruments for the 
potentially endogenous regressors. Appendix A.1.5.1 discusses, in detail, the differences between the two 
estimators. To determine which of the two estimators fits the analysis better, Blundell and Bond (2002) outline 
a set of assumptions. If satisfied, the parameter estimates produced using the SYS GMM are more consistent 
and efficient than the estimated coefficients of the DIFF GMM. Appendices 1.5.2 and A.1.5.3 showcase that the 
conditions are satisfied.  
30 In brief, the assumptions of the SYS GMM require that the series is highly persistent, in both levels and first-
differenced equations, while also being stationary in first-differences. To test for series persistence, Blundell 
and Bond (1998, 2000) and Bond (2002) suggest estimating simple first-order autocorrelation models, including 
year dummies, with all available lags; the results are presented in Appendix A.1.5.2. On the other hand, to test 
for series stationarity, we perform the Levin-Lin-Chu panel data unit root test. Appendix A.1.5.3 validates 
stationarity in first-differenced equations.  
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On the other hand, the external instrument set includes other economic indicators and 
sociodemographic characteristics that are expected to be related with the endogenous 
explanatory economic variables, and uncorrelated with the error term, 𝜖𝑠𝑡. In other words, 
these variables are not included in the model as explanatory variables but rather as 
instruments of the endogenous regressors.  
The external instrument list includes economic factors such as: Gross State Product (GSP), 
effective interest rate, loan-to-price ratio, House-Price-Index (HPI), disposable income per 
capita, average unemployment insurance (UI) duration, a dummy capturing whether the 
state has minimum wage legislation laws, personal tax revenue-to-GSP ratio, poverty and 
employment rates. A sociodemographic set of factors is also included. This contains median 
age, percentage of black population, and finally, a variable constructed to capture 
educational attainment. All variables are included at the state level. Appendix A.1.1.1 
presents, in detail, the definition of each factor.  
 
1.4.2.1 Instrument Validity and Specification Tests 
As advanced earlier, the efficiency of system GMM depends on the validity of instruments. 
Inclusion of ‘too many’ instruments (Roodman 2009) causes instrument proliferation which 
in turn, produces biased estimates31. Further, including numerous instruments might 
significantly weaken the power of specification tests such as, the Hansen or the difference-
in-Hansen tests, and thus, produce implausibly perfect p-values of 132 (Anderson and 
Sørenson, 1996; Roodman, 2006, 2009a, 2009b). The Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions assesses the overall validity of the instruments used whereas the difference-in-
Hansen test examines the validity of the additional instruments33 employed by the level 
equation (Blundell and Bond, 2000). The null hypothesis, of both tests, is that the model 
specification is correct.  
                                                     
31 Converging towards the biased estimates produced by the fixed-effect estimator.  
32 The statistic takes values between 0 and 1. Thus, a high p-value is regarded as a sign of validity of GMM 
estimation results (Roodman, 2009a). 
33 Compared to the DIFF GMM. 
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Accordingly, given the relatively modest cross-sectional dimension of our sample, we 
address our concerns of overfitting the model in two ways. Firstly, as advanced earlier, we 
limit the number of internal lags. Secondly, as suggested by Roodman (2009a, 2009b), the 
instrument list is collapsed34.  
Finally, to address concerns of autocorrelation in the model, rendering the instrument list 
invalid, we perform Arellano-Bond’s (AB) serial correlation test. The null hypothesis is that 
the error term, 𝜖𝑠𝑡, is not serially correlated. Failing to reject the null, provides support to 
the model specification. First-order autocorrelation is expected when including a lagged 
dependent variable in the model (Roodman, 2009b). If that is the case, the internal 
instrument list is valid only if lags are dated 𝑡 − 3 and longer.  
All three specification tests are reported after the estimated coefficients. Appendix A.1.5.4 
provides additional details on the instrument validity and specification tests performed.  
 
1.5 Results 
As discussed in the previous section, the empirical analysis utilises data between 1983 and 
2009 to estimate the model in equation (1). The results are presented in Table 1.1. Column 
(1) presents the estimated coefficients for the whole sample period; whereas columns (2) – 
(4) display the findings for the latest recession, using three different variations of the 
unemployment benefit variable.  
The AB autocorrelation tests show that there is serial autocorrelation of order 1 but not of 
order 235. This suggests that the internal instruments used are valid, and the instrument list 
correctly starts from 𝑡 − 3 while providing further support to our model specification. 
Instrument validity and structural model specification are also tested using the Hansen and 
difference-in-Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions. All tests verify the model’s correct 
                                                     
34 The collapse command produces an instrument list that consists of one instrument for each lag distance and 
instrumented variable. This option is available when using Roodman’s xtabond2 package in Stata.  
35 First-order serial correlation of the differenced residual is expected when the model includes a lag dependent 
variable; even if the error term, in levels, is serially uncorrelated (Roodman, 2009b). 
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specification and show that the additional instruments utilised by the SYS GMM are useful in 
the estimation. 
 
The lagged dependent variable is strongly statistically significant, as expected, in all model
estimations. This showcases that prior engagement in burglary offences leads to higher rates
of burglary36. This further demonstrates that, although the literature often neglects to
include a crime lag, accounting for crime dynamics is important when estimating the
relationship between economic conditions and crime. Also, the variable capturing the police
officers’ pay, used as a proxy for the probability of apprehension, has a negative effect on
burglary. Indicatively, a 10% increase in officer wages is expected to reduce burglaries by
1.6%.
                                                     
36 This is true across all model specifications, presented in columns (2) - (5). 
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From an economic perspective, the findings indicate that higher income benefits have a
negative effect on burglary rates, as expected. Specifically, column (1) shows that a 10%
increase in benefits, paid out to low-income individuals, leads to a 1.2% reduction in burglary
rates, significant at the 1 percent level. This translates into, approximately, 13,000 less
burglaries been committed for every 10% increase in income benefits.
However, the unemployment benefits variable has a positive coefficient, contrary to our 
expectations. Thus, we investigate this further. As during the Great Recession, the 
government decided to temporarily extend the duration of unemployment benefits, we 
restrict our sample period to the latest business cycle and the model is re-estimated. 
The results are presented in columns (2) through (4). Column (2) estimates the model using
the same model specification as column (1). Both economic indicators maintain their
significance with the remaining variables having the expected signs. The findings show that
the magnitude of the income benefits variable increases in size. Indicatively, during the
Great Recession, a 10% increase in income benefits led to a 3.4% decrease in burglary rate,
or, approximately, to 36,800 fewer burglaries.
Unemployment benefit payments also increase in magnitude during the latest business cycle 
and the coefficient still maintains its positive sign. As we find this odd, we try to interpret the 
results more carefully. The variable is a ratio of the total weekly unemployment benefits 
paid by states and the federal government to eligible recipients, divided by the number of 
total unemployed individuals. Thus, depending on the percentage change of the numerator 
and the denominator, the ratio can increase or decrease.  
Nevertheless, it is the duration of unemployment benefits that was extended, not the
amount of benefits paid. Also, the measure included in the model represents the weekly
benefit amount received by unemployed37. Thus, we are confident that the percentage
change of the denominator is larger, driving the ratio downwards. This could explain the
                                                     
37 One can argue that extending the duration of unemployment benefits suggests that the total benefit amount 
received while being unemployed will be higher. However, since our model includes weekly benefit payments, 
we manage to avoid this.  
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positive coefficient and further indicate that more unemployed individuals are linked to
higher burglary rates.
In other words, eligible recipients were given unemployment benefits for an extended 
duration, effectively implying that they remained unemployed for a prolonged period. This 
further suggests that their condition did not change and neither did their incentives as, on a 
weekly basis38, the amount of benefits received did not change. 
The literature provides tentative evidence to support this explanation. Hagedorn et al. 
(2015) analyse the effect of different maximum durations between states, as a result of the 
extended unemployment benefit duration. They find that, unintentionally, the benefit 
extension led to significant increases in unemployment duration and reduced employment 
creation. Further, Bradbury (2014) utilises individual level data from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) to examine the variations in duration of benefits, between 2005 and 2013. She 
finds that by extending benefits, individuals stayed unemployed longer, with non-
beneficiaries abandoning the labour force altogether.  
Bindler (2015) takes advantage of the quasi-experimental setting of unprecedented 
temporary benefit extensions, as a result of increased unemployment durations and exploits 
the relationship of unemployment duration and crime in the US, during the Great Recession. 
She finds that crime rates increased due to higher unemployment, driven by emergency 
benefit extensions. She further explains that, ceteris paribus, prolonged periods of 
unemployment lead to higher human capital deprivation and negative income effects, 
partially justifying higher tendencies of criminal engagement.  
In addition, consider two unemployed individuals, one receives benefits whereas the other is 
long-term unemployed with exhausted unemployment benefits. Although, both are out of 
employment, the latter individual is more disincentivised and faces lower opportunity costs 
and thus, more likely to engage in criminal activities.  
To examine this and evaluate whether it is, indeed, the increases in the number of long-term 
unemployed that drive the unemployment coefficient in column (2); we re-estimate our 
                                                     
38 In the U.S., unemployment benefits are paid weekly. 
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model using average weekly benefits per first payments39, i.e. per newly unemployed. The 
first-payment component refers to the reference year, not to first-time unemployed 
individuals. By restricting the number of beneficiaries to first-benefit payment unemployed 
individuals, we aim to capture increases in the number of individuals who are forced into 
unemployment due to the economic recessionary phase. The results are presented in 
column (3) of Table 1.1. Although, the positive sign remains, the coefficient is no longer 
significant. Income benefits are still negatively significantly related to burglary rates. These 
results corroborate our previous findings. Newly unemployed are less financially motivated 
to engage in criminal acts. 
Further, in column (4), we re-estimate the model by including the average annual 
unemployment benefit amount per newly unemployed. This allows us to examine if changes 
in the total amount of benefits received, during unemployment, affect burglary rates. The 
estimates show that this relationship is not significant. That is, just because unemployed 
individuals end up with a higher lump-sum than initially anticipated, i.e. when they became 
unemployed, due to the extension of benefit duration, it does not change the fact that they 
struggle financially at that moment in time. Particularly when the weekly benefit amount is 
lower than the expected relative returns of illegal activities. The longer they remain 
unemployed, the more likely they are to engage in criminal activities due to lower 
opportunity costs. Nevertheless, the findings from this model specification, still, 
demonstrate that increases in income benefits, decrease burglary rates.  
We acknowledge that it would have been interesting if we could isolate the effect of newly
and long-term unemployed on crime, by estimating the average benefits received by each
group. Unfortunately, we only have data on first-payments and total unemployment
numbers with no distinction been made between the amount of benefits paid out to each
group40. However, we perform further robustness checks that validate the aforementioned
conclusions and provide support for the model specification. These are discussed in the next
section.
                                                     
39 Figure A.1.1.2.3 in the Appendix demonstrates the growth rates of the weekly UI benefits.  
40 The numerator, in all measures, is the total amount of unemployment benefits paid to newly and long-term 
unemployed individuals.  
CHAPTER 1: BURGLARY RATES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
 
 
 
29 
1.6 Robustness Checks 
As a robustness check, we re-estimate the model by including a measure of income
inequality, at the state level, encompassing the entire income distribution. By including the
Gini coefficient, we hope to capture the overall economic injustice which might not be
accounted for when we only use the amount of benefits received by the unemployed and
the low-income earners, and measure how that affects burglaries. A wider gap of economic
injustice is expected to be associated with higher burglary rates.
This is based on sociological and economic theories which suggest that earnings inequality 
raises feelings of unfairness, prompting poorer individuals to reduce perceived income 
inequality by engaging in criminal activities (Runciman, 1966) whereas Wilson and Daly 
(1997) argue that high income inequality induces risk-seeking behaviour from people at the 
bottom of the income distribution. As advanced earlier, the economic perspective explains 
criminal engagement through economic incentives (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973) and 
suggests that criminal activity is an occupational choice which depends on the probability of 
apprehension. Thus, the economic theory predicts that more income inequality leads to 
higher crime rates. 
Although the findings provide further support to our main results, because the movements
in income inequality have no effect on burglary rates41, we do not present the estimation
results, but are available upon request.
 
 
 
                                                     
41 The insignificance of income inequality may be explained by looking at the overall trend of the Gini 
coefficient. As demonstrated in Figure A.1.1.2.6, there is a lot of variability throughout the business cycles.  
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Further, we compute two ex-ante forecasts to test how well the included regressors predict 
burglary trends. These are plotted against the actual burglary rates to assess the predictive 
capabilities of our model. 
The first ex-ante forecast simply saves the predicted values, after model estimation, and 
plots them against the actual rates of burglary. As shown in the Appendix A.1.6.1, the fitted 
values mirror the actual values quite well, providing support for the model specification and 
indicating that the variables included in the model explain well the depend variable.  
The second test is an ex-ante dynamic forecast. By compiling information from three 
sources: (1) the model, as presented in equation (1); (2) equations for each endogenous 
economic indicator as well as its identity42; and (3) exogenous variables; we are able to 
perform this dynamic forecast. Since we want to test how well our model predicts future 
trends in crime and we have information on the actual burglary crime trends, we fabricate 
an out-of-sample sample. In other words, we end the estimation-sample in 2009; meaning 
that all the above estimations are performed over the period of 1983 to 2009. By default, 
using prior values of the endogenous variables, as computed from the forecast procedure, 
forecasts for 2010 and following years are dynamic forecasts. Having this setting, allows us 
to compare these forecasted values against the actual burglary rates of 2010 to 2014.   
The model is estimated using the same specification as the one discussed in the empirical 
analysis. We still treat economic indicators as endogenous and thus, we create an 
instrumented equation for each one the factors by employing independent explanatory 
variables. The unemployment compensation equation is estimated using the log of average 
UI of newly unemployed as the dependent variable and with the contemporaneous 
percentage change of GSP per capita and the lag of disposable per capita and the average 
duration of UI compensation as the explanatory variables. To further address potential 
endogeneity issues between unemployment and the economic activity within the state, we 
instrument GSP growth using effective interest rate, loan-to-price ratio and House-Price-
Index (HPI). All three regressors are statistically significant and the coefficients’ signs are as 
                                                     
42 An identity is a non-stochastic equation that expresses an endogenous regressor as a function of other 
variables in the model.  
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expected: GSP growth is negatively related to unemployment benefits while disposable 
income and duration of unemployment have a positive relationship with unemployment.  
Further, we specify the income benefits equation in terms of the percentage change in 
benefits. We define income benefits as a function of its own first lag (positive) while also 
including a dummy capturing states having a minimum wage lower than the Federal 
minimum (negative), the growth in poverty rate (positive), the employment rate (negative), 
median age, the percentage of black population (positive), and the percentage of high-
school graduates (positive). Again, all variables are significant and the estimated coefficients’ 
signs are plausible. 
The last instrumented equation estimates the income inequality based on the percentage 
change of disposable income, the economic growth as captured by the GSP, the cost of living 
proxied by HPI, the labour share, changes in tax policy43 as captured by the log of personal 
tax revenue-to-GSP ratio and the median age44. Its coefficient estimates have plausible signs 
and significance.  
Finally, we define all the exogenous variables before estimating the dynamic forecasts of the 
model. The findings are presented in Appendix A.1.6.2. As shown, the model performs quite 
well and accurately captures the burglary crime trends for most states. These dynamic 
forecasts provide further support to the model specification and the empirical findings 
presented. 
  
 
                                                     
43 Higher taxes are expected to be linked negatively with income inequality. Indeed, the model estimates prove 
that.  
44 Younger populations are considered to be more unequal societies, i.e. experience higher income inequality, 
than older ones. Probably, this is due to lower earnings disparities among older individuals.  
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1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter estimates a dynamic panel data model to assess whether, and to what extent, 
business cycles affect the rate of burglary. The model is estimated using the SYS GMM 
estimator, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity and dynamic endogeneity. Both internal, 
i.e. lagged values, and external instruments are used to address potential endogeneity 
issues. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study to employ the SYS GMM 
estimator with external instruments. 
The analysis uses two economic indicators, a measure of unemployment benefits and 
supplemental benefits paid to low-income earners, to capture the economic motives of 
disadvantaged groups who, historically, have been characterised as more susceptible to 
engage in criminal activities due to economic distress.  
The empirical findings demonstrate that individuals can financially be motivated to commit 
crimes due to severe economic conditions which lower opportunity costs. The results are 
robust to different specifications and carry some noteworthy policy implications.  
In all model specifications, the coefficient of income benefits is significantly negatively
related to burglary rates. A 10% increase in income benefits leads to 1.2% decrease in
burglary rates. The results suggest that increases in income benefits, paid to various low-
income groups, can change the motives of people who are at-the-margin, leading to lower
crimes being committed. By re-estimating the model, during the latest business cycle, 2001-
2009, we find that the significance of the variable remains, and its magnitude almost triples
in size to 3.4%. As the Great Recession is the most severe economic downturn among the
three business cycles examined, the increasing elasticity leads us to believe that income
benefit increases are more effective when economic crises are stronger.
Nevertheless, unemployment benefits, contrary to our expectations, are found to have a 
positive relationship with burglary. A closer examination of the findings reveals that the ratio 
is driven by the number of long-term unemployed. That is, by exploiting an unprecedented 
temporary extension of the duration of unemployment benefit, during the Great Recession, 
we find that longer periods of unemployment increase burglary rates. 
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That is, longer spells of unemployment lead to higher expected returns to illegal activities as 
human capital depreciates and expected future legal payoffs are lower due to higher job 
competition. This conveys increased probabilities of crime engagement due to lower 
opportunity costs. This argument is in-line with the economic theory (Becker, 1968; Ehlrich, 
1973) and other empirical studies suggesting that increased unemployment rates are linked 
to higher crime rates especially, property crimes.   
Thus, the findings indicate that increasing benefits is a more effective mechanism to reduce 
countercyclical crime than providing support for an extended period, as by implementing 
such policies the condition of economic distress of disadvantaged groups is perpetuated. 
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Appendix A.1 
A.1.1 Sources and Data Description 
A.1.1.1 Data Definitions and Sources
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A.1.1.2 Variable Trends  
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A.1.1.3 Unemployment Insurance (UI) Benefit Duration 
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A.1.2 Descriptive Analysis 
Economic theory predicts that movements in economic activities are associated with 
changes in criminal behaviour. Specifically, for property crimes, as they are more likely 
motivated by financial incentives. This suggests that property crimes are countercyclical, 
indicating a higher growth rate during economic downturns. 
To assess whether this is true, we examine the relationship of burglary rates across business 
cycles (Cook and Zarkin, 1985; Paternoster and Bushway, 2001; Bushway et al., 2015) by 
performing a descriptive analysis, before empirically evaluating the relationship between the 
two. However, in contrast to the above papers, which only estimate the national association 
of the two, we estimate and compare burglary growth rates between expansionary and 
recessionary phases across all 51 states. 
Between 1973 and current date, the U.S. has experienced five complete business cycles45, as 
shown in Table A.1.2.1. The table provides data on U.S. business cycles expansions (trough-
to-peak) and contraction (peak-to-trough), as published by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER)46. Expansion is the period between the trough and the subsequent cyclical 
peak whereas contraction is the period between the previous peak and the trough of the 
current cycle. A complete business cycle is defined either from a peak-to-peak period or from 
trough-to-trough. As the data are annual, the start and the end of each business cycle is 
approximated.  
According to Table A.1.2.1, the average contraction lasts for 12 months47, while the average 
expansion lasts for about 71 months; leading to an average business cycle of 82 months. 
Appendix A.1.1.2 graphically represents the trends in burglary rates over the latest business 
                                                     
45 Data have been collected for 1980-1982 as well. However, due to the business cycle being too small (only 2 
years), the estimates produced are not reliable and thus, excluded from this study. Serial correlation tests, used 
to determine from what lag the instrument list should start, indicate an autocorrelation of order 1. This calls for 
lag 3 and further to be used as instruments, which is no viable option.  
46 NBER has a long-lasting reputation on publishing data on business cycles. It approximates recessions by 
identifying “a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few 
months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail 
sales” (NBER, 2018).  
47 Thus, a 1-year growth rate should be sufficient to capture the recessionary period and then compared 
against the rate of growth during economic expansion.  
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cycles. 
 
This descriptive approach treats each cycle as an independent event which takes place under 
unique conditions. This context allows us to assess the impact of the post-peak economic 
recession on burglary by estimating the average annual burglary rate of growth over the 
period of expansion. Then, this is compared against the percentage change during economic 
downsizing, i.e. between peak and the subsequent trough. As shown in the table above, on 
average, the recessionary period lasts one year.  
Therefore, to determine whether burglary rates increase or decrease during recessions, we 
estimate the percentage change of the year after the last peak. For instance, as shown in 
Table A.1.2.1, BC1 is between 1975 and 198048. The trough-to-peak interval which 
represents the expansionary phase of the business cycle is between 1975 and 1979; whereas 
the recessionary period is the next year, 1980. A burglary growth rate during expansion 
(trough-to-peak) that is higher than the rate of growth in the subsequent recessionary year 
(peak-to-trough) indicates a procyclical crime; giving support to the opportunity theory. On 
                                                     
48 Trough-to-trough period is between March 1975 and July 1980.  
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the other hand, burglary is countercyclical when the average rate of growth, during years of 
economic expansion, is lower than the growth rate of post-peak slump. This provides 
support to the motivational theory; which states that recessions increase the rate at which 
crimes are committed (Paternoster and Bushway, 2001).  
As demonstrated in Table A.1.2.2, over the latest five business cycles (BC1 – BC5), burglary 
increases more during contractions than periods of economic growth; confirming that 
burglary rate is countercyclical.  
The statistics indicate that burglary grew during periods of economic distress in all but one 
business cycle, BC2 (1980-1982). This post-war recession is a well-known exception which 
has puzzled scholars over the years (Cook and Zarkin, 1985). Since this business cycle is not 
included in the empirical analysis, due to data availability, we do not try to explain these 
paradoxical results.  
Nevertheless, Table A.1.2.2 demonstrates that burglary grew 11%, on average, during BC1; 
around 2% during BC3 and BC4; and approximately 1% over the latest recession, BC5. This 
also showcases the overall burglary drop over recent years, as displayed in Appendix A.1.1.2.  
By performing a state-level descriptive analysis, we can examine the wide-ranging effects of 
business cycles across states which are not visible when compounded in a national figure. 
For instance, during BC1, states such as Alabama, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey 
and New York; experienced increases over 17% whereas the national average was only 11%. 
The analysis indicates that 49 out of 51 states experienced increases in burglary rates during 
that year of economic distress. Over BC3, the lowest rate of growth was 0.03% in Wisconsin, 
whereas Missouri had the highest rate, 17.59%. Overall, the recession increases the rate at 
which burglaries are committed in 34 states. Over BC4 and BC5, the same pattern is 
observed. However, in the latest recession, BC5, only 25 states experienced higher growth 
rates during the economic slump than the expansionary period – this is examined more 
closely in the empirical analysis.  
In general, the findings demonstrate the usefulness of a panel data setting since it unveils 
differences across years and states that national studies fail to capture. Also, the estimations 
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provide evidence for the motivational theory and reinforce the notion that burglary is a 
countercyclical type of crime.  
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Nevertheless, although this descriptive analysis compares relative magnitudes of growth 
rates across business cycles and states; it does not provide an explanation as to why burglary 
rates are, on average, increasing during economic slumps (Cook and Zarkin, 1985). In other 
words, it only demonstrates whether and how changes in economic conditions affect 
burglary.  
Thus, as demonstrated in Section 1.4, we attempt to empirically determine why this is the 
case by employing variables which capture economic incentives and control for law 
enforcement factors that could be linked to crime engagement. As explained in Section 1.3, 
we believe these variables are able to capture changes in economic opportunities and 
extensively, changes in an individual’s behaviour, as induced by movements in economic 
conditions. This enables us to empirically assess the relationship between business cycles 
and burglary rates.  
 
A.1.3 Summary Statistics 
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A.1.4 Correlation and Multicollinearity Tests 
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A.1.5 Econometric Modelling 
A.1.5.1 System GMM vs Difference GMM 
A dynamic panel data setting is adopted to capture relationship between economic 
indicators and crime. Estimating a dynamic model, by construction, causes endogeneity 
issues since 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑡−1 and 𝜇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 are correlated. In effect, conventional linear panel-
data estimators, such as OLS49 and within-groups/fixed effects50, yield biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates51 since they fail to effectively control for this correlation.  
Thus, to avoid the above problems, we consider two estimators, the difference (DIFF GMM) 
and the system GMM (SYS GMM). Both DIFF GMM and SYS GMM account for the 
endogeneity in the model by instrumenting 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑡−1 and other potentially endogenous 
regressors with variables uncorrelated with area specific fixed effects. The DIFF GMM 
eliminates unobserved specific effects by taking first-differences. It corrects for endogeneity 
in difference equations by using lagged levels as instruments. The SYS GMM incorporates an 
additional set of equations, in levels, using lagged first-differences as instruments while using 
lagged levels to instrument equations in first-differences. That is, the model is estimated in 
both differences and levels, jointly, in a system. 
Assuming (1) the error terms are serially uncorrelated and (2) regressors are endogenous; 
the DIFF GMM estimator follows these two moment conditions:  
𝐸[𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑡−𝜏(𝛥𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑡)] = 0      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜏 = 2. . , 𝑡 − 1,   𝑡 = 3, … , 𝑇               (2) 
𝐸[𝐱𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑡−𝜏(𝛥𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑡)] = 0              𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜏 = 2. . , 𝑡 − 1,   𝑡 = 3, … , 𝑇                (3) 
Thus, provided that there is no AR(1), valid instruments for the equations in first-differences 
are lags dated 𝑡 − 2 and earlier. Although asymptotically consistent, the DIFF GMM is not 
                                                     
49 OLS does not control for the correlation between the error term and lagged dependent variable, giving rise 
to Nickell bias. This correlation between a regressor and the error violates an important assumption necessary 
for the consistency of OLS (Fajnzylber et al., 2002a, 2002b; Roodman, 2009b, Blundell and Bond, 2000). 
50 Although, the within-groups estimator tries to correct for this endogeneity by transforming the data to 
remove unobserved area fixed effects; the estimator is inconsistent when 𝑇 is fixed and does not eliminate 
Nickell bias entirely (Nickell, 1981; Bond, 2002; Drukker, 2008; Roodman, 2009b). 
51 The estimates reflect the short-term relationships between the dependent variable and the regressors 
(Levitt, 2001). 
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ideal within the context of this study. Firstly, it eliminates area-specific fixed effects, making 
it impossible to examine the cross-state relationship between crime and economic 
indicators. Further, the difference GMM estimator suffers from large finite sample biases 
when lagged instruments are only weakly correlated with and contain little information 
about the endogenous variables in first-differences equations. Weak instruments are more 
prevalent when the dependent variable and the regressors are highly persistent, series are 
stationary and when 𝑇 is small (Blundell and Bond, 2000)52. 
SYS GMM reinforces these issues by exploiting more moment conditions and adds a levels 
equation to complement the DIFF GMM. It requires for the series to be highly persistent and 
stationary, i.e. 𝐸(𝛥𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑡 𝜇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒) = 0 and (𝛥𝐱𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑡 𝜇𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒) = 0 . Thus, it requires the 
first-differences of both the dependent and independent variables to be uncorrelated with 
the area-specific effects. Correlation between the levels of the corresponding variables and 
the state fixed effects is allowed. Effectively, lagged differences are valid instruments for the 
levels equations (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Assuming endogenous 
regressors, the SYS GMM estimator is more informative and its performance improves 
compared to DIFF GMM53 when the below additional moment conditions hold:  
𝐸[𝛥𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑡−𝜏(𝜀𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑡)] = 0                      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜏 = 1,   𝑡 = 3, … , 𝑇               (4) 
𝐸[Δ𝐱𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑡−𝜏(𝜀𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑡)] = 0                              𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜏 = 1,   𝑡 = 3, … , 𝑇                (5) 
Hence, at 𝑡 − 2, SYS GMM estimator combines equations in first-differences and levels into a 
joint system. It utilises lagged levels of endogenous variables as instruments for equations in 
differences while using lagged differences to instrument endogenous variables in level 
equations.  
This methodology allows to investigate both short- and long-run dynamics of the link 
between crime rates and economic factors. To determine which of the two estimators fits 
the analysis better, Blundell and Bond (2002) outline a set of assumptions. If satisfied, the 
                                                     
52 Appendices A.1.5.2 and A.1.5.3 perform various empirical tests to examine and prove that SYS GMM is the 
most appropriate estimator for this study.  
53 Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrate that the system GMM has better asymptotic and finite sample 
properties compared to difference GMM.  
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parameter estimates produced by the SYS GMM are more consistent and efficient than the 
estimated coefficients of DIFF GMM. The assumptions of SYS GMM require that the series is 
highly persistent, in both levels and first-differenced equations, while also being stationary, 
in differences. These are examined in Appendices A.1.5.2 and A.1.5.3. 
 
A.1.5.2 Testing for Series Persistency  
To test for series persistence, Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) and Bond (2002) suggest 
estimating simple first-order autocorrelation models, including year dummies, with all 
available lags. As shown in Table A.1.5.2.1, the burglary rate, the economic indicators and 
the law enforcement variables considered are highly persistent54. This provides the first 
indication that lagged levels, employed by DIFF GMM, are weak instruments for the 
differenced equations. In other words, under this framework, DIFF GMM produces biased 
estimates. 
As advanced in Appendix A.1.5.1, SYS GMM is more efficient than DIFF GMM when the series 
is highly persistent and stationary (in differences). Using simple AR(1) models including year 
dummies55 can test for the series persistence. As shown in the tables below, crime rates are 
highly persistent. The results reassure us that the first assumption made by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) for the use of SYS GMM, that the series is persistent, is satisfied.  
As shown, for the crime rates, both DIFF and SYS GMM estimators suggest a very high 
autoregressive coefficient, above 0.9 for most crime rates. Since there is an autocorrelation 
of order 1, the preferred specification is to use SYS GMM including instruments from the 
third lag and further. Further, arrest rates, young male population, population density show 
a high persistence, around 0.9. Unemployment compensation and police expenses are also 
persistent but to a lesser degree; around 0.6. Imprisonment rates have a coefficient of 0.7 
(SYS, t-2 columns). Notice that they do not experience autocorrelation of order 1 and thus, 
the instrument set can include instruments from second lag and further.  
                                                     
54 Various estimators (OLS, within-groups, and variations of DIFF and SYS GMM) are employed to compare 
series persistence across different estimation frameworks. 
55 Accounting for heteroskedastic robust errors; allowing observations to be independent across states 
(clusters) but not necessarily within states.  
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A.1.5.3 Testing for Series Stationarity 
The second condition set-out by Blundell and Bond (1998)56 for the use of SYS GMM 
supports that increases in efficiency can be achieved when also the stationarity requirement 
is also satisfied (Yasar, 2003; Roodman, 2009a, 2009b). This assumption concerns the 
additional equation in levels. In other words, it requires that the dependent variable, in 
differences, is stationarity. The differences of the right-hand side variables should not be 
correlated with the state-specific effect, i.e. no unit root in differences. Correlation between 
the levels of the corresponding variables and the state fixed effects is allowed, i.e. can have 
unit root in levels. Essentially, this test ascertains that when the explanatory variable is 
stationary, lagged differences are valid instruments for equations in levels. 
To test for the series stationarity, the Levin-Lin-Chu panel-data unit root test57 is 
implemented. As shown in Table A.1.5.3.1, the series are stationary in first-differences and 
have a unit root in levels.  
Therefore, SYS GMM is our preferred estimator as both tests, of autocorrelation and 
stationarity, provide tentative evidence to support the usefulness of the additional set of 
internal instruments utilised by the level equation.  
 
 
 
                                                     
56 First outlined by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
57 The Im-Pesaran-Shin test is also used and confirms the results.  
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A.1.5.4 Specification Tests and Instrument Validity 
As advanced earlier, the efficiency of system GMM depends on the validity of instruments. 
Inclusion of ‘too many’ instruments (Roodman 2009) causes instrument proliferation. In 
other words, overfitting the model produces biased estimates58. In effect, we perform 
various specifications tests to ensure instrument validity and correct model specification.  
Further, including numerous instruments might significantly weaken the power of 
specification tests, such as the Hansen test, by producing implausibly perfect p-values of 159 
(Anderson and Sørenson, 1996; Roodman, 2006, 2009a, 2009b). The Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions assesses the overall validity of the instruments used. Specifically, it 
determines whether the structural model specification is correct. Therefore, if the test 
reports p-values of 1, the simplest and most effective way60 to avoid instrument 
proliferation is to limit the number of lags used as instruments.  
Further, using the difference-in-Hansen test, we examine the validity of the additional 
instruments (compared to the DIFF GMM) of the level equation when estimating the model 
using SYS GMM (Blundell and Bond, 2000). The null hypothesis denotes that the subset of 
instruments employed by the level equations is valid (Roodman, 2009a). However, as with 
the Hansen test, a high instrument count, weakens the test. 
Accordingly, given the relatively modest cross-sectional dimension of our sample, we 
address our concerns of overfitting the model in two ways. Firstly, as advanced earlier, we 
limit the number of internal lags. Secondly, as suggested by Roodman (2009a, 2009b), the 
instrument list is collapsed61.  
Finally, to address concerns of autocorrelation in the model, rendering the instrument list 
invalid, we perform Arellano-Bond’s (AB) serial correlation test (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
The test ensures instrument validity by examining whether the idiosyncratic disturbance 
                                                     
58 Converging towards the biased estimates produced by the fixed-effect estimator.  
59 The statistic takes values between 0 and 1. Thus, a high p-value is regarded as a sign of validity of GMM 
estimation results (Roodman, 2009a). 
60 For an extensive discussion of all the methods that can be used to avoid instrument proliferation, read 
Roodman (2009a).  
61 The collapse command produces an instrument list that consists of one instrument for each lag distance and 
instrumented variable. This method makes the instrument count linear in the time dimension of the sample. 
This option is available when using Roodman’s xtabond2 package in Stata.  
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term, 𝜖𝑠𝑡, is serially uncorrelated. The null hypothesis is that the error term, 𝜖𝑠𝑡, is not 
serially correlated. Failing to reject the null, provides support to the model specification. 
Nevertheless, first-order serial correlation of the differenced residual is common when the 
model examined is dynamic (Roodman, 2009b; Fajnzylber et al., 2002). Fortunately, this 
endogeneity issue can be easily resolved by restricting the number of lags that are included 
in each instrument set. That is, if the above argument is true, i.e. there is AR(1) but not 
AR(2), in order to instrument the lagged dependent variable, the instrument matrix in 
differences must include instruments from the third lag, 𝛥𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡−3, onwards; while the 
instrument set in levels should include instruments from lag 1, 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡−2 , and further. If the 
test indicates the existence of second-order autocorrelation, then even longer lags should be 
considered (Roodman, 2009b).   
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A.1.6 Forecasting 
A.1.6.1 Ex-ante Forecasting 
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A.1.6.2 Ex-ante Dynamic Forecasting 
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Abstract 
This study utilises a panel data of violent and property crime rates, for a sample of 42 Police 
Force Areas (PFA) in England and Wales for the period 2000/01-2011/12, to analyse the 
impact of economic indicators on crime rates. A novel Gini coefficient is constructed using 
micro-level data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) to examine the 
relationship between crimes and income inequality. Jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) and income 
support (IS) benefits are used to capture specific disadvantaged groups of the population 
who, traditionally, have been linked to crimes. A panel-data based system GMM 
methodology is used to estimate a dynamic model of crime rates. This estimator controls for 
unobserved PFA-specific effects, the existence of measurement error and the joint 
endogeneity of lagged crime rates, economic indicators and law enforcement variables. The 
results show that economic indicators affect crime both in the short- and long-run with the 
impact being stronger in the long-run. Property crimes and robbery are affected by changes 
in JSA, IS and income inequality, whereas violence against person and sexual offences are 
not but are affected by law enforcement factors. 
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Glossary G.2 
The following list of abbreviations, used in Chapter 2, is expanded below. 
 
SYS GMM System GMM estimator 
DIFF GMM Difference GMM estimator 
GMM Generalised Method of Moments estimator 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares estimator 
ONS Office for National Statistics 
PFA Police Force Area 
ASHE Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
JSA Jobseeker’s Allowance 
IS Income Support benefits 
LA Local Authority 
AB Arellano-Bond serial autocorrelation test 
IV Instrument Variable estimator 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
CHAPTER 2: THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ON CRIME IN E&W  
 
 
62 
2.1 Introduction 
Economic models of crime have analysed how financial incentives affect criminal 
participation. According to Becker (1968)62, individuals are utility maximisers and decide 
whether to engage in a criminal activity by assessing the returns from available legal and 
illegal opportunities. The returns to legitimate activities are determined by expected returns 
to a specific activity. Likewise, returns to illegitimate activities depend on the expected crime 
payoff but they are discounted by the probability of apprehension and incapacitation63 
(Draca and Machin, 2015).  
In this framework, deteriorating labour market opportunities can shift an individual’s 
incentives to engage in legitimate or illegitimate acts (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2002; 
Machin and Meghir, 2004). Further, the literature supports the view that this theoretical 
framework better describes property crime offenders, as property crime is usually assumed 
to be financially motivated64. 
This chapter empirically reassesses the link between economic incentives and crime. Our 
contribution is threefold. First, the crime-inequality link is re-examined using a Gini 
coefficient from micro-level data. Second, specific economic indicators are used to capture 
the incentives of the unemployed and economically disadvantaged. Third, we explicitly 
account both for the dynamic nature of crime and potential endogeneity of all regressors in 
the crime equation. We discuss each in turn.  
We re-examine the relationship between crime and income inequality by constructing a 
novel Gini coefficient, at the police force area (PFA) level, using micro-level data. To our 
knowledge this is the first study to include an income inequality measure estimated at the 
same level of disaggregation as the level at which crime statistics are available. Most studies 
                                                     
62 Becker’s (1968) analysis is abundantly generic in terms of what constitutes a criminal activity. It is not limited 
to violent and property felonies but rather, covers all different kinds of violations; such as traffic violations, tax 
evasion, white-collar crimes and others. 
63 An apprehended offender loses access to legal earnings and thereafter, faces labour market discrimination 
upon release and expects lower wages. 
64 The empirical findings confirming this are discussed, in detail, in Section 2.2.  
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use a national65 figure to control for income inequality (Han et al., 2013) or an inter-quantile 
measure (Witt et al., 1998; 1999, Wu and Wu, 2012). A national measure of inequality is 
restrictive and limiting in a panel setting since it does not allow for earnings inequality to be 
measured at the area level. The alternative measure, the inter-quantile wage rate, is 
estimated as the ratio of the upper to lower quantiles. Although it can be measured at the 
PFA level66, it omits the middle class since, it accounts only for the upper and lower quantiles 
of the wage distribution, meaning that the largest proportion of the population is left out.  
Second, this paper makes use of unemployment and income benefits which we argue affect 
the individual’s decision on whether to engage in a criminal act rather than just the state of 
unemployment alone67. That is, the income received during a period of unemployment, 
through unemployment benefits, (or, through government benefit payments even for the 
employed, if a low-earner) is what crucially affects the costs and earnings of an individual’s 
decision-making, not the state of unemployment or poverty per se.  
These monetary transfers are important since they may act as an income effect (Bindler, 
2017) while also influencing the ratio of returns-to-work against the returns-out-of-work 
(Machin and Meghir, 2004). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine 
the effect of benefits on crime68, in England and Wales.  
We consider two income measures when a person is unemployed or under-employed: 
jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) and income support (IS), respectively. JSA is paid to individuals 
who are actively seeking employment whereas IS is a governmental support subsidy paid to 
low-earners. These two income measures are both significant determinants of crime and 
better measures of legal alternatives than the unemployment rate – particularly for 
                                                     
65 Captures the whole United Kingdom: Scotland and Northern Ireland included; while the studies focus on 
England and Wales.  
66 By aggregating wage-quantiles from the Local Authority (LA) level. 
67 Unemployment does affect this calculation, as demonstrated by previous research, but empirical evidence 
documents a weak link between unemployment and crime, despite the intuitive appeal of the above 
theoretical argument. On the other hand, research examining the relationship between crime and earnings 
reports stronger effects, presumably because changes in returns to activities better capture shifts in 
individual’s incentives (Grogger, 1998; Gould et al., 2002; Machin and Meghir, 2004).  
68 Field (1990) is the only other paper that, in our knowledge, tests the link between unemployment benefits 
(by also including unemployment rates in the same regression) and crime. However, it is a national time-series 
study between 1950 and 1987. Although 12 crime categories were considered, unemployment benefits are 
only included in the regressions for thefts from vehicle and violence against the person. See Appendix A.2.3 for 
more information.  
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individuals who are struggling economically, forcing them on the brink of offending.  
Thus, higher benefit payments may reduce crime by altering the relative incentives linked to 
engaging in legal and illegal activities, during the un(der)employment state. Further, since 
violent behaviour may be less akin to economic incentives, property crimes and robbery are 
expected to have a stronger link to economic indicators compared to violent crimes (Raphael 
and Winter-Ebmer, 2002; Machin and Meghir, 2004; Malby et al., 2012).  
Finally, the literature often overlooks three important issues when examining the link 
between economic activity and crime. First, the dynamic nature of crime is generally 
ignored69. Crime trends tend to be persistent over time indicating that crime depends to a 
large extent on its past realisations. A lagged crime variable is included in the model to 
account for crime’s persistence. Second, many of the explanatory variables are possibly 
endogenous, i.e. it is likely that crime itself affects these regressors. Thus, estimating this 
dynamic model using OLS or fixed-effects estimators produces biased estimates. Third, 
unobserved area-specific fixed effects, such as measurement error, might be correlated with 
both the dependent variable and the regressors (Fajnzylber et al., 2002b; Yasar, 2003) 
leading to biased estimates. 
To account for these issues, an instrumental variable procedure used in dynamic panel data 
models, known as the system GMM (SYS GMM) estimator, is employed. The SYS GMM 
utilises the dynamic properties of the data to generate valid instruments by employing 
internal lags. The model estimates, jointly, equations in levels and in first-differences. The 
levels equations employ lagged instruments in differences whereas the equations in first-
differences use lagged levels as instruments. Thus, the joint endogeneity of all three 
economic indicators – JSA, IS and Gini coefficient – and law enforcement variables is 
addressed by instrumenting70 current values with past realisations that are not correlated 
with the error term. Further, although the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable is 
expected to mitigate any concerns of omitted-variable bias, we also include observable 
                                                     
69 Exceptions are Machin and Meghir (2004) and Han et al. (2013). 
70 The validity of the instrument list is tested using Sargan/Hansen tests and Arellano-Bond test for serial 
autocorrelation. The null hypothesis, in both tests, gives support to the model specification.  
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demographic variables and control for area and year fixed effects. Finally, this methodology 
allows one to estimate both the short- and long-run effects of economic indicators on crime.  
The findings indicate significant effects of economic indicators on crime, both in the short-
run and the long-run. In fact, the percentage changes in the long-run are emphatically larger
in magnitude. Specifically, the findings indicate that, in the short-run, a 10% increase in
unemployment benefits leads to a 1.2%, 0.7% and 1.2% reduction in robberies, burglaries
and thefts, respectively. These effects become significantly stronger in the long-run for all
three crimes with the reductions amounting to 3.2%, 2.5% and 2.2%, respectively. Income
support payments are only significant for robbery, as a 10% increase can lead to a 12% and
32% decrease in the short- and long-term. Furthermore, income inequality has a significant
positive effect on robbery and thefts. A 10% higher income inequality can lead to 0.9% and
0.6% increase in robbery and thefts, respectively. Both effects significantly increase in size
over the long-run, to 2.4% and 1.1%, respectively.
In line with the literature, we find that violent crimes are not affected by economic 
incentives. In contrast, violent crimes are more responsive, both in short- and long-run, to 
changes in the probabilities of apprehension and sentence lengths than property crimes71. 
Higher detection rates lead to lower violent crimes whereas longer sentences increase the 
occurrences of violence against the person. Additionally, robberies and burglaries (in the 
long-run) are positively affected by the number of police officers. Finally, in line with earlier 
research, a larger proportion of male juveniles has a positive effect on robberies, burglaries 
(in the long-run) and thefts.  
The structure of the rest of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2, a detailed literature 
review, with particular emphasis on empirical work undertaken for England and Wales, is 
presented. In Section 2.3 the data, covering 42 police force areas in England and Wales, are 
described while in Section 2.4 the empirical methodology used is discussed. In Section 2.5, 
                                                     
71 Probability of apprehension is proxied by including a ratio of PFA residents to police officers and 
detection/conviction rates. Average sentence lengths capture the severity of punishment, once apprehended. 
Correlation and multicollinearity tests indicate that inclusion of both variables does not create any issues. See 
Appendix A.2.4.2. 
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the empirical findings are presented while Section 2.6 discusses the findings from various 
robustness checks. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.  
2.2 Literature Review 
Economic models72 consider crime as an alternative to legal job markets. That is, the 
propensity of criminal engagement depends on changes in the expected costs and benefits 
of illegitimate activity and the expected returns from legal job opportunities (Becker, 1968; 
Ehrlich, 1973, 1981, 1996; Levitt, 1997). In general, these economic models look at crime and 
employment in a similar way; both require time and generate income (Ehrlich, 1973; Witte 
and Tauchen, 1994; Grogger, 1998; Fagan and Feeeman, 1999; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 
2002; Machin and Meghir, 2004; Lochner, 2004, 2010).  
The paper of Becker (1968)73 is the first formal effort of an economist explaining why 
individuals engage in criminal activities. He posits crime as a rational decision74. Under this 
framework, direct and indirect economic incentives affect crime participation. The direct 
effect comes in two complementary forms, alternatives and returns to crime, whereas 
deterrence and incapacitation effects can indirectly affect crime participation (Draca and 
Machin, 2015). The direct effect accrues from a cost-benefit assessment of participating in 
legal or illegal activities. The model demonstrates that individuals compare their payoffs 
gained in each activity to decide whether it is beneficial to commit a crime.  
However, if they do engage in criminal activities, offenders face a probability of 
apprehension – that is the indirect effect. Consequently, earnings coming from illegal 
activities are discounted by the risk of getting caught and the possible sanctions that may 
                                                     
72 For comprehensive reviews, see Chiricos (1987), Freeman, 1999, Webster and Kingston (2014), Draca and 
Machin (2015). 
73 Ehrlich (1973, 1981, 1996), Block and Heineke (1975), Levitt (1997), Lochner (2004, 2010) Machin and Meghir 
(2004) and others have extended and/or modified this model. Pyle (1995) reviews the evolution of economic 
theory in detail. 
74 Although, this notion – of the criminal following rational judgements – may strike many as unrealistic, as 
Friedman (1953) suggests, it is the theory’s predictive power that matters, not the realism of its assumptions. 
Empirical research has demonstrated that criminals respond to changes in opportunity costs, in the likelihood 
of apprehension, the severity of punishment and other related factors; effectively giving support to this 
economic approach. Thus, whether a criminal’s actions are rationally calculated or not, the underlying 
proposition is that economic circumstances induce criminal behaviour. This argument is intuitively appealing 
and based on the premise that individuals respond to incentives (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2002).  
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follow. The model predicts that if the expected net gains exceed the expected net costs of 
offending, then the individual will commit a crime. In general, the model forecasts that, 
ceteris paribus, higher illegal payoffs increase crime whereas higher legal returns, higher 
probability of apprehension and stricter sanctions, if caught, lead to less crimes.  
2.2.1 Crime and Unemployment 
To measure the direct effect on crime, researchers considered various economic indicators 
and, by far the most widely used is the unemployment rate (Field, 1990, p.7). This is 
unsurprising since, both crime and unemployment have traditionally been at the top of the 
political agenda in an effort to keep them as low as possible (Hale and Sabbagh, 1991; 
Carmichael and Ward, 2000). Despite researchers studying extensively the link between 
these two variables, the evidence is mixed or as Freedman (1999) describes it “fragile, at 
best”. Nevertheless, comprehensive literature reviews (Chiricos, 1987; Freeman, 1983, 1999; 
Freeman and Rodgers, 1999; Papps and Winkleman, 2000; and Draca and Machin, 2015) 
indicate that more often than not there is a positive link between unemployment and crime. 
A summary of the literature for England and Wales can be found in Appendix A.2.3.  
Older studies use national-level time-series data75. However, this level of aggregation is 
uninformative since it does not allow for the useful local variation of unemployment and 
crime to be explored (Chiricos, 1987; Pyle and Deadman, 1994; Levitt, 2001; Draca and 
Machin, 2015). Recent empirical studies are more refined and allow for area-specific 
variation by using panel data76. Yet, several of these studies focus on the contemporaneous 
link between unemployment and crime.  However, the lagged relationship is also important 
as the impact of unemployment on crime may not be instantaneous. 
A popular view, first described by Cantor and Land (1985)77, is that unemployment causes 
two opposing effects: the motivational and opportunity effects. On the one hand, the 
                                                     
75 Wolpin (1978), Field (1990), Hale and Sabbagh (1991), Pyle and Deadman (1994, 1997), Hale (1998) and 
Saridakis (2011).  
76 Witt et al. (1998, 1999), Carmichael and Ward (2000, 2001), Machin and Meghir (2004), Wu and Wu (2012) 
and Han et al. (2013). 
77 The study of Cantor and Land (1985) has been criticised by many scholars (Hale and Sabbagh, 1991; Hale, 
1991; Greenberg, 2001). Among them, Hale and Sabbagh (1991), using annual time-series for the UK (1949-
1987), demonstrate that the Cantor and Land’s model is susceptible to changes in model specification and 
technique specification. They support that there is a strong positive link between unemployment and crime.  
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motivational effect is in-line with the predictions made by economic models (Carmichael and 
Ward, 2000). Due to high unemployment, legal labour market opportunities are limited and 
the opportunity cost of engaging in criminal activity is lower (Willis, 1983; Witt et al., 1999). 
Thus, the motivational effect predicts a positive relationship between unemployment and 
crime (Hale and Sabbagh, 1991; Witt et al., 1998, 1999; Carmichael and Ward, 2000, 2001).  
On the other hand, the opportunity effect, predicts a negative link between the two. When 
unemployment is high; fewer goods are circulated and consumed in the economy and 
consequently, there is less to steal (Field, 1990; Witt et al., 1999; Winter, 2008). In addition, 
higher levels of unemployment imply that more people stay at home; protecting themselves 
(due to a lower possibility of encountering an offender) and their belongings. This is also 
known as the guardianship effect.  
The interaction of these two opposing effects may explain why the net effect of 
unemployment on crime is found to be ambiguous (Pyle and Deadman, 1994; Witt et al. 
1999). While national time-series studies tend to find the weakest link between the two 
(Chiricos, 1987), empirical analyses conducted at lower levels of aggregation find a stronger 
positive relationship between unemployment and (property) crime. Witt et al. (1998, 1999) 
examine the relationship between male unemployment rate and property crime and find a 
strong positive link between the two. Carmichael and Ward (2000, 2001) test the 
relationship between adult and young unemployment with crime and find that the latter has 
a stronger motivational effect. However, using more recent data (2002-2007), Wu and Wu 
(2012) fail to find a significant link between male unemployment and crimes78, for both 
property and violent. 
Unemployment rate is a rather problematic economic indicator and the mixed evidence may 
be occurring for a number of reasons. By definition, unemployment excludes individuals who 
are labour force inactive as well as under-employed79 (Chiricos, 1987; Greenberg, 2001; 
Andresen, 2013). The former relates to individuals who either stopped looking for a job or 
who never searched for full-time employment because they never believed they could 
secure one. Effectively, unemployment rates do not accurately account for the real level of 
                                                     
78 However, they do find a correlation between crime and fraud (negative), drug and other crimes (positive).  
79 For instance, individuals on non-discretionary part-time employment.  
CHAPTER 2: THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ON CRIME IN E&W  
 
 
69 
unemployment (Arvanites and Defina, 2006). Further, it excludes low-wage earners and thus 
overlooks that work and crime are not mutually exclusive (Machin and Meghir, 2004). That 
is, crimes can be committed by both the employed and the unemployed, despite differences 
in incentives. Inevitably, many researchers turned their focus into other economic indicators 
such as wages and poverty rates. The findings indicate an unambiguous relationship 
between economic variables and crime.  
2.2.2 Crime and Earnings  
Machin and Meghir (2004) suggest that wages are better suited to capture economic 
incentives and utilise a panel of 42 police force areas in England and Wales, between 1975 
and 1996, to prove it. They use two wage measures, based on the 25th percentile of the 
overall and retail trade wage distribution, to explore the relationship between property 
crime and the labour market opportunities for less skilled workers. Their findings predict a 
strong link between low-wage workers and property crime (crime against the property and 
vehicle crimes).  
Other researchers study the link between income inequality and crime. The theory predicts 
that, the greater income inequality, the higher the incentive to commit a crime since 
individuals at the bottom-end of the distribution experience lower opportunity costs, in 
terms of earnings and conviction. Witt et al. (1998, 1999) define wage inequality as the ratio 
of the 90th to 10th decile of manual male gross weekly earnings. They find that increases in 
relative wages reduce property crimes. Likewise, Wu and Wu (2012) define income 
inequality as the ratio of the 10th to 90th percentile of male wage for 10 regions in England 
and Wales between 2002-2007. Using random effects, they find evidence to support that 
property crimes (robbery included) – which are more likely to be affected by economic 
incentives – and male income inequality are positively related. Saridakis (2011) tests the 
long-run relationship between poverty rate and violent crimes in England and Wales. He 
finds that a positive relationship exists only for aggravated assault.  
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2.3 Data Description 
A dynamic panel model for England and Wales is estimated using data collected from various 
sources. The panel dataset is disaggregated at 4280 Police Force Areas (PFAs) between 
2000/01 to 2011/12. Appendix A.2.1.1 summarises the definitions, the sources, and the 
disaggregation level of each variable and explains how each factor is constructed. 
Five different categories of violent and property crimes are examined. Violent crimes include 
violence against the person, sexual offences and robbery whereas property crimes cover 
burglary and thefts. Crimes are in per capita terms, i.e. measured as the number of recorded 
crimes per 1,000 PFA residents. The annual data are obtained from Home Office. 
Unemployment benefits per unemployed are measured by dividing JSA expenditure by the 
number of JSA recipients whereas low-income benefits are calculated by dividing the total 
weekly IS payments by the number of IS claimants. The latter variable aims to account for 
low-wage earners, not captured by the unemployment benefits variable. For both variables, 
the data are obtained from the Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Tables, published by the 
Department for Work and Pensions, and are estimated at the PFA level. For more details 
about these variables, see Appendices 2.1.2 and 2.1.3.  
The study also uses a Gini coefficient, constructed specifically at the PFA level, using 
individual level data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). Appendix A.2.1.4 
provides more details on how this variable is constructed. 
The advantages of this constructed inequality index are the following. Firstly, it is a full-
information measure since it considers all parts of the population distribution. Secondly, it 
facilitates a direct comparison between populations at the PFA level, irrespective of their 
sizes. As shown in Figure 2.1, income inequality varies quite considerably across PFAs. By 
using a national figure, all of this variation will not be accounted for in the empirical model. 
Hence, compared to the alternatives, this measure better represents the income inequality 
within society.  
                                                     
80 The financial district of London, reported as the City of London, is excluded from the analysis due to its 
unique heterogeneity and the low resident population causing crime rates to inflate.  
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As mentioned earlier, criminals respond to changes in their income. JSA and IS payments, 
can affect the opportunity cost of committing a crime, as for many un(under)employed 
might be the only source of legal income. Additionally, by including a measure of income 
inequality, we are able to capture a wide range of disadvantaged groups. As explained 
above, in England and Wales, Income Support benefits are given to specific low-income 
groups of the population. In effect, individuals who are low-income earners but do not fill 
the programme’s threshold criteria, are left out from the analysis. Thus, we hope that these 
excluded groups are picked up by the constructed Gini coefficient, as it captures the income 
inequality prevailing in each PFA.  
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We expect that increases in income and unemployment benefits will negatively affect 
financially motivated crimes. On the other hand, increases in the Gini coefficient indicate 
increases in income inequality which effectively imply that the distribution of income 
widens. Thus, the opportunity costs of poorer people are lower. That is, low-income earners 
have a lower opportunity cost of participating in an illegitimate activity and have less to lose, 
in terms of earnings obtained from legal activities (e.g. wages). Correlation and 
multicollinearity tests81 confirm that inclusion of these three economic indicators is 
appropriate. The results are presented in Appendix A.2.4.2.  
The model also accounts for law enforcement factors. The baseline model includes a ratio of 
population per police officer – an indicator of police’s strength – and detection rates82 – a 
percentage measure of recorded offences that have been ‘cleared-up’ by the police. Data for 
the former are obtained from the yearly publication of Police Statistics, issued by the 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) whereas data for the latter 
are obtained from the Criminal Statistics, part of the annual Home Office Statistical Bulletin.  
Alternative measures, include conviction rates (ratio of the number of sentenced offenders 
to recorded crimes) and the average length of custodial sentence (determinate custody 
sentence divided by the total months spend in custody). Both variables were provided by the 
Ministry of Justice, part of the Justice Statistics Analytical Services.  
Our preferred specification also controls for young male population83, aged 15-24 years old. 
The data are obtained from Nomis where Mid-Year Population Estimates by age and sex are 
published. Young males are expected to have a positive relationship with crime rates.  
Alternately, to test for the robustness of the results, population density (dividing the area, in 
hectares, by 1,000 resident population) and educational attainment (as a percentage of 
                                                     
81 Correlation and multicollinearity tests for thefts is represented, but similar results are obtained when using 
different crime rates.  
82 This variable is available by type of offence. Vehicle detection rates are not available. Thus, thefts detection 
rates are used; since vehicle detections are included in there.   
83 Empirical research finds that young men have lower risk aversion and are more likely to commit crimes than 
any other group of the population; since the opportunity cost of committing crime is lower for younger 
individuals than adults, in terms of lost earnings and incapacitation. Youth usually receive more lenient prison 
sentences (Levitt, 1998a) while earning lower wages in the legal labour market (Reuter et al., 1990; Freeman, 
1999; Levitt and Lochner, 2001). 
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working age population with NVQ4+84 qualifications) are also used. Population density data 
are obtained from Police Statistics, published by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance 
and Accountancy (CIPFA) whereas data on education are collected from the Labour Force 
Survey for the period of 1997 to 2003 and from the Annual Population Survey for 2004 to 
2014. Both surveys are published by Nomis. Data on young males and education attainment 
are available at the LAs and are aggregated up to the PFA level. 
All variables included in the regressions are in natural logarithms, except for the Gini 
coefficient which is multiplied by 100 to obtain percentage changes since, it ranges between 
0 and 1. Appendix A.2.4.1 provides summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis.  
 
2.4 Empirical Methodology 
2.4.1 Modelling Issues and Estimation Method 
The estimation method chosen enables one to control for various estimation problems that 
many empirical studies suffer from. Firstly, the effect of unobserved variables that mainly 
vary across PFAs but not much over time is being controlled for by including area-specific 
fixed effects (Fajnzylber et al., 2002b; Yasar, 2003). Secondly, we consider that past crime 
itself is a significant determinant of criminal behaviour. Empirical findings document crime’s 
persistence85: the crimes of yesterday are affecting the crimes of today (Fajnzylber et al., 
2002b; Hale, 1998 p.694). As Witt et al., (1999) explain, people participating in crime have 
the tendency “to continue in it even after the circumstances that led them to turn to crime 
have changed”. In general, prior engagement in criminal acts, can positively affect 
reoffending86.  
Secondly, the model specification controls for the joint endogeneity of the economic 
indicators and criminal justice factors. The endogeneity arises either due to reverse 
                                                     
84 National Vocational Qualification.  
85 The coefficient of lagged crime rates from our AR(1) tests, reinforces that finding; see Appendix 2.5.2. 
86 This is also known as recidivism.  
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causation between these indicators and crime rates or due to omitted variable bias, or both 
(Field, 1990; Bindler, 2017). By not accounting for this possible endogeneity, biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates may be produced. However, by correcting for this joint 
endogeneity, the exogenous impact of these economic indicators on crime rates is isolated.  
Generally, scholars acknowledge and control for the potential endogeneity of law 
enforcement variables, such as deterrent and incapacitation effects but neglect to address 
the endogeneity of economic indicators when estimating their models. From the 
aforementioned papers testing the link of economic variables on crime in England and 
Wales, none takes into consideration the bi-causality of these variables (see Appendix 2.3). 
Some researchers, such as Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 200187 and Gould et al., 200288, 
acknowledge the potential endogeneity and, using instruments, they control for it. However, 
they fail to do so for law enforcement variables. Others, such as Machin and Meghir (2004) 
and Witt et al. (1999), account for endogeneity of law enforcement variables but do not 
control for the possible endogeneity of economic indicators. Not controlling for either, or 
controlling for some endogenous variables can, still, lead to biased estimates89 (Fajnzylber et 
al., 2002b). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study examining the link between 
economic incentives and crime, in England and Wales that treats economic indicators as 
endogenous. 
To address the above issues and to explore short- and long-run dynamics between economic 
indicators and crime, the instrumental variable (IV) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
of Blundell and Bond (1998), known as the system GMM (SYS GMM), is employed. This 
estimation method is an extension to the difference GMM (DIFF GMM) developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995).  
                                                     
87 Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) instrument unemployment rates with Department of Defence (DOD) 
annual prime contract awards for each state and a state-specific measure of oil price shocks. In their 
regressions, they also include an incarceration rate without addressing potential endogeneity concerns. 
88 Gould et al. (2002) use state unemployment rates, income per capita and non-college educated male weekly 
wages. Suspecting economic indicators being endogenous, they construct a Bartik instrument. The Bartik 
instrument averages national employment growth across industries using local industry employment shares as 
weights to produce a measure of local labour demand, which is not related to local labour supply. In other 
words, it isolates local labour demand changes. However, their model also includes arrest rates, which are not 
control for endogeneity and might be a source of bias. 
89 Depending on the sign of the reverse causality, their effects on crime rates would be over or under estimated. 
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The SYS GMM exploits the dynamic properties of the data to generate appropriate 
instrumental variables by using exogenous internal lags as instruments90 (Fajnzylber et al., 
2002b). The model estimates first-differenced and level equations jointly in a system. The 
estimator employs lagged levels to instrument equations in differences and uses lagged first-
differences as instruments for level equations. The model allows to use instruments dated 
𝑡 − 2 (𝑡 − 1) and earlier for equations in levels (first-differences), provided there is no serial 
autocorrelation of order 1. If AR(1) exists then, the instrument list should include longer lags 
to be valid. Appendix 2.5.1 presents the econometric modelling in more detail.  
SYS GMM is more efficient than DIFF GMM when the series is highly persistent (overall) and 
stationary (in differences). The dataset is examined to determine whether the series for 
crime, economic indicators and criminal justice variables are persistent. To test for series 
persistence, simple first-order autocorrelation models including year dummies91 are 
estimated. As shown in the tables of Appendix A.2.5.2, crime rates are highly persistent 
across all estimators. This suggests that lagged levels provide weak instruments for the 
differenced equations, i.e. DIFF GMM suffers from large sample bias92.  
Blundell and Bond (1998) show93 that efficiency can be increased when series are also 
stationary (Yasar, 2003; Roodman, 2009a, 2009b). This additional assumption gives rise to 
the level equations. Thus, when the explanatory variables are stationary, lagged differences 
are valid instruments for equations in levels. To test for series stationarity, the Levin-Lin-Chu 
panel-data unit root test94 is implemented. As shown in Appendix A.2.5.2, the series are 
stationary in first-differences and have a unit root in levels.  
Thus, both tests indicate that the series is persistent and stationary. As a result, in the 
context of this study, the use of SYS GMM is more appropriate than DIFF GMM since it 
provides more efficient and consistent estimates.  
                                                     
90 Internal lags are used because this approach assumes that no good external instruments – correlated with 
the regressor but uncorrelated with the source of endogeneity – exist outside the immediate dataset. 
Nevertheless, the estimator allows for the inclusion of external instruments (Roodman, 2009b).  
91 Accounting for heteroskedastic robust errors; allowing observations to be independent across states 
(clusters) but not necessarily within states.  
92 When series are highly persistent, and T is small, the bias becomes more severe (Yasar, 2003).  
93 First outlined by Arellano and Bover (1995).  
94 The Im-Pesaran-Shin test is also used and confirms the results.  
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Nevertheless, the consistency of the coefficient estimates depends on the validity of 
instruments used. Inclusion of too many instruments, known as instrument proliferation 
(Roodman, 2009a, 2009b), can produce biased estimates. Thus, we perform various 
specification tests – as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (2000) – to verify whether the instruments used are valid95. These are 
presented in Appendices A.2.5.2 and A.2.5.3. 
 
2.4.2 Model Specification 
The equation below is based on Becker’s (1968) economic model of crime. The theoretical 
framework predicts that engagement in criminal activity is contingent on the earnings 
obtained through legal activities, their incentives and factors associated with the likelihood 
of arrest and length of punishment. These are captured by the inclusion of economic and law 
enforcement variables. The following linear dynamic model specification is estimated using 
SYS GMM96:  
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐿𝑎𝑤𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡 + 𝛿𝐶𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜇𝑃𝐹𝐴 + 𝜖𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡      (1) 
where 𝑒𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑃𝐹𝐴 + 𝜖𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡 , for 𝑃𝐹𝐴 =  {1, . . . ,42} and 𝑡 =  {1, . . . ,13} 
where 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡 is the crime rate in each PFA in year 𝑡; 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡−1 is the lagged crime 
rate; 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡 represents a set of economic indicators (that is, JSA, IS and Gini 
coefficient); 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡 includes law enforcement variables; 𝛿𝐶𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡 is a set of 
demographic controls; 𝜏𝑡 is a vector of year dummies; 𝑒𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡 is the cross-section error term 
which captures two effects: (1) 𝜇𝑃𝐹𝐴, the unobserved time-invariant PFA-specific effects and 
(2) 𝜖𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡, the time-varying unobservable idiosyncratic error.  
The explanatory variables in the preferred model specification are: the lagged crime rate, 
the average JSA per unemployed, the average weekly IS received per claimant, the Gini 
                                                     
95 As shown in Section 2.5.1 and Appendix A.2.5.2, the tests indicate autocorrelation of order 1; which is 
expected. Therefore, for the instrument list to be valid we use instruments dated 𝑡 − 3 and earlier in our 
preferred specification.  
96 The dynamic model is also estimated using OLS, within-groups estimator and difference GMM in order to 
compare and contrast the empirical findings reached by each.  
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coefficient, the population per police officer, detection rates, the average sentence length 
and the percentage of young males (15-24 year olds). All variables, except for young male 
population, are treated as endogenous in the empirical analysis.  
 
2.5 Results  
2.5.1 System GMM Estimation  
As advanced earlier, all preliminary tests for series stationarity and persistence, serial 
autocorrelation and instrument validity, indicate that the SYS GMM is the preferred 
estimator. Appendix A.2.5.4 estimates the empirical model using various estimation 
methods: OLS, within-groups, DIFF and SYS GMM to examine if different estimators provide 
different outcomes. As demonstrated SYS GMM performs better in this framework.  
The model specifications presented below treat as endogenous the lagged dependent 
variable, economic indicators and law enforcement variables. The instrument list starts from 
lags dated 𝑡 − 3, for the equations in levels. The findings are reported in Tables 2.1 through 
2.5. Model alterations are presented alongside the preferred specification, which is reported 
in column (3), to examine the consistency of the parameter estimates.  
In all tables, column (1) estimates the lagged dependent variable along with only one 
economic indicator, the JSA per unemployed, and all three law enforcement variables. In 
column (2), the baseline model is presented – IS pay and Gini coefficient are added to the 
model. Column (3), our preferred specification, also includes young male population. 
Alternatively, column (4) incorporates an education variable in the model. Column (5) 
includes both. In column (6) the population density is added to the baseline model. Finally, 
column (7) estimates the model using conviction rates instead of detection rates.  
All estimations point towards a highly significant effect of the lagged crime variable; 
signifying crime’s persistence both over the short- and long-run, and also captures peer 
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effects (Machin and Meghir, 2004). The coefficient of lagged dependent variable is higher for 
property crimes – burglary and thefts. 
The estimation results presented in Tables 2.1, indicate that violence against the person is
negatively affected by detection rates while showing a strongly significant positive effect on
sentence length. The magnitude of both coefficients is persistent throughout all estimations.
These findings imply that violent offenders are discouraged by the possibility of
apprehension whereas longer spells of imprisonment lead to more violent crimes been
committed. In fact, the model predicts that a 10% increase in detection rates, decreases
violent crimes by, approximately, 2.7% and 6.6% in the short- and long-run, respectively. In
other words, by detecting, on average, 5 more violent crimes, 400 and 978 less offences are
to be committed in the short- and long-term, respectively. On the other hand, 10% longer
sentences can increase violent crimes by more than 7.1% in the short-run, with the effect
becoming even larger, around 17.4%, in the long-run. That is, 1 more year in prison leads to
more than 1,000 more violent crimes been committed in the short-run and 2,500 more in
the long-run.
The results reported in Table 2.2, show that sexual offenders are also likely to respond to the
threat of apprehension. Again, this finding is consistent across all model specifications. By
increasing detection rates by 10%, sexual offences are reduced by 2.3% (approximately
equal to 30 cases) in the short-run whereas, in the long-run, the impact more than triples in
size, 7.5% (approximately, 90 less sexual offences). As both violence against the person and
sexual offences are more violent-oriented, economic indicators do not affect these two
types of crime, as expected. This in line with the literature (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer,
2001; Levitt, 1996, 1997; Malby et al., 2012; Wu and Wu, 2012).
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Table 2.1: Violence against the Person, Regression Estimates using System GMM, 2000/01-2011/12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Violence,t-1 0.62*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.60*** 0.62***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
rJSA per unemployed 0.03 0.00 0.00 =0.01 =0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
rAv.Weekly IS =0.71 =0.67 =0.72 =0.68 =0.71 =0.75
(0.75) (0.81) (0.78) (0.84) (0.75) (0.77)
Gini Coeff(x100) =0.02 =0.02 0.00 =0.01 =0.02 =0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Pop per Officer 0.09 =0.08 =0.09 =0.07 =0.08 =0.09 =0.03
(0.21) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.28) (0.31)
Violence Det.Rate =0.27 =0.27 * =0.27 * =0.28 * =0.28 * =0.27 *
(0.18) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14)
Av.Violence Sent.Length 0.83** 0.72** 0.71*** 0.74*** 0.73*** 0.72** 0.85**
(0.35) (0.27) (0.25) (0.27) (0.25) (0.27) (0.35)
Violence Sent.Rate =0.06
(0.13)
Males,15-24 =0.07 =0.09 0.12
(0.33) (0.34) (0.42)
Education =0.18 =0.18
(0.14) (0.14)
Pop Density 0.00
(0.04)
Obs 462 462 462 462 462 462 462
No of Instr 26 32 33 33 34 33 33
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) p-value 0.17 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.15
Sargan 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.67
Hansen 0.72 0.76 0.73 0.85 0.83 0.76 0.85
Diff-in-Hansen all 0.95 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83
α 1.60 1.47 1.46 1.44 1.44 1.47 1.64
p-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04
βJSA 0.08 0.00 0.00 =0.03 =0.03 0.00 0.00
p-value 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.86 0.99 0.99
βISpay =1.74 =1.65 =1.77 =1.67 =1.74 =1.99
p-value 0.33 0.39 0.34 0.40 0.33 0.29
βGini =0.04 =0.04 =0.01 =0.01 =0.04 =0.02
p-value 0.49 0.50 0.90 0.87 0.53 0.81
γPop.per.Off 0.23 =0.20 =0.21 =0.16 =0.19 =0.21 =0.07
p-value 0.68 0.74 0.72 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.93
γDet.Rate =0.71 =0.67 =0.66 =0.68 =0.68 =0.67
p-value 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.04
γSent.Length 2.16 1.76 1.74 1.81 1.80 1.77 2.23
p-value 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.10
γSent.Rate =0.15
p-value 0.62
δMales =0.17 =0.21 0.32
p-value 0.84 0.80 0.77
δEduc =0.44 =0.45
p-value 0.18 0.18
δPopDen 0.01
p-value 0.94
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All equations include a full set of set of PFA specific effects and yearly dummies. Sample period 2000/01-2011/12 for 42 PFAs.
The equations are estimated using one-step system GMM. The reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Column (1) estimates the lagged dependent variable with only 1 economic indicator, the JSA per unemployed, and all three law
enforcement variables. Column (2) estimates the baseline model, by adding IS pay and the Gini coefficient. Column (3) presents
the preferred model specification which also includes a variable capturing young male population. Alternatively, column (4)
includes an education variable in the model. Column (5) includes both whereas column (6) includes the population density to the
baseline model. Finally, column (7) estimates the model using conviction rates instead of detection rates. Also, for the
first-differenced equations, the instrument list includes lags dated t-3 to t-4 ; as there is serial autocorrelation of order 1 in the
model. All variables are in natural logs, except for the Gini coefficient which is multiplied by 100.
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Table 2.2: Sexual Offences, Regression Estimates using System GMM, 2000/01-2011/12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sexual offences,t-1 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.70*** 0.67*** 0.70*** 0.67*** 0.63***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
rJSA per unemployed 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
rAv.Weekly IS 0.29 0.37 0.33 0.41 0.34 0.36
(0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.52)
Gini Coeff(x100) 0.00 =0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 =0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Pop per Officer =0.14 =0.14 =0.21 =0.1 =0.17 =0.22 =0.22
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.14)
Sexual Det.Rate =0.36 *** =0.24 ** =0.23 * =0.26 ** =0.25 ** =0.22 *
(0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Av.Sexual Sent.Length 0.19 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 =0.12
(0.18) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Sexual Sent.Rate =0.29 ***
(0.09)
Males,15-24 =0.22 =0.23 =0.05
(0.28) (0.28) (0.29)
Education =0.16 =0.14
(0.12) (0.11)
Pop Density 0.03
(0.03)
Obs 462 462 462 462 462 462 462
No of Instr 26 32 33 33 34 33 33
AR(1) p-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) p-value 0.37 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.41
Sargan 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.10
Hansen 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
Diff-in-Hansen all 0.14 0.29 0.17 0.40 0.14 0.21 0.05
α 1.98 2.00 2.30 1.99 2.33 2.01 1.72
p-value 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.02
βJSA 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.16
p-value 0.76 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.50
βISpay 0.88 1.22 0.99 1.37 1.04 0.98
p-value 0.53 0.45 0.48 0.42 0.46 0.47
βGini =0.01 =0.02 0.00 =0.01 0.01 =0.06
p-value 0.76 0.63 0.99 0.81 0.88 0.20
γPop.per.Off =0.40 =0.42 =0.68 =0.29 =0.57 =0.65 =0.59
p-value 0.28 0.28 0.22 0.47 0.30 0.27 0.18
γDet.Rate =1.08 =0.73 =0.75 =0.79 =0.82 =0.67
p-value 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.10
γSent.Length 0.58 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.05 =0.34
p-value 0.24 0.83 0.79 0.75 0.71 0.88 0.30
γSent.Rate =0.79
p-value 0.00
δMales =0.72 =0.77 =0.14
p-value 0.51 0.49 0.87
δEduc =0.47 =0.47
p-value 0.14 0.14
δPopDen 0.09
p-value 0.37
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All equations include a full set of set of PFA specific effects and yearly dummies. Sample period 2000/01-2011/12 for 42 PFAs.
The equations are estimated using one-step system GMM. The reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Column (1) estimates the lagged dependent variable with only 1 economic indicator, the JSA per unemployed, and all three law
enforcement variables. Column (2) estimates the baseline model, by adding IS pay and the Gini coefficient. Column (3) presents
the preferred model specification which also includes a variable capturing young male population. Alternatively, column (4)
includes an education variable in the model. Column (5) includes both whereas column (6) includes the population density to the
baseline model. Finally, column (7) estimates the model using conviction rates instead of detection rates. Also, for the
first-differenced equations, the instrument list includes lags dated t-3 to t-4 ; as there is serial autocorrelation of order 1 in the
model. All variables are in natural logs, except for the Gini coefficient which is multiplied by 100.
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In contrast, the findings, presented in Table 2.3, indicate that economic incentives can affect
robberies. The Gini coefficient, as expected, has a significantly positive effect on robberies.
In the short-run, a 10% higher income inequality can potentially increase robberies by 0.9%
whereas in the long-run the effect more than doubles in size to 2.4%. Although, in the short-
run, only the model specification in column (3) predicts JSA benefits to be significantly
negatively related to robbery rates, in the long run, most specifications (columns 3-6)
indicate a significant relationship between the two. A 10% increase in JSA payments
decreases robberies by 1.2% in the short-run and by 3.2% in the long-run. In other words, by
increasing the weekly unemployment benefits amounts by a little more than £3, 11 less
robberies are committed in the short-run and 29 in the long-run. IS pay is also shown to be
negatively linked to robbery rates. Indicatively, by increasing weekly income benefits by,
approximately, £7, this translates into 108 less robberies in the short-term and 283 in the
long-term.
Further, the proportion of PFA population to police officers affects negatively the rate of
robberies committed. Although there is some research supporting this negative effect
between police officers and crime (Wills, 1983; Bradford, 2011), this is against our
expectations. Thus, we consider this finding as counterintuitive and difficult to explain.
Finally, in accordance to the literature, the findings show that the proportion of young male
individuals is positively linked to robbery rates. In fact, a 10% increase in male population
aged between 15 to 24, increases robberies by 16.1% in the short-run, with the effect
becoming more imminent in the long-run, 42%.
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Table 2.3: Robbery, Regression Estimates using System GMM, 2000/01-2011/12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Robbery,t-1 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.62*** 0.68*** 0.64*** 0.61*** 0.72***
(0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
rJSA per unemployed =0.06 =0.10 =0.12 * =0.10 =0.10 =0.08 =0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
rAv.Weekly IS =0.78 =1.21 * =0.70 =1.06 * =0.85 =1.01 *
(0.56) (0.63) (0.54) (0.59) (0.57) (0.60)
Gini Coeff(x100) 0.07*** 0.09** 0.07** 0.07* 0.05** 0.09**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Pop per Officer =0.57 =0.67 ** =0.52 * =0.59 * =0.44 =0.33 =0.60 **
(0.40) (0.33) (0.30) (0.32) (0.28) (0.33) (0.26)
Robbery Det.Rate =0.10 =0.18 =0.38 =0.23 =0.40 * =0.21
(0.39) (0.28) (0.24) (0.27) (0.23) (0.24)
Av.Robbery Sent.Length 0.01 0.00 0.02 =0.01 0.00 =0.02 =0.15
(0.29) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.22) (0.24)
Robbery Sent.Rate =0.17
(0.19)
Males,15-24 1.61*** 1.44** 0.96*
(0.57) (0.55) (0.48)
Education =0.17 =0.07
(0.21) (0.18)
Pop Density =0.19 ***
(0.07)
Obs 462 462 462 462 462 462 462
No of Instr 26 32 33 33 34 33 33
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) p-value 0.78 0.87 0.91 0.99 0.81 0.94 0.63
Sargan 0.06 0.23 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.41 0.06
Hansen 0.13 0.21 0.36 0.19 0.21 0.35 0.08
Diff-in-Hansen all 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.09 0.34 0.02
α 2.21 2.07 1.62 2.10 1.76 1.57 2.51
p-value 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
βJSA =0.19 =0.32 =0.32 =0.31 =0.29 =0.20 =0.26
p-value 0.22 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.12
βISpay =2.40 =3.17 =2.16 =2.92 =2.19 =3.55
p-value 0.21 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.13 0.13
βGini 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.14 0.30
p-value 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.04
γPop.per.Off =1.84 =2.07 =1.36 =1.83 =1.22 =0.85 =2.12
p-value 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.29 0.02
γDet.Rate =0.32 =0.54 =1.00 =0.72 =1.11 =0.53
p-value 0.79 0.46 0.05 0.28 0.02 0.32
γSent.Length 0.05 0.01 0.04 =0.03 =0.01 =0.06 =0.54
p-value 0.96 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.92 0.53
γSent.Rate =0.60
p-value 0.28
δMales 4.20 3.97 3.38
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.02
δEduc =0.53 =0.19
p-value 0.40 0.69
δPopDen =0.50
p-value 0.00
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All equations include a full set of set of PFA specific effects and yearly dummies. Sample period 2000/01-2011/12 for 42 PFAs.
The equations are estimated using one-step system GMM. The reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Column (1) estimates the lagged dependent variable with only 1 economic indicator, the JSA per unemployed, and all three law
enforcement variables. Column (2) estimates the baseline model, by adding IS pay and the Gini coefficient. Column (3) presents
the preferred model specification which also includes a variable capturing young male population. Alternatively, column (4)
includes an education variable in the model. Column (5) includes both whereas column (6) includes the population density to the
baseline model. Finally, column (7) estimates the model using conviction rates instead of detection rates. Also, for the
first-differenced equations, the instrument list includes lags dated t-3 to t-4 ; as there is serial autocorrelation of order 1 in the
model. All variables are in natural logs, except for the Gini coefficient which is multiplied by 100.
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In addition, the estimations of Table 2.4 indicate that short-term increases of 10% in
unemployment benefits can decrease burglaries by 0.7%. That is equal to, approximately,
100 fewer burglaries per year. Although the ratio of PFA residents to police officers and male
youth is insignificant in the short run, they become significant in the long-run. A 10%
increase, in the former, decreases burglaries by 8% whereas an increase, in the latter,
increases burglaries by 14.9%. There seems to be no significant relation between burglaries
and the other two economic indicators, IS payments and income inequality or, the law
enforcement variables.
Further, as shown in Table 2.5, thefts are affected both by the level of unemployment
benefits as well as the income inequality. Increases of 10% in JSA benefits lead to 1.2% fewer
thefts. This translates into a reduction of more than 300 theft offences. On the other hand,
higher levels of income inequality, increase the rate of incidents by 0.6%. That is, more than
150 cases. Both effects persist over the long-run and double in magnitude, the coefficients
being 2.2% and 1.1%, respectively. These percentages correspond to 560 and 280 thefts.
This finding is consistent across all model specifications. Also, young male population has a
significantly positive impact on the number of thefts committed both in the short- (6.6%)
and long-run (12.3%).
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Table 2.4: Burglary, Regression Estimates using System GMM, 2000/01-2011/12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Burglary,t-1 0.79*** 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 0.76*** 0.69*** 0.80***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.18) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.10)
rJSA per unemployed =0.07 ** =0.07 ** =0.07 ** =0.07 ** =0.07 * =0.07 ** =0.07 *
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
rAv.Weekly IS =0.17 =0.3 =0.15 =0.21 =0.26 =0.30
(0.28) (0.45) (0.30) (0.40) (0.29) (0.39)
Gini Coeff(x100) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Pop per Officer =0.22 =0.27 =0.22 =0.21 =0.15 =0.21 =0.18
(0.14) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.19) (0.24) (0.15)
Burglary Det.Rate =0.03 =0.14 =0.14 =0.13 =0.10 =0.15
(0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Av.Theft Sent.Length =0.08 =0.07 =0.10 =0.09 =0.13 =0.09 =0.08
(0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Theft Sent.Rate =0.02
(0.13)
Males,15-24 0.42 0.37 0.34
(0.39) (0.35) (0.28)
Education =0.13 =0.08
(0.16) (0.13)
Pop Density =0.03
(0.03)
Obs 462 462 462 462 462 462 462
No of Instr 26 32 33 33 34 33 33
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) p-value 0.84 1.00 0.95 0.91 0.84 0.96 0.75
Sargan 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06
Hansen 0.21 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.36
Diff-in-Hansen all 0.92 0.73 0.53 0.70 0.68 0.83 0.28
α 3.88 2.64 2.58 2.71 3.20 2.26 3.94
p-value 0.14 0.12 0.27 0.17 0.25 0.10 0.12
βJSA =0.32 =0.26 =0.25 =0.28 =0.29 =0.22 =0.36
p-value 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.21
βISpay =0.62 =1.09 =0.55 =0.89 =0.86 =1.46
p-value 0.51 0.34 0.59 0.51 0.32 0.33
βGini 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.08
p-value 0.62 0.33 0.48 0.40 0.98 0.54
γPop.per.Off =1.09 =0.98 =0.80 =0.78 =0.64 =0.70 =0.89
p-value 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.22 0.26 0.12
γDet.Rate =0.14 =0.51 =0.52 =0.47 =0.43 =0.48
p-value 0.80 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.25 0.11
γSent.Length =0.38 =0.25 =0.37 =0.34 =0.54 =0.29 =0.41
p-value 0.51 0.59 0.42 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.51
γSent.Rate =0.09
p-value 0.88
δMales 1.49 1.55 1.66
p-value 0.07 0.10 0.06
δEduc =0.49 =0.34
p-value 0.23 0.40
δPopDen =0.10
p-value 0.36
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All equations include a full set of set of PFA specific effects and yearly dummies. Sample period 2000/01-2011/12 for 42 PFAs.
The equations are estimated using one-step system GMM. The reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Column (1) estimates the lagged dependent variable with only 1 economic indicator, the JSA per unemployed, and all three law
enforcement variables. Column (2) estimates the baseline model, by adding IS pay and the Gini coefficient. Column (3) presents
the preferred model specification which also includes a variable capturing young male population. Alternatively, column (4)
includes an education variable in the model. Column (5) includes both whereas column (6) includes the population density to the
baseline model. Finally, column (7) estimates the model using conviction rates instead of detection rates. Also, for the
first-differenced equations, the instrument list includes lags dated t-3 to t-4 ; as there is serial autocorrelation of order 1 in the
model. All variables are in natural logs, except for the Gini coefficient which is multiplied by 100.
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Table 2.5: Thefts, Regression Estimates using System GMM, 2000/01-2011/12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Thefts,t-1 0.52*** 0.49*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.45*** 0.33***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
rJSA per unemployed =0.14 *** =0.12 *** =0.12 *** =0.12 *** =0.12 *** =0.11 *** =0.08 **
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
rAv.Weekly IS 0.31 0.06 0.36 0.18 0.22 =0.01
(0.43) (0.48) (0.44) (0.47) (0.44) (0.40)
Gini Coeff(x100) 0.05** 0.06** 0.06* 0.06** 0.04* 0.03**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Pop per Officer =0.29 * =0.29 =0.2 =0.19 =0.11 =0.2 =0.12
(0.16) (0.20) (0.20) (0.15) (0.16) (0.25) (0.21)
Theft Det.Rate 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Av.Theft Sent.Length =0.24 * =0.01 =0.05 =0.03 =0.08 =0.04 =0.2
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14)
Theft Sent.Rate =0.14
(0.10)
Males,15-24 0.66* 0.64* 0.87**
(0.37) (0.37) (0.35)
Education =0.22 =0.18
(0.21) (0.19)
Pop Density =0.03
(0.04)
Obs 462 462 462 462 462 462 462
No of Instr 26 32 33 33 34 33 33
AR(1) p-value 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
AR(2) p-value 0.89 0.40 0.37 0.33 0.34 0.41 0.38
Sargan 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.00
Hansen 0.49 0.70 0.82 0.78 0.76 0.73 0.34
Diff-in-Hansen all 0.48 0.75 0.88 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.79
α 1.07 0.96 0.87 0.94 0.97 0.81 0.49
p-value 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03
βJSA =0.29 =0.24 =0.22 =0.24 =0.23 =0.21 =0.13
p-value 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07
βISpay 0.61 0.12 0.70 0.35 0.40 =0.01
p-value 0.47 0.90 0.42 0.71 0.61 0.98
βGini 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.05
p-value 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03
γPop.per.Off =0.60 =0.56 =0.37 =0.37 =0.22 =0.35 =0.18
p-value 0.08 0.12 0.32 0.16 0.48 0.42 0.57
γDet.Rate 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.14
p-value 0.63 0.48 0.68 0.49 0.65 0.47
γSent.Length =0.50 =0.02 =0.09 =0.07 =0.15 =0.08 =0.30
p-value 0.08 0.95 0.72 0.81 0.60 0.74 0.14
γSent.Rate =0.21
p-value 0.18
δMales 1.23 1.27 1.30
p-value 0.02 0.03 0.00
δEduc =0.43 =0.35
p-value 0.25 0.32
δPopDen =0.06
p-value 0.44
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
All equations include a full set of set of PFA specific effects and yearly dummies. Sample period 2000/01-2011/12 for 42 PFAs.
The equations are estimated using one-step system GMM. The reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Column (1) estimates the lagged dependent variable with only 1 economic indicator, the JSA per unemployed, and all three law
enforcement variables. Column (2) estimates the baseline model, by adding IS pay and the Gini coefficient. Column (3) presents
the preferred model specification which also includes a variable capturing young male population. Alternatively, column (4)
includes an education variable in the model. Column (5) includes both whereas column (6) includes the population density to the
baseline model. Finally, column (7) estimates the model using conviction rates instead of detection rates. Also, for the
first-differenced equations, the instrument list includes lags dated t-3 to t-4 ; as there is serial autocorrelation of order 1 in the
model. All variables are in natural logs, except for the Gini coefficient which is multiplied by 100.
5
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2.5.2 Discussion of Findings  
For easier comparison and model interpretation, Table 2.6 presents a summary of the 
elasticities of the explanatory variables across all the categories of crime, for both the short- 
and long-run. The summary table displays the coefficients estimated using our preferred 
specification97 – column (3) – from Tables 2.1 through 2.5.  
 
In line with the literature, the findings indicate that violent crimes, in contrast to property 
crimes and robbery, are not reactive to changes in economic circumstances. This is 
unsurprising if we consider that violent crime is not usually financially motivated or at least, 
the majority is not committed for financial gain. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that 
economic distress can propel violence (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001). An individual level 
study might be more equipped to isolate and examine this relationship as it allows to control 
for other factors such as, earnings, family background, alcohol consumption etc. Rather, our 
                                                     
97 This model specification is typical of that used by other scholars to estimate the effects of economic 
incentives on crime. Thus, any discrepancy between this paper and the literature cannot be explained by model 
specification.  
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findings indicate that violent crimes are responsive to higher probabilities of apprehension
(Chalfin and McCrary, 2017) and longer sentences (Eher et al., 2016; Rydberg and Clark,
2016; Nagin et al., 2018). This suggests that, although a higher likelihood of apprehension
discourages engagement in criminal activities; lengthier sentences, increase the rate of
violent crimes. This suggests that the certainty rather than the severity of punishment is a
more effective deterrent for violent offenders. Also, prison is a school for incarcerated, as it
fosters peer relations allowing offenders to become more entrenched criminals (Branham,
1992). As violent offenders receive harsher sentences, they have more opportunities to learn
from other incarcerated criminals.
Yet, property crime offenders seem to be unaffected by movements in law enforcement
factors (Bradford, 2011; College of Policing, 2011). This finding is not surprising, considering
the following. The magnitude and direction of the relationship between property crimes and
police officers depends on police’s efficiency in responding to these crimes (Willis, 1983).
Nevertheless, the efficiency of police, at preventing and clearing-up offences, is not the
same across all types of crime. Provided that the police resources are limited, and property
crimes occur more frequently, while posing a lower threat to society, police’s resources may
be distributed towards most serious crimes. Thus, an insignificant coefficient might capture
police’s inefficiency to investigate property crimes.
Further, the detection rate98 is used as a proxy for the probability of apprehension. Again,
insignificance may reflect heavy workload. Provided that the number of officers is the same,
more reports lead to less investigation time per case, effectively inducing lower probabilities
of detection. Also, property crime offenders are more likely to receive a more lenient prison
sentence than violent criminals, implying a smaller incapacitation effect due to a lower cost
of incarceration. On the other hand, insignificance may simply suggest that variations on de-
tection rates do not matter for property crime offenders. Finally, in line with previous empir-
ical analyses, we find that young males are more likely to engage in robberies, burglaries (in 
the long-run) and thefts.
                                                     
98 In turn, the conviction rate, used in column (7), depends on the probability of being detected and then, on 
the probability of being convicted.  
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In addition, as anticipated, property crimes, along with robberies, are responsive to shifts in 
economic indicators. Lower JSA and IS payments and higher levels of income inequality 
increase these financially motivated crimes. Further, in the long-run, all parameter estimates 
maintain their sign while the magnitude of the effect becomes stronger. This is a valuable 
finding as it suggests that by intervening and increasing benefit payments while keeping 
income inequality low, more at-the-margin individuals will be discouraged from committing 
property crimes. Most importantly, this negative effect on property crimes is not just 
contemporaneous but rather, it persists over time.  
The literature, although more theoretical than empirical, gives support to our findings. 
Burdett et al. (2004) develop a job-search model of crime, unemployment and inequality. 
They suggest that increases in unemployment benefit replacement rate increases both 
unemployment and crime. Further, Engelhardt et al. (2008) build a search model, which 
theoretically assesses the effect of various labour market and crime policies, to examine the 
relationship between crimes and optimally determined employment contracts. They find 
that a more generous unemployment benefit scheme reduces the crime rate of the 
unemployed. However, the scheme’s impact on the employed is contingent upon job 
duration and prison sentences. 
Empirical studies also reach similar conclusions. Machin and Marie (2006) assess, in a quasi-
experimental setting, the effect of the 1996 JSA reform on crime in England and Wales. The 
authors support that there is a positive relation between crime rates and stricter eligibility 
criteria for unemployment benefits. Bindler (2017) exploits quasi-experimental variation in 
unemployment benefit duration induced by temporary policy changes during the U.S. Great 
Recession and finds that, ceteris paribus, extending benefit durations partially explains 
increased crime participation. Finally, although Fougère et al. (2009) find no relation 
between crime and long-term unemployment, in France, they report that there is a positive 
association between crime and not receiving unemployment benefit payments.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study making use of income subsidies to 
analyse their relationship with crime. Thus, a direct comparison with the existing literature is 
not possible. Nonetheless, other empirical studies use earnings of low-skilled workers to 
capture economic incentives of individuals who are more susceptible to engage in criminal 
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activities. Unequivocally, these studies find that increases in the returns of low-wage earners 
have a negative effect on property crime (Wolpin, 1978; Grogger, 1998; Gould et al., 2002; 
Machin and Meghir, 2004). Further, higher income inequality has traditionally been 
associated with increases in crimes, particularly property crimes (Witt et al., 1998, 1999; Wu 
and Wu, 2012; Han et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, the findings indicate importance of estimating both the short- and long-run 
effects [of economic indicators on crime]. As discussed in Section 2.2, the work of Cantor and 
Land (1985) also stresses the importance of this distinction99. By isolating the exogenous 
effect of economic indicators on crime, we are able to capture the true size of the parameter 
estimates. The findings indicate that increases in the returns of disadvantaged groups have a 
negative effect on property crime during both periods. 
 
2.6 Robustness Checks 
2.6.1 Different JSA/Gini Coefficient Measures  
The model is re-estimated using different variations of unemployment benefits and Gini 
coefficient. Instead of using the average JSA received per unemployed per annum, an 
average weekly JSA variable is constructed, following the same process as the IS pay variable. 
It is built at the PFA level. However, a limitation of using this variable is its availability. The 
data, published by Nomis, are only available at a specific point in time, for a particular week. 
Thus, for estimation purposes we assume that the number of recipients at that specific day 
are representative for the whole year.  
In addition, the income inequality measure reported in this section is estimated using the 
annual gross pay100 at the individual level, aggregated up to the PFA level. Up to this point, 
                                                     
99 They support that unemployment causes two opposing effects: the motivation (positive, long-run) and the 
opportunity/guardianship (negative, short-run) effects. They argue that since these effects are realised in 
different points in time (this is disputed by other scholars, see Section 2.2.1), the net effect is ambiguous, and 
this also explains the mixed effects reported in the literature.  
100 Based on micro-level data, published in the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.  
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the Gini coefficient was estimated using weekly basic pay101. Gross pay captures both 
permanent and transitory earnings. Thus, to capture changes in gross earnings and examine 
its effect on crime, we re-estimate our preferred estimation using this inequality measure102.  
Table 2.7 reports estimates. The first column, for each type of crime, estimates the baseline 
model using the average weekly JSA and the Gini coefficient based on basic pay; whereas the 
second column utilises the annual JSA payments per unemployed and the Gini coefficient 
calculated on annual gross pay. Finally, the third column uses both the average weekly JSA 
and annual gross pay Gini coefficient. As shown, the findings support earlier results.                    
                                                     
101 Weekly basic wage is preferred, as changes in the permanent income are more likely to affect crime rates, 
than shifts in transitory income (Dahlberg and Gustavsson, 2008). Assuming that each individual’s weekly basic 
wage is the main source of income; a loss (due to unemployment) or a reduction of that income is more likely 
to affect the incentives of the individual, and potentially motivate criminal engagement, than any other 
changes in the transitory income. 
102 The data also provide the weekly gross pay. Although, the estimations using Gini coefficient built on weekly 
gross pay are not shown here, the conclusions drawn are the same. 
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2.6.2 Law Enforcement Variable Variations 
Considering that law enforcement variables might not be endogenous, but in fact 
predetermined or even exogenous; the model is re-estimated to examine whether the 
estimation results vary. Table 2.8 reports the results for violence against the person and 
sexual offences while Table 2.9 summarises the estimations for robbery, burglary and thefts.  
For ease of comparison, column (1) reproduces the estimates of column (3) from Tables 2.1 – 
2.5 where all economic indicators and law enforcement variables are assumed to be 
endogenous. In column (2), law enforcement variables are treated as predetermined and 
instrumented by 2 lags (𝑡 − 2 and 𝑡 − 3) whereas in column (3) only 1 lag (𝑡 − 2) is used as 
instrument. In column (4), instead of controlling for their potential endogeneity by 
instrumenting contemporaneous values with own lags, the law enforcement variables enter 
the model in lagged form (Witt et al., 1999). Column (5) treats all three as exogenous. In all 
specifications, economic indicators are instrumented using lagged levels dated 𝑡 − 3 and 𝑡 −
4 for the difference equations.  
As shown in Tables 2.8 and 2.9, for each type of crime, the results remain consistent with the 
previous findings. Violent and sexual offences are affected by detection rates and sentence 
lengths; whereas property crimes and robberies are influenced by economic factors. Higher 
benefits can lead to lower crime rates. However, higher levels of inequality increase the 
rates of crime. The findings are valid for both the short- and long-run.  
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2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter uses a dynamic panel data model to explore the short- and long-run 
relationship between economic indicators and crime rates, by exploiting the bi-directional 
nature of economic and criminal justice factors and accounting for crime persistence. The 
findings indicate that crime persistence is a significant determinant for all types of crime and 
thus, should not be ignored in empirical studies.  
A vast analytical literature uses unemployment rates when exploring the role of economic 
incentives on determining crime rates. However, this study indicates that the state of 
unemployment alone cannot motivate an individual to conduct a criminal act. As economic 
theory predicts, crime is a rational decision with the offenders deciding on whether to 
engage in legal or illegal activities based on the expected payoffs which are not fully 
captured by the unemployment rate.  
Thus, it is argued that benefits paid towards disadvantaged population groups better 
capture the motivation of individuals under economic distress, i.e. people who are at-
the-margin of offending. Three economic indicators are used in the analysis, these 
include the jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) payments to the unemployed, the income 
support (IS) benefits received by low-income earners and finally, an income of 
inequality that we construct using individual level data. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first time that unemployment and income benefits are used to investigate 
the links between economic factors. 
Benefit payments are made towards individuals who either are unemployed or in-
need of income assistance. Arguably, these individuals are more likely to engage in 
criminal activities, especially property crimes (Hale, 1998) as they have no returns 
from legal activities, making crime engagement more tempting due to lower 
opportunity costs. In other words, the expected returns of offending might outweigh 
the expected legal payoff (i.e. benefits) received while being economically distressed. 
In effect, benefit payments can bridge the gap between these two expected payoffs; 
and thus, shift the incentives of at-the-margin individuals away from offending.  
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Further, this is the first study to exploit the relationship between economic incentives 
and crime, in England and Wales, using an income inequality matching the 
observational level of crime data. Till date, a national Gini coefficient or an inter-
quantile range variable have been used to capture earnings inequality. The novel Gini 
coefficient is constructed using confidential micro-level data from the Annual Survey 
of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). To design this income inequality measure, basic weekly 
pay is used.  
In line with literature, the results indicate that violent crimes are less likely to be affected by 
changes in economic incentives but rather, they are responsive to higher probabilities of 
apprehension (positively) and longer sentences (negatively). Moreover, in accordance with 
the literature, we find that young males are more likely to be involved in criminal acts, 
specifically in robberies, burglaries and thefts. 
Nevertheless, the findings suggest that there is a significant negative link between
economic indicators and property crime, both in the short- and the long-run.
Increases in benefit payments lead to fewer property crimes, with the reductions
being larger in size during the long-term. Specifically, 10% increases in unemployment
benefits lead to lower robberies, burglaries and thefts of 1.2%, 0.7% and 1.2%, in the
short-run, whereas the long-term effects are significantly larger: 3.2%, 2.5% and 2.2%,
respectively. Similarly, we find that increases in income benefits are negatively linked
to robbery rates.  Higher levels of income inequality lead to higher rates of robberies
and thefts – both in the short and long term.
From a policy perspective, these findings are particularly important as they uncover a 
dynamic relationship between economic indicators and property crime rates. The 
results suggest that contemporaneous small increases in benefit payments can have a 
considerable long-term negative effect on property crime. Thus, by intervening and 
increasing benefit payments while keeping income inequality low, more at-the-
margin individuals will be discouraged from committing crimes. Further, the analysis 
provides strong indications about the pervasive relationship between economic 
indicators and crime. Strengthening law enforcement and enhancing the capacity of 
criminal justice system is not the only way to reduce crime, especially property crime. 
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Thus, by further understanding the effect of economic distress on crime, much may 
be gained, both in terms of policy development and crime prevention.
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Appendix A.2 
A.2.1 Sources and Description of Data 
A.2.1.1 Data Sources 
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A.2.1.2 Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) 
Jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) is a benefit paid to working-age individuals who are not in full-
time employment or work less than 16 hours a week. Unemployed benefit recipients must 
be able to work and are actively seeking a job. The UK government offers two types of JSA: 
contribution- and income-based JSA. The former is non-means tested whereas the latter is 
means tested. The contribution-based JSA is received by individuals who have previously 
been working and paid enough national insurance contributions in the last two years. The 
benefits are received for up to 6 months, irrespective of having a partner. On the other 
hand, income-based JSA is paid towards individuals who are low income earners or have 
savings under £16,000. It is not necessary for the recipient to have paid any national 
insurance contributions prior to receiving the benefits, and payments can be made 
indefinitely as long as, on average, they work less than 16 hours per week. If recipients have 
a partner then, their partner must either be out of full-time employment or work for less 
than 24 hours a week. Individuals who receive JSA based on contributions might also be 
eligible for some income-based JSA if they are low income earners and have a partner, 
disability or they are carers to a person with a disability, or have housing costs, such as 
mortgage.  
Annual JSA expenditures per local authority are available by the Department for Work and 
Pensions as part of the Benefit Expenditure and Caseload Tables publication, after the 
calendar year 2000/01. After deflating nominal values, the data are aggregated up to the 
PFA level by allocating LAs to corresponding police areas. Then, annual JSA expenditures are 
divided by the number of JSA recipients (again, at the PFA level), to obtain average annual 
JSA payments. The number of unemployed is obtain from Nomis103.  
 
 
                                                     
103 Nomis is an online tool run by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). It keeps updated records about UK’s 
labour market statistics.  
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A.2.1.3 Income Support (IS) 
In the UK, Income Support (IS) offers some relief to working-age low income earners. It is a 
means-tested benefit and entitlement is subjective to recipient’s income and savings (less 
than £16,000). IS can be received on its own or on top of any other benefits or part-time 
income, in order for the individual to receive the basic amount the law says is needed to live 
on. However, it is targeted towards four specific groups of the population. The statistical 
categories are based on the claimant’s primary reason for claiming benefit. This is done 
hierarchically, so a claimant can only appear in one group, which prevents double-counting. 
The ordering is: incapacity (due to illness or disability), lone parents, carers and other income 
related – mostly relating to people on Pension Credit104. Also, to be entitled to IS, the 
individual should not receive JSA105 and although allowed to work (less than 16 hours per 
week), should not be in full-time employment.  
To obtain the average income support benefits, two variables, available in Nomis, are used: 
the number of IS claimants and the average weekly benefits106. The data are available at the 
LA level thus, some adjustments are made. Before aggregating data to the PFA level, the 
total weekly benefits paid at the LA are estimated, by multiplying the average weekly 
benefits by the number of IS claimants. Then, the data are aggregated up to the PFA level. 
Finally, the total weekly benefits are divided by the number of claimants, to obtain average 
weekly earnings for each PFA.  
 
                                                     
104 Pension Credit is also an income-based benefit which consists of 2 parts: (1) Guarantee Credit, received by 
GB residents when claimants or their partners have reached the qualifying age for Pension Credit which is 66, 
and (2) Savings Credit, is an extra benefit received when individuals or their partner is 65 years old and over. 
For more information see,  https://www.gov.uk/pension-credit/eligibility . 
105 Or recipients of Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) which is offered to ill or disabled individuals. For 
more information see, https://www.gov.uk/employment-support-allowance/overview . 
106 The data are published on a quarterly basis (February, May, August and November). The number of 
claimants for each quarter is measured on the last day of that quarter. For instance, if August 2010 is chosen, it 
shows the number of people on IS at 31st August 2016. It does not specify how many individuals receive IS in 
the year prior to that, just the number of people on the system at that specific date. Since, the IS is paid at the 
end of each week, the average weekly IS benefits, also available in Nomis, are estimated at these 4 specific 
points in time. To avoid seasonality, the same quarter is chosen for each year. For this analysis, February was 
chosen.   
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A.2.1.4 Gini Coefficient 
To account for the limitations of national and inter-quantile measures of income inequality; 
individual level data, obtained from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), are 
used to construct a Gini coefficient at the PFA level. ASHE is the most reliable and 
comprehensive source of information on wages and hours worked. The survey represents a 
1% sample of the UK working population, approximately 140,000-185,000 individuals per 
year. The sample is drawn from HM Revenue and Customs Pay As You Earn (PAYE) records. 
Due to its large sample size and the earnings information being collected from employers 
and not from the employees themselves, the survey is considered to be more accurate than 
other surveys, such as the Labour Force Survey (LFS).  
The dataset has information on each individual’s work and home LA. The estimations 
presented make use of the work LA because, for many individuals the home LA was missing. 
Despite acknowledging the fact that an individual may live in a LA but work in another, since 
the income inequality is aggregated up to the PFA level, these two LAs should fall under the 
same PFA107. Also, the sample is restricted to include only LAs within England and Wales. 
Appendix A.2.2 provides a comprehensive list of LAs and to which PFA they belong to.  
To design this income inequality measure, first, using work LAs, each individual has been 
given a PFA ‘label’. This was done for all available years. Then, using the surveys’ weights the 
individual basic weekly pay is weighted up to local authorities’ level and then, to the 
respective PFAs. Again, this is done for all years, individually. Basic weekly earnings are used 
to estimate the Gini coefficient rather than the gross pay108. As discussed by Dahlberg and 
Gustavsson (2008), it is changes in permanent income – one’s salary – that affect crimes the 
most, not shifts in transitory income. Thereafter, the fastgini command is implemented to 
obtain PFA income distributions. This is achieved by utilising a fast-optimised algorithm. The 
standard errors of this income inequality measure are also estimated. Although, the 
command allows us to approximate the Gini coefficient, the whole sample is used to obtain 
an exact measure of income inequality.   
                                                     
107 To show that this indeed the case, home LAs are used to construct the Gini coefficient and the regressions 
are re-estimated. The results indicate that there is no difference.  
108 Nevertheless, for robustness, a Gini coefficient using gross pay is also constructed and crime regressions are 
re-estimated. The estimation results are provided in Section 2.6.1. 
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A.2.2 LA to PFA Allocation 
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A.2.3 Summary of England and Wales Literature 
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A.2.4 Summary Statistics 
A.2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
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A.2.4.2 Correlation and Multicollinearity Tests 
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A.2.5 Econometric Modelling 
A.2.5.1 System GMM 
Appendix A.1.5.1 describes, in detail the differences between SYS GMM and DIFF GMM 
estimators.  
A.2.5.2 Tests for Series Persistence and Stationarity 
SYS GMM is more efficient than DIFF GMM when the series is highly persistent and 
stationary (in differences). To test for series persistence, simple first-order autocorrelation 
models including year dummies109 are estimated using all available lags. The test is also 
performed for all explanatory variables in the dataset – tables are available upon request. 
Table A.2.5.2.1 shows that crime rates are fairly persistent across all estimators, ranging 
from 0.54 (violence against the person and robbery) to 0.88 (burglary). Also, the results 
indicate a serial correlation of order 1 and so, the instrument list should start from values 
dated 𝑡 − 2 and earlier. See Appendix A.2.5.3 for a discussion of tests of serial correlation.  
The second condition requires the dependent variable, in differences, to be stationarity. In 
other words, the first-differences of the explanatory variables should not be correlated with 
the PFA-specific effect, i.e. no unit root in differences. Correlation between regressors in 
levels and the PFA fixed effects is allowed, i.e. can have unit root in levels. To test for the 
series stationarity, the Levin-Lin-Chu panel-data unit root test110 is implemented. As shown 
in Table A.2.5.2.2 below, the series are stationary in first-differences and have a unit root in 
levels; satisfying the second additional assumption of SYS GMM. 
The results of both tests indicate that both assumptions of high persistence and stationarity 
are satisfied. Thus, using SYS GMM would produce more efficient and consistent estimates 
than DIFF GMM. 
                                                     
109 Accounting for heteroskedastic robust errors; allowing observations to be independent across states 
(clusters) but not necessarily within PFAs.  
110 The Im-Pesaran-Shin test is also used and confirms the results.  
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A.2.5.3 Specification Tests and Instrument Validity 
The consistency of both GMM estimators depends on the instrument validity of lagged 
values of the explanatory variables. Inclusion of too many instruments can create biased 
estimates. This is known as instrument proliferation (Roodman, 2009a; 2009b).  
As a rule of thumb, the number of instruments used should be less than the number of 
panels. Since 42 PFAs are included in this study, the total number of instruments used must 
be less than that. Further, to make sure that the lagged values included in the instruments 
list are valid, three specification tests are performed: Sargan/Hansen, difference-in-Hansen 
and AB autocorrelation tests (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995 and 
Blundell and Bond, 2000). We explain each one in turn. 
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The first set of tests involves the Sargan and Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions. The 
utility of these tests is twofold: indicating instrument validity and correct model 
specification. Both tests evaluate the overall validity of the instruments. Failure to reject the 
null hypothesis gives support to the model and thus, to the instruments used.  
Also, both statistics range between 0 and 1. The Sargan test indicates a correct model 
specification if a low p-value, i.e. close to zero, is achieved. In contrast, the Hansen statistic, 
requires a high p-value to validate the GMM estimation results (Roodman, 2009a). Both 
statistics are reported after each estimation performed by DIFF and SYS GMM, since each 
test has its own pitfalls.  
The Sargan statistic is not robust to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation but it is robust to 
instrument proliferation whereas, the Hansen J statistic is robust to both but weakened by 
the inclusion of too many instruments. Hence, inclusion of too many instruments generates 
implausibly good p-values of 1.000 (Roodman, 2006, 2009a, 2009b). If the test reports p-
values of 1 then the simplest and most effective way111 to avoid the instrument proliferation 
issue is to limit the number of lags used as instruments.  
The second test is the difference-in-Hansen test. It follows the same logic as the two above, 
but it is only conducted after using SYS GMM. As the moment conditions used by the DIFF 
GMM are only a strict subset of the instruments employed by the SYS GMM, we can test the 
validity of these additional moment conditions used in the level equation (Blundell and 
Bond, 2000). The null hypothesis denotes that only this subset of instruments is valid 
(Roodman, 2009a). However, similarly to the Hansen test, a high instrument count, weakens 
the test. 
Finally, the Arellano-Bond (AB) serial correlation test is performed. The null hypothesis is 
that the error term, 𝜀𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡, is not serially correlated. The model specification is supported 
when failing to reject the null. In general, to determine if serial correlation of order 𝑙 in level 
equations exists, need to search for autocorrelation of order 𝑙 + 1 in differences. As 
autocorrelation of order 1 is expected, if the test indicates a second-order serial correlation, 
                                                     
111 For an extensive discussion of all the methods that can be used to avoid instrument proliferation, read 
Roodman (2009a).  
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the appropriateness of the proposed instruments is rejected and higher-order lags are 
required as instruments.  
Accordingly, the AB autocorrelation test indicates which lag should be the first to be 
included in the instrument list. The tests performed after the simple AR (1) models indicate 
that, the errors are autocorrelated of order 1; rendering 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡−2 a potentially invalid 
instrument. The results are presented in in Table A.2.5.2.1 in Appendix A.2.5.2.  
To avoid any endogeneity issues, the instrument set is restricted to lags dated 𝑡 − 3 and 
longer (Roodman, 2009b). Also, to avoid instrument proliferation, the number of 
instruments for each endogenous variable is restricted to two. That is, in period t, the 
endogenous variables in the first-differenced equations, are instrumented using t-3 and t-
4112 lags in levels. Respectively, the instrument list for the equations in levels includes lags 
from t-2 and longer. Also, as discussed above, instead of using all the available lags as 
instruments, the list is collapsed, i.e. restricted to make sure that it is less than the 42 – the 
number of panels (PFAs).  
 
A.2.5.4 Comparing Estimators against SYS GMM 
To determine the correct number of lags, to be included in the instrument list, as well as to 
examine if different estimators provide different outcomes; the preferred model 
specification is estimated using various estimation methods: OLS, within-groups, DIFF and 
SYS GMM. The last two make use of internal instruments to account for the possible 
endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable, the three economic indicators and law 
enforcement variables. Thus, we test instrument validity by estimating different 
specifications of the model.  
                                                     
112 Also, as suggested by Roodman (2009a, 2009b), when estimating the model, the ‘collapse’ command is 
employed. 
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As these do not represent our main empirical findings, we do not present tables for all five 
types of crime113 rather, we compare estimated coefficients for thefts and discuss why SYS 
GMM performs better in this framework. Table A.2.5.4.1 presents the results. 
All estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity, but not all are robust to autocorrelation114. 
Tests for first- and second-order serial correlation are reported and when applicable, 
Sargan/Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions are also presented.  
In columns (1) and (2) the model is estimated using OLS and within-groups estimators, 
respectively. Estimating a dynamic model causes endogeneity since, by construction, the 
lagged crime rate and the error term are correlated. The theory predicts that when the 
lagged dependent variable is positively correlated with the error term, the OLS regression 
biases the coefficient of interest upwards, close to unity, whereas the within-groups 
estimator’s bias is downwards (see Roodman, 2009b).  
The coefficient of lagged dependent variable, for both DIFF and SYS GMM, is expected to be 
within or close to these bounds. Hence, the range between the OLS and within-groups 
estimates provides a fair indication of the validity of the results obtained from theoretically 
superior estimators, such as DIFF and SYS GMM (Bond, 2002). As shown, the results, using 
OLS and within-groups, for the lagged dependent variable are between 0.87 and 0.60.  
Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) report the estimated results using the DIFF GMM in one- and 
two-step specifications. The two-step estimator controls for Windmeijer standard error bias. 
In period 𝑡, for every endogenous variable, in the first-differenced equations, lags dated    
𝑡 − 2 and earlier are potentially valid instruments. Nonetheless, not all available lags are 
used, due to the limited dimension of the panel. The instrument count is reported after each 
estimation. For columns (3) and (7), three lags, in levels (instrumenting first-differenced 
equations), are included, starting from  𝑡 − 2115, whereas columns (4) and (8) use two lags, in 
levels, starting from 𝑡 − 3116.  
                                                     
113 Tables for other four crimes are available upon request. 
114 As shown in Table 2.1, DIFF and SYS GMM variants, starting from lag 𝑡 − 2, are not robust to serial 
correlation since there is first-order serial autocorrelation.  
115 Instrument endogenous variables using lagged logs of that variable dated 𝑡 − 2 to  𝑡 − 4 . 
116 The instrument list includes only two lags for each endogenous variable, dated 𝑡 − 3 to 𝑡 − 4.  
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Respectively, in columns (5), (6), (9) and (10) the model is estimated using SYS GMM in one- 
and two-step variations. In columns (5) and (9), the endogenous regressors in the first-
differenced equations are instrumented using the second to fourth lags (𝑡 − 2 to 𝑡 − 4) [of 
these variables]. In addition, the equations in levels are instrumented using the lag-1 of the 
endogenous variables in first-differences. Finally, columns (6) and (10) include lag-2 
differences for the equations in levels in addition to lags in levels dated 𝑡 − 3 to 𝑡 − 4 for the 
first-differenced equations.  
The AB tests for autocorrelation indicate that there is serial correlation of order 1. Therefore, 
the estimations in columns (3), (5), (7) and (9) using instruments from 𝑡 − 2 are invalid since, 
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡−2 is correlated with error term, 𝑒𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑡−1 . Thus, longer lags are required for the 
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model to be correctly specified. Accordingly, columns (4), (6), (8) and (10) include a valid 
instrument list.  
Comparing the Hansen statistic for both the DIFF GMM and SYS GMM, in columns (4) and 
(6), as well as their two-step variants in columns (8) and (10), it is evident that the SYS GMM 
performs better. The Hansen statistic is higher and closer to unity when SYS GMM is used, 
indicating that the model is correctly specified, and the instrument set is valid. Also, the 
difference-in-Hansen statistic which specifically tests for the validity of the first-differenced 
instruments, is close to unity (0.88). This suggests, the additional instruments used by the 
SYS GMM are integral when estimating the model. Since all the necessary assumptions 
outlined by Blundell and Bond (1998) are met, the SYS GMM estimator allows us to obtain 
consistent and efficient parameter estimates. Thus, it is our preferred estimator.  
Further, Table A.2.5.4.1 illustrates that irrespective of the estimator used; the coefficient
estimates have the same sign across all estimators, but they differ in magnitude and
significance. Specifically, the jobseeker’s allowance benefits variable is significantly
negatively correlated with thefts across all estimates except the OLS. The magnitude is larger
in size, and the level of significance is stronger when SYS GMM is used. As expected, the
parameter estimates suggest that 10% higher unemployment benefits are linked with lower
thefts (-1.2%). For individuals at-the-margin, e.g. people whose expected returns from illegal
activities are only marginally exceeding their legal expected returns, even a slight increase in
the level of benefits can pivot crime engagement. The magnitude of this negative effect
becomes even larger in the long-run: a 10% increase in JSA leads to 2.2% reduction in theft.
This indicates that increases in unemployment benefits not only have a contemporaneous
negative effect but, in fact, it becomes more prevalent during the long-run. Moreover, as
expected, thefts and income inequality have a positive relationship both over the short- and
long-run; with the magnitudes being higher in the latter. Also, in line with the literature, a
larger young male population is positively linked to thefts.
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Abstract  
This study builds a predictive model which identifies solvability and case-limiting factors of 
fraud and computer misuse crimes by utilising preliminary investigative information from 
cases referred to Warwickshire Police (WWP) and West Mercia Police (WMP) between 2013-
2015. The dataset is randomly split into equally sized samples; the developmental and the 
validation. The former sample is used to identify prevalent factors and build the predictive 
model, which is then tested on the validation sample to obtain external validity. This is the 
first study that empirically identifies fraud solvability and case-limiting indicators while 
developing a solvability model that increases investigatory efficiency by addressing the 
implicit resource constraint. Given the high correlation of solvability with a named suspect, 
factors which can affect solvability in the absence of a named suspect are also considered. 
We find that certain variables are more likely to serve as viable investigative leads, when no 
suspect is identified by the victim. After estimating the predictive model, we evaluate the 
various cut-off points to minimise the trade-off between incorrect filling and false case 
allocation. The empirical analysis suggests that the overall predictive accuracy of the model 
is 91.35%; with correct fraud allocation and case filing amounting to 87.45% and 95.41%, 
respectively. The findings indicate that local forces can increase solvability when adopting 
statistical allocation models that capitalise on information collected during preliminary 
investigation.  
 
Keywords: fraud; cyber; solvability; investigation; predictive model 
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Glossary G.3 
The following list of abbreviations, used in Chapter 3, is expanded below. 
AF Action Fraud 
CSEW Crime Survey of England and Wales 
FFA Financial Fraud Action UK 
HMIC Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary 
ICT Information and Communications Technology 
LR Likelihood Ratio Test 
MG11 Method of, or Magistrates' Guidance form 11, i.e. Witness Statement Form 
MO Modus Operandi, i.e. Method of Operation Report 
NFIB National Fraud Intelligence Bureau 
ONS Office for National Statistics 
PFA Police Force Area 
VRM Vehicle Registration Mark 
WMP West Mercia Police 
WWP Warwickshire Police 
 
 
Other useful terminology for Chapter 3. 
 
Advance fee 
payments 
 
Fraudsters require victims to make advance or upfront payments for goods, 
services and/or financial gains which are never materialised. 
Call-for-
service 
Fraud 
 
Frauds that a reported to the police and require immediate action either 
due to the victim being vulnerable or the offence is taking place at the time 
of reporting. 
Computer 
Misuse 
Crime 
It covers any unauthorised access to computer material, this is not limited 
to a desktop or laptop computers. Rather, it includes any device that has an 
operating system connected to the internet, such as smart TVS, game 
consoles etc. 
 
Cyber-
dependent 
crime 
 
Crimes that are only committed via a computer, computer network or 
other ICT.  
Cyber-
enabled 
crime 
 
Traditional crimes that are committed at a larger scale with the use of ICT. 
Unlike cyber-dependent crimes, they can be committed without the cyber 
element.  
Fraud A fraud occurs when a person deceitfully and deliberately deludes a victim 
for own private gain, either in terms of property or money, or when the 
victim experiences loss or risk of loss. It includes computer misuse crimes. 
 
NFIB Fraud 
 
Frauds directly reported to Action Fraud. 
Non-
investment 
fraud 
It includes various types of fraud such as, online shopping, door to door 
sales and ticket fraud.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Fraud consists of a diverse range of criminal, civil and regulatory offences and poses a large-
scale threat for both victims and local forces (Button et al., 2016). Fraudsters dishonestly and 
deliberately exploit victim’s negligence, ignorance or candidness for their own private 
benefit (Fraud Review, 2006). Although fraud does not constitute a new type of criminality, 
fraudsters, in response to an ever-changing world, which has become more digital-
dependent, have evolved rapidly. The technological advances and the rise of people 
depending, storing and sharing personal details online, not only allowed the development of 
new techniques to commit traditional fraud, but also generated new types of fraud, notably, 
computer misuse fraud and cybercrime offences (ONS, 2018). This is unsurprising when 
considering that the internet provides offenders with a wide-ranging opportunity to obtain 
the data being stored online, to use for their own personal gain while devising the tools to 
remain unseen (HMIC, 2015).  
Over the years, the size of the problem has been overlooked, despite annual estimates 
suggesting the UK economy suffers fraud losses of £190 billion117 (UKFCMC, 2017). In 2016, 
the financial banking sector alone suffered losses amounting to approximately £768.8 million 
with banks preventing another £1.38 billion (FFA UK, 2017). The Crime Survey of England and 
Wales (CSEW) indicates that incidents of fraud account for 46% of the total CSEW crime 
while fraud victims account for 42% of all individuals being victimised (ONS, 2017). In fact, 
the Office for National Statistics (ONS) estimates that an individual is more likely to fall 
victim to fraud or computer misuse than any other crime (Action Fraud, 2018). Individuals 
are 10 times more likely to be victimised by fraud or cybercrime than by theft, and 35 times 
more likely than to be a victim of robbery (ONS, 2017). Further, CSEW finds that, between 
mid-2016 and mid-2017, adults aged 16 and over experienced approximately 3.3 million 
fraud incidents with 57% of these incidents being computer misused crimes.  
                                                     
117 This is the total estimated amount of overall fraud.  
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Despite the huge economic implications of fraud and the heightened efforts of government 
and authorities to understand fraud better118, especially in recent years, empirical research 
is almost non-existent in this area119. Although fraud has the lowest clearance rate among all 
types of crime, there is limited evidence on factors affecting solvability of fraud let alone 
research on predictive fraud solvability models.  
This chapter aims to expand our knowledge on fraud solvability factors while developing a 
novel predictive case solvability model for fraud. As we point out, in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, 
the distinctive features of fraud and cybercrime120 make this analysis unique. Although there 
are solvability models which are built using a similar statistical methodology as the one we 
employ121 for other types of crime, to the best of our knowledge this study represents the 
only in-depth empirical analysis of fraud, in England and Wales.  
More specifically, the study aims to answer four research questions. The first is identifying 
the determinants which indicate solvability of fraud offences and financially motivated 
cyber-dependent crime. To that extent, continuous and categorical variables are tested using 
t- and chi-squared tests, respectively, while also estimating effective size estimates and 
calculating factor prevalence.  
Further, it is proved that a named suspect is one of the strongest solvability factors and thus, 
the second research question investigates whether, case solvability is possible in the absence 
of suspect information. That is, we identify other viable lines of enquiry that lead to case 
solvability, when the suspect is unknown.  
The third one asks whether a logistic model can correctly predict case clearance by utilising 
                                                     
118 The Fraud Review (2006) identified the police’s lack of understanding of what constituted fraud while 
highlighting that fraud, in all of its forms, does not respect police boundaries. Therefore, the need of 
centralisation of fraud recording was apparent (HMIC, 2015). Effectively, as of 2013, the Action Fraud (AF)118 
represents the national centre of reporting for fraud offences (ONS, 2017; 2018). 
119 Identification of solvability and case-limiting factors for violent and property crimes – such as burglary, 
vehicle and robbery – have been examined in the literature, but not fraud. To our knowledge, no other 
empirical work has examined potential determinants of fraud, let alone solvability factors. 
120 For a detailed description of the offences constituting fraud see Appendix A.3.1.3. Cybercrime falls under 
the umbrella, of the more generic term, fraud.  
121 For instance, Olphin (2015) uses a similar approach to build a solvability model for non-domestic violent 
crime in West Midlands Police whereas Olphin et al. (2017) develop an empirical model that examines 
solvability of burglary offences in Norfolk Police. For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Section 3.2. 
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solvability122 and case-limiting factors123. The model identifies, based on a cut-off value, 
whether the case is solvable or not. This is determined by assigning a score, formulated by 
summing identified factors that are present in each case, to individual cases. The score is 
then compared to a cut-off value. If the case’s score is at least equal to the cut-off point, 
cases are allocated whereas cases are filed when the score is lower than the chosen cut-off 
value. Thus, this type of analysis can potentially allow local forces to make effective use of 
their resources while maximising solvability. The fourth research question asks whether the 
solvability model developed is externally valid. Thus, we address the validity of the model by 
externally testing its predictive capabilities using a randomly assigned validation sample. 
To determine the optimal cut-off point124, a trade-off between two types of errors is 
considered. That is, two types of errors are generated when deciding whether to allocate or 
file a case, based on a threshold value: (i) cases are incorrectly allocated, i.e. they are 
allocated when they should have been filed; and (ii) cases are incorrectly filed when they 
should have been allocated for further investigation. Trying to minimise one type of error; 
causes an increase in the other. For instance, by increasing allocative efficiency, more cases 
will be incorrectly filed. Nevertheless, it is important to note that there are no formal test 
procedures which identify the optimal cut-off point. Thus, we experiment with different cut-
offs on an ad-hoc basis.  
Despite local forces implicitly using solvability predictors, there is no empirical evidence to 
back these up and neither are these tested to obtain external validity. Rather, these factors 
are, primarily, based on officer judgment and therefore, are highly subjective. Accordingly, 
the predictive model is proposed as a rigorous basis to screen frauds by focusing on more 
solvable cases and hence, allowing the release of limited resources.   
To build the model, data from Warwickshire Police (WWP) and West Mercia Police (WMP) 
are used. The model exploits information obtained from the stages of initial investigation125 
                                                     
122 Presence or absence of factors that lead to case solvability.  
123 Case-limiting factors are the ones where their presence or absence leads to the case being filed.  
124 Section 3.5.2 discusses in detail the empirical procedure followed to determine a cut-off value that 
minimises both types of errors. 
125 Initial investigation phase refers to the first stages of reporting where information about the offence is 
gathered. According to College of Policing, the phase of initial investigation is concluded when the investigator 
obtains victim’s account and any potential witnesses are identified while submitting all intelligence gathered. 
More information can be found here:  
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to predict clearance. The dataset consists of automatically recorded indicators, such as time 
of offence and victim details, as well as factors identified using the original police reports. 
The latter category combines filed (MO) reports in free-text and investigation logs.  
The empirical findings126 indicate that case-limiting factors include: banking and computer 
misuse fraud, phone scams and individual frauds; whether victim has suspicions as to who 
the offender is but cannot name the suspect, suspect personally attending the place of 
offence and finally, when cash is the payment method. On the other hand, the analysis 
identifies the following variables as solvability factors: fraud call-for-service127; offence being 
part of a series; corporate employee fraud; repeated victimisation; suspect is known; 
suspect’s physical description, VRM details or CCTV footage is available and finally, when 
offence location is known.  
All aforementioned factors have individually been identified to be associated with solvability. 
However, the study acknowledges that although, in isolation, some factors may be 
insignificant, when ‘co-existing’ with other indicators, they may be jointly significant. 
Numerous variable compilations are tested128 to examine whether that is true. Indeed, the 
results identify four interaction terms as solvability factors. These include, cases where the 
victim completes an MG11 form and evidence is available; suspect’s phone number is 
known, and the call provider has confirmed the details of the suspect; the police was able to 
seize items from the scene and the victim has lost funds; and finally, cases where the 
payment method is through a bank transfer and the suspect’s name is known. We believe 
that this is the first work that assesses the impact of compilation variables on solvability.   
Overall, the model correctly classifies 91.35% of the sampled cases. Specifically, the 
percentage of correctly allocated cases is equal to 87.45% whereas correctly filed cases 
amount to 95.41%. These findings indicate the model’s precision and consistency. The 
                                                     
https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/investigations/investigation-process/ .  
126 The case-limiting and solvability factors presented here include only the predictors that have been identified 
as statistically significant in the estimated logistic regression.  
127 As AF is the central point of contact, any fraud offence should be reported to AF. However, as explained in 
Section 3.3.1, if the victim is considered to be vulnerable or the offence is taking place at the moment of 
reporting, the local force can take action. This is known as call-for-service.  
128 The same procedure is followed as with individual significant factors. That is, we create pairwise 
combinations of individually insignificant factors and then conduct chi-squared tests, and calculate effective 
size and factor prevalence. 
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performance of the model is also tested on a separate dataset of equal size, providing 
external validity. Specifically, based on the chosen cut-off point, we find that the overall 
accuracy of the model is 89%, with 85% an 93% of the cases being correctly allocated and 
filed, respectively. Although, not directly comparable with other solvability models 
developed on other types of crime, the predictive capability of our model is one of the 
highest reported in the literature. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents an overview of the 
literature on solvability models used in other types of crime. In Section 3.3, the fraud 
reporting process is described, followed by a description of the dataset and a presentation of 
the descriptive analysis. Further, Section 3.4 introduces tests for solvability and case-limiting 
factor identification while explaining the development of the predictive model. Section 3.5 
presents the empirical findings; which are followed by a robustness check measuring the 
model’s accuracy using a randomly assigned sample. Section 3.6 discusses possible policy 
implications and data limitations. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
As stated above, this is a novel study that empirically assesses investigatory factors 
associated with fraud solvability. Therefore, there is no prior empirical research on 
solvability models of fraud, per se, that we can refer to, or compare our findings against. 
However, there is existing literature that identifies solvability factors for other crime types. 
Therefore, the methodologies and the research design of solvability models, in general, are 
discussed and their findings are presented. Emphasis is given on the model specifications 
and estimation methods used; allowing for identification of potential methodological gaps in 
the literature.  
CHAPTER 3: FRAUD SOLVABILITY MATRIX 
 
123 
 
The national fraud outcome rate129 is, just, around 7%; which is the lowest rate of outcome 
assigned to offences among all types of crime recorded (Home Office, 2017). Considering 
that fraud is heavily under-reported130 – more than any other type of fraud – a high 
clearance rate may encourage more reporting. That is, higher solvability signals police 
effectiveness (Cordner, 1989; Litwin, 2004) which in turn, can encourage reporting as the 
public’s trust toward police will be restored (Regoeczi et al., 2000; Tankebe, 2008; Tyler and 
Fagan, 2008) while boosting police officer’s morale (Riedel and Jarvis, 1998). Additionally, 
higher detection can stimulate incapacitation and deterrence effects (Von Hirsch et al., 1999; 
Levitt, 2004; Jansson, 2005).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a named suspect has been found to be the single most significant 
solvability factor (Isaacs, 1967; Greenwood, 1970; Brandl and Frank, 1994; Olphin, 2015). 
Isaacs (1967) finds that 86% of the cases with a suspect being named are cleared, whereas if 
the offender is unknown, 88% of cases remain unsolved. Greenwood (1970) studies the 
association of property crimes with solvability and finds that suspect identity information is 
linked to higher arrest rates. This association is stronger even when comparing cases where 
only suspect’s description was available, or evidence has been collected. This is consistent 
across various studies and types of offences (Eck, 1979, 1983; Coupe and Griffiths, 1996; 
Burrows et al., 2005; Eitle et al., 2005; Peterson et al., 2010; Olphin, 2015). The opposite is 
also found to be true. That is, incidents between strangers have a lower probability of 
detection (Snyder, 1999; D’Alessio and Stolzenberg, 2003). 
                                                     
129 Outcomes assigned to offences. Since 2013, Home Office introduced an outcome framework to replace the 
then recording system which narrowly accounted only for detections. Section 3.3.3.1 explains this in more 
detail.  
130 Indicatively, in 2016/17, CSEW indicated that approximately 5 million incidents of fraud and computer 
misuse have been experienced by the responders. The police recorded data, for the same period, amounted to 
just 653,468 cases. This suggests that only 17% of incidents of fraud come up to police’s attention. 
Nevertheless, it important to stress out that most victims experiencing bank and credit industry fraud are 
encouraged by their banks to contact them first than the police. Also, the two sources vary in their coverage. 
CSEW covers a broader range of frauds, including attempted and successful occurrences; with or without 
monetary loss. It also captures low-harm cases; which are unlikely to be reported to the police. On the other 
hand, police data include incidents reported to AF and focus on more serious fraud – at least serious enough 
that the victim will consider it important to report it to the police. Further, it is useful to note that CSEW only 
started recording fraud and computer misuse in the year ending September 2016. So prior comparisons are 
unable. For more information see, 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/
june2017#main-points ; Tables 1a and 2.  
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Further, the RAND Criminal Investigation Study (1979) assessed how detectives allocate their 
time while examining the importance of different investigative activities on police 
effectiveness. The study finds that 44% of solvable cases have identified an offender during 
the reporting process and shows that follow-up investigation has only a minimal effect on 
detection. The author argues that much of detective’s time is wasted on administrative work 
undertaken for cases that have a low probability of clearance. More specifically, the study 
stresses that it is the circumstances of crime – i.e. factors which are readily available – that 
lead to clearance, not follow-up investigatory efforts. Other researchers agree and assert 
that the most useful and indicative information, in terms of solvability, is collected during 
the preliminary stages of investigation (Greenwood and Petersiua, 1975; Brandl and Frank, 
1994; Coupe and Griffiths, 1996; Weisburd and Eck, 2004). 
However, the RAND study has been criticised as misleading (Sherman, 2003) due to its 
extremely small sample size – only 10 cases of aggravated assault were used, all of which 
have been cleared during preliminary investigation. Telep and Weisburd (2011) support that, 
still, there is insufficient information on the performance of detectives and their workload 
and thus, assessing their investigative value is at least crude.  
Eck (1983) has extended the work undertaken by the RAND study – which supports the 
circumstance-result hypothesis as he calls it – and combines it with the work of Folk (1971) – 
who argued that, irrespective of investigative leads, detective’s effort is more important. Eck 
supports that, in fact, there are three types of cases and called this the triage hypothesis. 
The first group involves cases where little effort is required for clearance. The second group 
contains cases where viable investigative leads exist and the cases are potentially solvable, 
provided effective investigation. And finally, the third group includes cases which will never 
be solved, at least not by devoting a reasonable amount of effort and resources. The study 
focuses on burglary and robbery offences. The results indicate that identified predictive 
factors, collected during initial investigation, are associated with arrest, but this is also true 
for detective’s follow-up actions. Essentially, Eck supports that a large number of cases is 
solvable when effective investigation techniques are followed, provided there are viable 
investigative links. Although, critics argue that sometimes it is difficult to determine which 
case falls into which group, Eck’s work is significant as it acknowledges that investigative 
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efficiency can be achieved by identifying different characteristics (factors present) in solved 
and unsolved cases. 
Based on that premise, Paine (2012) uses chi-squared tests to compare different 
characteristics between detected and undetected burglary and attempt-burglary offences. 
This enables solvability factor identification. The study finds 14 predictors, 12 of which are 
argued to have over 80% predictive accuracy. However, this study has a few pitfalls. First, it 
only examines the effectiveness of individual factors on clearance and discards the 
possibility of a combination of factors leading to detection. Second, due to its large sample, 
the author is restricted to include only electronically recorded information which prevents 
close examination of each case. Finally, the study is just a descriptive analysis where no 
predictive model is developed. Other studies have identified various solvability factors 
including: presence of witness (Paine, 2012); CCTV footage and implementation of proactive 
policing methods (Robb et al., 2015).  
Further, although not directly relevant to fraud, many homicide papers develop multivariate 
models to identify factors that are linked to solvability. Usually, homicide clearance is used 
as the dependent variable and the identified predictors as the independent regressors while 
the model is estimated using a logistic regression (Mouzos and Muller; Alderden and Lavery, 
2007; Ousey and Lee, 2010). Multivariate models are useful since not only do they allow for 
the inclusion of multiple variables to predict possible outcomes – in this case, case solvability 
– but they also allow for more detailed ‘what-if’ scenarios. For instance, the outcome of a 
case depends on a range of factors that are simultaneously present, not just one. The better 
the quality of the data, the more accurate the predictive power of the model.  
Nevertheless, the aforementioned studies test the effectiveness of the model on the dataset 
used to develop the model on and not on separate data. Thus, there is no external validity. 
Even for burglary crimes, which are exhaustively studied in the literature, the empirical 
research fails to develop and test predictive models using large-scale datasets and examine 
their validity.  
To our best knowledge, only two other studies (Olphin, 2015; Olphin et al., 2017) test the 
validity of the model using a randomly assigned sample. To build a solvability model, we 
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follow a similar statistical methodology as the two papers above. Olphin (2015) examines 
predictive clearance factors for non-domestic violent offences by exploiting a large-scale 
dataset from West Midlands Police. The overall effectiveness of the model is estimated to be 
around 67%. Specifically, the model correctly allocates 69% of the cases whereas it correctly 
files 65% of the reported offences. On the other hand, Olphin et al. (2017) builds a solvability 
model for burglary in Norfolk with an estimated overall accuracy of 56%. Depending on the 
cut-off used, the designed model correctly allocates and files 87% and 52% of reported 
burglaries, respectively.   
In general, what all these studies try to capture is that, solvability factor identification is 
possible – across all types of crime – and given the scarce police resources, neglecting to use 
these for guidance and more effective case allocation will result in lower clearances.  
Also, when developed correctly, statistical modelling can be more precise in case 
classification than an experienced investigator (Kahneman and Egan, 2011). The Association 
of Chief Police Officers (ACPO, 1989) acknowledges that, and therefore, encourages the use 
of a system which objectively assesses the nature of the offence and the presence of 
solvability factors to allocate investigative resources on cases which are more likely to be 
solved. Although formal screening is a reality in many forces (BBC, 2013), it is mainly based 
on officer’s experience, subjective perceptions, mandatory offences, media coverage and 
what the public perceives as important (Gill et al., 1996; Robinson and Tilley, 2009).  
However, even if formal screening is not in place, the officers informally decide which cases 
to investigate based on which crimes they view as more solvable (Brandl and Frank, 1994; 
Coupe and Griffiths, 1996). Nonetheless, this may result in inconsistencies across local forces 
since these decisions are not based on a unified and coordinated approach (Coupe and 
Griffiths, 1996). 
Greenberg et al. (1973) utilise information gathered from primary investigation and create a 
case screening model using 2000 burglaries; where 6 solvability factors are identified. 
Afterwards, the model is tested on a different dataset, of only 500 cases, with each factor 
being weighted using its own predictive probability. The model’s accuracy is estimated to be 
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between 67% and 92%. In a later study, Eck (1979), replicates the analysis of Greenberg et 
al. (1973) and finds that 85% of the cases can be correctly classified.  
Further, Eck (1983) examines investigation of burglary and robbery in relation to case 
clearance. He finds that 6% and 9% of cases are incorrectly filed and allocated, respectively. 
This translates into victims being let down and resources being wasted. However, as the 
author argues, this it to a lesser degree than if no crime screening mechanism is 
implemented. 
Olphin (2015) tests the predictive model developed in the study against the existing West 
Midlands Police allocation mechanism and finds that, the designed model increases 
efficiency by 11.62%. Even so, the author finds that the screening model’s accuracy is, only, 
around 67% – which is relatively low. Although, predictive models are usually expected to 
perform better than that; the findings provide evidence to the argument that police forces 
do not efficiently use the scarce investigative resources and if, statistical allocation models 
are adopted, efficiency can be increased.  
To sum up, the above findings reinforce the usage of applicative methods to prioritise 
allocation of scarce police resources. By directing investigative efforts towards cases that are 
more likely to be solved, more effective investigation is allowed; which leads to higher 
solvability. In effect, this ensures not wasting resources and effort on cases that are unlikely 
to be solved.  
 
3.3 Data Description 
3.3.1  Fraud Reporting 
Fraud, in all its forms has a particular feature: it disregards police force boundaries, both 
within the UK and internationally (HMIC, 2015). Thus, due to its versatile nature and its ever-
growing severity, a more clustered and nationally consistent approach was deemed 
necessary. As a result, Action Fraud (AF) was established. It represents a national and central 
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point of reporting and recording of all fraud and financially motivated cybercrime. Since the 
implementation of AF, the way in which fraud is reported and thereafter recorded has 
changed (Home Office, 2017).  
Previously, fraud offences were directly reported to local police forces whereas now, AF 
provides an online reporting tool and has a dedicated call centre to record fraud, nationally. 
Unless the fraud is a call-for-service, in which case the local authority takes immediate 
action, the victim must report the fraud via the online portal. A call-for-service requires 
certain criteria to be met. These are: victim is vulnerable or at risk131; offenders are arrested 
by police; victim calls police to report fraud and the offender is currently committing or has 
recently committed (at the time of the call) fraud and finally, in cases where the offender is 
suspected to be residing within the force’s jurisdiction area132. If local forces take on a case 
as a call-for-service, AF is notified. 
If none of these conditions apply the fraud must be directly reported to AF. The National 
Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) reviews the reports133 and is responsible for allocating 
cases to the local forces. The forces are advised about which cases are to be investigated 
further. The NFIB’s scoring matrix analyses the fraud reports and “identifies key information 
supplied in a report, as well as searching for any matching data within the system in existing 
reports” (Home Office, 2017). If viable investigative leads are identified, the NFIB distributes 
the case to the most appropriate local force for further investigation.  
It is important to highlight that AF is simply a reporting centre, it is not responsible for fraud 
investigation. Still, that authority remains with the law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, 
                                                     
131 According to Warwickshire and West Mercia’s guidelines, vulnerability is defined with respect to victim’s 
circumstances and/or age. An adult at risk is one that suffers from mental or physical disabilities, illness, or any 
other condition or circumstance rendering them either permanently, or temporarily incapable of caring and/or 
protecting themselves against exploitation or unable to demonstrate capacity to decide while requiring care 
and support. 
132 A ‘local suspect’ is where there are possible lines of enquiry about who the offender might be. That is, 
police can or could potentially identify the offender with the information being provided or in cases where 
police have enough details to arrest a suspect. This ‘locality’ condition is put in place to ensure that fraud 
victims are treated the same way, by the police, as victims of any other type of crime where local viable 
investigative leads exist, and an investigation is undertaken immediately.  
133 NFIB uses a database, called the Know Fraud system to analyse the information gathered as well as to 
establish links and patterns in offending. Reports are distinguished based on whether there is a realistic 
prospect of solvability or not.  
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on a monthly basis, local forces are also informed about cases without any investigative 
leads but which are committed against victims in their jurisdiction. This is for the police 
forces to have a good indication of the fraud levels within their area. Nevertheless, these 
cases are kept in the dataset, if new information comes to light, either from the victim or by 
matching information across different cases and viable lines of enquiry are believed to exist 
then, the most appropriate force is notified. Further, AF receives information reports. These 
are cases which are not classified as a crime but still implicate fraudulent activity. These are 
also forwarded to the local agencies. Figure A.3.1.1134, in the Appendix, graphically displays 
the recording process of fraud. 
 
3.3.2  Types of Fraud 
As explained in the section above, frauds are self-reported to AF via its online tool. Victims 
are asked about the type of fraud that they have experienced before submitting the final 
report in order to be redirected to the appropriate section of the website. Although, this 
information is available in our dataset, most cases have empty entries. For cases with a type 
of fraud attached to them, unless the full police report is read, we are unable to know if this 
is indeed the fraud that victims have experienced.  
Thus, we re-allocate cases using the correct NFIB Fraud classifications135. This process was 
extremely time-consuming as it was not possible to automate it. However, this allows us to 
include types of fraud in our model specification while also creating a variable that captures 
whether victims have correctly identified the type of fraud they have experienced. The 
former allows us to test whether specific types of fraud are more likely to be solved than 
others whereas the latter permits us to test if incorrect classification leads to insolvability. 
Appendix A.3.1.1 discusses in detail the various lines of enquiry that different types of fraud 
generate. If more than one types of fraud apply to each case, as per NFIB counting rules, the 
most serious offence is recorded. 
                                                     
134 The flow chart is published by Home Office (2017).  
135 Table 3.1 provides the complete list. 
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Table 3.1 provides a detailed description of the NFIB types of fraud been committed during 
the period of study within the WWP and WMP Constabularies. As shown, the most frequent 
type of fraud – or at least, more likely to be reported – is non-investment fraud, followed by 
banking frauds, advance fee payments and computer misuse frauds.   
 
3.3.3  Dataset 
3.3.3.1  Outcome Variable 
To determine which cases have been detected and which have been filed as undetected, the 
outcome variable is used. In 2013/14, the Home Office revised its framework for recorded 
crime outcomes by taking a more victim-oriented approach. Previously, a detection 
framework was followed instead. The new outcome framework advances the way crime is 
dealt with by the police, by providing a broader range of possible outcomes to resolve a case 
than the formerly available sanction detection categorisation. Under this framework, each 
case has an attached outcome to it (Home Office, 2014). Appendix A.3.2 discusses other 
possible case clearance factors used in the literature.  
Figure 3.1 presents the outcomes of fraud cases examined in this study. As shown, most 
cases are resolved with the suspect being charged or summoned. The fraud outcome rate is 
only 25%, in our dataset suggesting that there is a lot of room for improvement. Figures 3.2-
A1 and 3.2-A2 illustrate solvability by type of offence; Figure 3.2-A2 present confidence 
intervals for each detection rate. As demonstrated, for more prevalent types of fraud, the 
confidence intervals are smaller. Both figures confirm that the probability of detection is 
low. This is evident across all types of fraud that are available in the dataset, with computer 
misuse fraud having the lowest outcome rate among all of them.  
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3.3.3.2  Data Sources and Variables Examined 
The dataset comprises of all reported fraud offences in WWP and WMP between January 
2013 and December 2015. These are used to build an empirical model that predicts case 
solvability by evaluating information gathered in the first stages of investigation. The end 
date has been carefully chosen to allow enough time for the investigation process to take its 
course and thus, for the cases to be cleared. This was of incremental importance since we 
did not want to sacrifice any of the model’s accuracy, which heavily depends on the outcome 
of the cases. The dataset includes all frauds reported either directly to the PFA or cases 
allocated by AF to the two PFAs. In total, 4012 cases136 have been documented, both 
detected and undetected.  
                                                     
136 This is the total number of cases during the period of study. However, cases with no information been 
recorded, or cases were no specific intend victim is identified are excluded. As explained later in Section 3.3, for 
a case to be recorded as fraud, Home Office counting rules require a specific intend victim, if that is not able to 
be established, the case is only recorded for information purposes and no further investigatory steps are taken. 
Also, cases were people report that a bank account has been opened in their name without their knowledge or 
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We acknowledge that data accuracy is a fundamental principle to obtain true estimates. The 
only tangible way to evaluate incident reporting quality is by reading reports, which assess 
WWP and WMP’s strategy for securing correct crime records, as prepared by HMIC137. In a 
2015 report, WMP is described as having “good processes for initial investigation and 
subsequent allocation of crimes for further investigation. The force has a crime allocation 
policy that directs which resources should be allocated to investigate; taking into account the 
nature of the offence and the needs of the victim” (HMIC, 2016a). WWP is presented as a 
force that “has effective, well-established arrangements to collect, share and act on partner 
information to prevent crime” (HMIC, 2016b). These reports give us confidence about the 
information collected and incident reports being drafted.  
Also, as advanced earlier, the process of reporting and investigating fraud is different and 
more complex than for any other type of crime. Therefore, it is possible that local forces 
receive AF referrals, not because the victim lives in the area, but because it is believed that 
the offender resides within their jurisdiction – i.e. in WWP and WMP area. This does not 
affect the analysis in any way as we develop a solvability model using the intelligence data 
collected during the primary investigation. These are either collected by the two PFAs, when 
there is a call-for-service, or forwarded by the AF138.  
The dataset consists of a combination of electronically automated variables, officer free-text 
fields (MOs) and investigation plan scripts. The former category involves variables 
downloaded directly from WWP and WMP systems. These variables provide incident-specific 
information such as custody records, and other personal information about the victim and 
suspect – if they are indications as to who the offender is –, MOs, offence location, interest 
indicators, warnings and other markers. Although desirable, obtaining data on workload of 
officers was not possible. Nevertheless, these automated variables are included in the 
analysis with ease. Consistent with the literature (Litwin, 2004; Puckett and Lundman, 2003; 
                                                     
permission and/or false information has been used are excluded. According to Home Office fraud counting 
rules this does not constitute a fraud per se. Fraud should only be recorded if there is evidence suggesting that 
the account was opened to purposely commit fraud or if there is any usage on the account (Home Office, 
2018).  
137 The full name is Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS). It is an 
independent criminal justice inspectorate organisation that assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police 
forces and fire & rescue services.  
138 If it is deemed that the case has viable investigative leads, the allocated detective adds comments in the 
investigation log, explains the procedure followed and the information gathered.  
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Riedel and Boulahanis, 2007), dummy variables are created for categorical variables, such as 
location.   
On the other hand, free-text fields and investigation plans are coded manually for each case 
in the sample. By coding these scripts, additional potential solvability factors are examined. 
To build a solvability model that correctly classifies fraud, it is important to have as much 
detail as possible, especially due to each case being inherently unique.  
Interestingly, the most useful information uncovered during preliminary investigation is not 
recorded electronically by WWP and WMP Constabularies rather, police officers write 
detailed free-text memos about how fraud was conducted while also preparing an 
investigation plan. The latter provides details about the crime scene, any observations made, 
if there are witnesses, physical description of suspect, bank account details, or any other 
personal detail which might reveal the offender’s identity, whether CCTV footage is 
available, evidence gathered, and items seized, whether resources need to be distributed 
while also updating any outstanding actions. Coding this information provides insightful 
information about how the fraud was committed.   
As these are free-text fields, officers are not obliged to record information in a specific 
format or detail. Further, automating the process was deemed impossible. For instance, 
consider an incident where the detective writes in the investigation log that ‘no CCTV’ 
footage is available at the scene, but CCTV footage can be obtained from nearby shops. A 
search for ‘no CCTV’ will not provide the correct number of cases where CCTV is not 
available. Therefore, considerable time was spent coding these factors.  
As explained in Section 3.4.1, after performing various tests to determine which variables 
have little explanatory power in terms of detection or which are highly correlated with other 
indicators, the initial list of potential factors is curtailed to 48 variables which are then 
included in a statistical model to predict solvability.  
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3.3.3.3  Developmental and Validation Samples 
To build the solvability model and examine its predictive capabilities, the sample is randomly 
split into two groups. To do that, each case is given a unique reference number. Random 
allocation ensures that there is no sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979) while also securing 
external validity. As it allows to build the model on one, the developmental sample, and 
afterwards test its predictive powers and accuracy on the second group, the validation 
sample. Additionally, by having two samples, we avoid overfitting the model.   
Nevertheless, to ensure the accuracy of the model, it is paramount that the two samples are 
equivalent in terms of both detection and types of fraud. Table 3.2 demonstrates that this is 
indeed the case.  
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3.3.4  Descriptive Analysis 
This section presents the findings from the descriptive analysis. First, victim and offender 
characteristics are discussed and then, incident and fraud attributes are examined. 
3.3.4.1  Victim Characteristics  
As shown in Figure 3.3-A, both genders are as likely to experience fraud but, cases where the 
victim is female are less likely to be detected. Also, the descriptive statistics showcase that 
the younger the victim, the higher the probability for case clearance. To put that into 
perspective, cases where the victim is 35 years old or younger are twice as likely to be solved 
than cases involving victims aged 66 and over. This is also demonstrated in Figure 3.3-B1 and 
Figure 3.3-B2. In the latter one, the probability of solvability is broken down by victim’s sex 
and age group while providing 95% confidence intervals. Further, Figure 3.3-B2 confirms that 
male victims have higher levels of detection.  
Figure 3.3-C illustrates the four types of fraud that victims are most likely to experience139, 
based on victim’s gender and age. When not accounting for the age difference among 
victims, as depicted in the last section of the graph, both sexes seem to be vulnerable to 
non-investment fraud; advance fee payments; banking and credit industry fraud and 
computer misuse crime; in that order. However, when taking into consideration the age of 
the victim, we can see that older individuals are more likely to become victims of advance 
fee payments. For the remaining age groups, the order does not change from the general 
conclusions.  
Nevertheless, it is evident that, across all age groups (except 66+), males have only a higher 
probability of becoming victims of non-investment fraud which accounts to 40% of the 
overall fraud been reported by men. In fact, males become victims of non-investment fraud 
                                                     
139 CSEW experimental statistics on fraud and computer misuse also indicate that individuals are more likely to 
be victimised by these four frauds (Table E5). Also, CSEW identifies these four types as the most likely to be 
reported to police by victims (Table E7). More information can be found in the ONS website which publishes 
national estimates on fraud and cybercrime; 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/crimeinenglandandwales
experimentaltables .  
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1.25 times more than women. Interestingly, although not depicted in the graph, males are 
also 1.6 times more likely than women to experience financial investment fraud.  
However, women experience a higher likelihood of victimisation for all remaining types of 
fraud, across all age groups. Advance fee payments account for 22% of the overall fraud 
being committed and 60% of these cases are against women. In general, women are 1.5 
times more likely to experience advance fee payment fraud than men. In addition, 16% of 
fraud reports involve banking and credit industry fraud – at least, cases been reported to the 
police and not directly to victim’s bank. Also, 56% of the time, banking frauds are against 
women. Further, women experience higher probabilities of, or at least are more likely to 
report140, computer misuse fraud.  
In total, computer misuse fraud accounts for 10% of the overall recorded fraud. 
Nevertheless, this percentage includes only cyber-dependent crimes, such as hacking. The 
percentage might turn out to be a lot higher than that if cyber-enabled crimes are also 
considered. Cyber-dependent offences are crimes which “can only be committed via a 
computer, computer network or other form of information and communications technology 
(ICT)” (NCA, 2016). On the other hand, cyber-enabled crimes are traditional crimes which are 
conducted in a larger scale when ICT is used. Unlike, cyber-dependent crimes, cyber-enabled 
crimes can be committed without its cyber-element141.  
As per NFIB counting rules, if more than one offence is committed, only the most serious 
crime is recorded. For example, if an offender hacks into the personal email of the victim and 
steals banking details, which are then used by the suspect, the fraud recorded will be 
banking and credit card industry fraud. However, this case can be characterised as a cyber-
enabled fraud. Therefore, accounting for all cases in the dataset with a cyber-element 
attached to them, we find that the percentage of cyber-fraud amounts to 39%. 
Additionally, although, in 75% of the cases victims are present during offence taking place 
(including phone scams), only 13% of individuals realise victimisation while it is happening. 
                                                     
140 Computer misuse fraud is one of the most underreported crimes at the moment. Comparatively, 2016 
estimates from the Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW) indicate that adults aged 16 and over have 
experienced 5.4 million incidents of fraud and computer misuse (ONS, 2017). 
141 For instance, ticket fraud where the victim buys tickets that are never supplied or turn out to be forged. 
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Half of the victims comply with the offender once before reporting the fraud to the police 
whereas 14% of the victims comply more than once, in many cases, for years. Further, in 
cases where victim’s personal information has been extracted (including name, home 
address, bank details), 1 out 3 victims provide this information themselves. Interestingly, in 
cases where offender asks specifically for victim’s bank details – most likely, by 
impersonating victim’s bank – 7 out of 10 individuals disclose their bank and/or credit card 
details. Even more alarming, in cases where offender asks victim to pay or transfer funds, 
93% of the time the victim does so.  
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3.3.4.2  Suspect Characteristics  
Figures 3.4-A and 3.4-B demonstrate that young males are more likely to commit crimes. 
This finding is consistent with the literature (Freeman, 1992). The descriptive analysis 
indicates that males are 4 times more likely to engage in fraud than females. For male 
offenders, Figures 3.4-C1 confirms the findings of Section 3.3.4.1. In particular, male 
offenders are more likely to engage in non-investment, advance fee payments, banking and 
credit industry fraud and computer misuse crime – and in that order. On the other hand, 
female offenders commit more banking and credit card frauds.  
Figure 3.4-C2 examines the type of fraud based on suspect’s age. The estimations are limited 
to detected cases, where this information is known. As shown, non-investment and banking 
fraud are the most prevalent types of fraud, across all age groups. However, since the 
estimates are only based on detected cases, we must acknowledge that, although being 
among the most popular types of fraud; cases of non-investment and banking frauds have 
also the highest probability of detection. This is in-line with the solvability outcomes 
presented in Figure 3.2-A1.   
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In addition, prevalence tests indicate that fraudsters are more interested in deceiving victims 
and securing funds than obtaining victim’s banking details. Specifically, offenders are 4.7 
times more likely to ask victims to transfer funds than requiring their personal banking 
information.  
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3.3.4.3  Incident and Fraud Characteristics 
Tables 3.3 – 3.5 assess the importance of various incident characteristics. Table 3.3 
compares case clearance based on the number of victims and offenders involved. In the 
majority of cases, there is only one offender. Cases involving only one victim and one 
offender have a higher probability of detection, about 29% of these cases are solved 
whereas only 0.64% of cases involving multiple victims and offenders are cleared. Table 3.3 
also showcases that victims and police have different perceptions as to how many suspects 
are involved. Only in 25% of the cases, victims report that there might be multiple suspects 
involved whereas after police investigation, multiple offenders are identified in 42 cases out 
of 100.  
Further, Table 3.4, indicates that 77% of the time, cases are cleared because the offender 
has a custody record whereas Table 3.5 illustrates that in 28% of the cases being reported, 
the victim identifies potential suspects, 47% of which are cleared. In general, if the victim 
knows who the suspect might be, the probability of detection is 60%. Interestingly, in 4 out 
of 10 cases, where suspect is known, the victim and the suspect are related either through a 
business or personal relationship.  
In addition, the descriptive analysis indicates that when a fraud is committed, 84% of the 
time the victim ends up losing money. Figures 3.5-A and 3.5-B illustrate the cost of fraud by 
outcome and by type of fraud, respectively. As shown, the cost of detected and undetected 
cases is approximately the same with the total cost adding up to £18 million142. This is a 
staggering amount, considering that only 2 PFAs are included in the analysis and it is just 
over a 2-year period. As demonstrated in Figure 3.5-B, the most lucrative fraud is banking 
and credit industry fraud with an approximate cost of £5 million; financial investment and 
advance fee payments fraud follow. The costs of banking fraud are probably even higher, if 
we consider that financial institutions encourage customers to report cheque, card or online 
banking fraud directly to them and not to the police (Home Office, 2018).  
                                                     
142 Comparatively, between April 2014 and March 2015, the total losses reported to Action Fraud amounted to 
£3.5bn (HMIC, 2015).  
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The above findings amplify the need for a more comprehensive and coordinated approach 
when investigating fraud offences. This is explored in the following sections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: FRAUD SOLVABILITY MATRIX 
 
146 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: FRAUD SOLVABILITY MATRIX 
 
147 
 
3.4 Methodology and Empirical Analysis 
As there is no previous examination of fraud solvability, before developing a predictive 
model and testing its forecasting capabilities on a validation sample, the study first focuses 
on the identification of investigatory factors that signify clearance.  
Specifically, this study aims to answer the following research questions:  
i. Which factors indicate solvability of fraud offences and financially motivated 
cybercrimes? 
ii. Which factors affect solvability in the absence of a named suspect? 
iii. Can the developed model, encompassing solvability and case-limiting factors as 
identified in this study, correctly predict case clearance?   
iv. Is the developed model externally valid? 
It should be noted that there is no record of mandatory investigation. That is, none of the 
cases is highlighted as high profile, or receiving lots of media attention, or having a major 
financial impact. Therefore, all cases, whether NFIB referrals or call-for-service, are equally 
likely to be allocated to an officer for further investigation, given there is an investigative 
lead.  
Although, there are many variables in the dataset capturing what information is known 
about the suspect, a more generic variable capturing whether there is any known level of 
intelligence about the suspect, ranging from physical descriptions to names, is created. 
Further, variables capturing whether a witness was present at the time of offence are 
created. If not, other variables capturing whether third parties can be contacted to obtain 
information about the suspect are also considered. These factors are divided into two 
‘groups’: known and can be known. If more information can be obtained either by a witness 
or a third party, the officer notes that down either in a free-text field or investigation log. 
However, in some cases it is not clear if the police officer has taken the deposition from the 
witness or whether third parties have been contacted. Therefore, for these cases a variable 
is created, capturing whether witness and third parties can be contacted whereas for cases 
clearly stating that the information has already been confirmed by the witness/third parties, 
we generate another variable. A VRM variable records if there are any vehicle details that 
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can be of help in the investigation. A variable capturing the availability of CCTV footage is 
also considered.  
3.4.1  Factor Identification 
To answer the first research question, three tests are performed. For the first test, 
investigatory factors are individually tested to examine how each one differs between solved 
and unsolved cases. Continuous variables, such as victim’s age and days between record 
created and fraud first committed, are tested using t-test whereas chi-squared tests are used 
for categorical factors143. Afterwards, the effective size is estimated to assess the impact that 
each factor independently exerts on case solvability. This test ensures that the factor’s 
magnitude is considered. In other words, it tests whether the difference between solved and 
unsolved cases is large enough to be of practical importance. Finally, the prevalence of each 
variable within the sample is estimated. This test simply estimates the percentage of cases 
having that factor present. 
All significant factors, as determined by the three tests, are subsequently tested for 
correlation and multicollinearity before forming our logistic regression. All tests presented 
are performed on the developmental sample144.  
3.4.1.1  T-tests and Chi-square Tests 
The findings from the t-tests145, presented in Table 3.6, demonstrate that all continuous 
variables considered are significant, apart from the variable capturing the days between last 
and first time of offending. Nevertheless, only age and the variable capturing the days 
elapsed between first offence and recording are considered in the analysis moving forward 
because, as shown in Appendix A.3.3, this is the only continuous variable – apart from age – 
that has entries for all cases in the sample. 
                                                     
143 For continuous variables, we use t-tests as the chi-squared test tests whether there is no association 
between two categorical values.  
144 Before estimating the predictive model on the validation sample, the tests are re-estimated. The results are 
available upon request.  
145 The t-tests which simply examine whether the sample mean differs from the hypothesised mean. The t-
statistic can be smaller (negative) or larger (positive) than the hypothesised value. However, as we are doing a 
two-sided test, its sign makes no difference.  
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For presentation purposes, the results from chi-square tests are broken-down into groups. 
The chi-square statistic tests the hypothesis of no association between two categorical 
variables. A small p-value indicates a significant correlation between the tested variables. It 
also allows identification of solvability and case-limiting factors. If the p-value of the chi-
square test is significant and the named factor has a higher percentage in cleared than 
unsolved cases, then it is considered as a solvability factor. Likewise, negative indicators 
imply case-limiting factors.  
Factors Directly Downloaded from WWP and WMP Systems 
Figure 3.6-A displays the results of chi-squared tests of directly downloadable factors from 
the WWP and WMP systems. All variables, except correct type of fraud, action and interest 
markers146 are statistically significant. Unsurprisingly, variables identifying suspect’s 
characteristics – such as custody record, body description, ethnicity, or nationality – serve as 
solvability factors. Also, if fraud is directly reported to the police instead of AF or fraud is 
part of a series or linked to another crime, then the case is more likely to be solved.   
                                                     
146 Appendix 3.2 contain lists of location, interest and warning markers that are used to generate these dummy 
variables.  
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Types of Fraud as a Factor  
The test is also performed on different types of fraud that are present in the sample. As 
shown in Figure 3.6-B, only six types of fraud are significant. The tests indicate that when 
advance fee payments, banking and credit industry, and computer misuse fraud is 
committed, the case is less probable to be cleared whereas solvability of telecom industry 
and corporate employee fraud is more likely.  
Advance fee payment frauds include offences such as lottery and dating scams. The 
likelihood of the victim knowing the offender is minimal and, usually, the suspect asks for 
the money to be transferred using MoneyGram or Western Union making the transaction 
practically untraceable.  
Most banking frauds involve cheque, card and online bank accounts being defrauded. On 
average, the number of days between the first-time fraud is committed and a record being 
created is 158. This is not surprising since cases are individually analysed by AF and this takes 
time. An offence reported to AF takes, at least, 30 days to be processed before forwarded to 
a force for further investigation. This delay bestows a unique opportunity to the fraudster to 
generate a complex money trail frequently, involving bank accounts outside the force’s 
jurisdiction, to accumulate on funds obtained dishonestly. Inherently, the investigation of 
banking and industry frauds becomes cumbersome.    
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Moreover, the ratio of detected to undetected cases for computer misuse fraud, which 
mainly includes hacking of personal accounts, is the smallest among the types of fraud being 
studied. This is anticipated given that police have yet to establish a response strategy or 
form risk assessments for this type of incidents (HM Government, 2014). Digital crime still is 
an unchartered territory for the police for the time being.  
HM Government (2014) and Home Office (2015) reports showcase that forces do not have a 
wider understanding of cybercrime, the way it is committed or, who is more susceptible to 
victimisation. Police staff lacks adequate training which not only restricts them from 
recognising digital crime, but also restricts police from implementing preventive plans and 
investigatory tactics147. The nature of cybercrime does not make the situation any easier. 
The internet gives the ability to the offenders to hide their tracks by providing online 
anonymity. Interestingly, by reading the police reports and the victim’s account, it was 
evident that, in most cases, it is with the victim’s help that cybercrimes are enabled either by 
downloading malware or viruses into own computer without realising it or, by the offender 
deceivingly obtaining victim’s consent to remotely control their computer. Nevertheless, it is 
highly likely that offenders are not even residing in the same jurisdiction as the victim or 
even within the same country, making the investigation even more difficult.    
On the other hand, the chi-squared tests indicate that telecom industry and corporate 
employee fraud are more likely to be detected. This makes sense since telecom frauds are 
usually committed in a shop, where individuals obtain phone contracts by false 
representation. The fraud is witnessed by the employees who can provide a description of 
the suspect and the offence is, most likely, captured in CCTV. Also, corporate employee 
fraud has a positive indication as offender is probably known. Accordingly, investigation 
becomes more straight forward when there is a lead suspect while making it is easier for the 
police to get hold of incriminating evidence.  
                                                     
147 The Home Office (2015, p.30-33) report provides detailed arguments as to why appropriate training is 
crucial to effectively tackle cybercrime.  
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Victim Information 
Figure 3.6-C presents the information, collected from the MOs and investigation logs, 
relating to the victim. Only two solvability factors have been identified: victim compliance 
with the offender (once) and been victimised before. The case limiting factors identified are: 
there is only one victim, victim refusing to make an official complaint, victim being present 
during offence, complying with the offender more than once, victim being vulnerable or old 
and finally, when the honesty of the victim is question.  
All results seem to be self-explanatory, except perhaps for the negative indication of the 
variable capturing whether the victim was present during the offence taking place. However, 
this also applies to numerous cases where the offence takes place over the phone. In such 
cases, the victim has no idea about who the offender is, what he/she looks like, nor does the 
victim have any other information relating to the fraudster. The only possible lead is the 
offender’s phone number but in most cases, the call is made using a withheld number. 
Respectively, it is not surprising that the ‘presence’ of the victim in the scene does not help 
the investigation process in any way148.  
                                                     
148 Also, further tests indicate that this factor is insignificant and thus, not included in the predictive model 
developed.  
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Case Characteristics 
The most interesting finding from Figure 3.6-D is that, the more information available, the 
more likely is the case to be solved. Only variables capturing the relationship between the 
suspect and victim, and if suspect’s email address is known are found to be insignificant. 
Although the former variable may seem odd to be insignificant, considering that the parties 
involved are usually family members, it is possible  in later stages of the investigation, they 
may choose to resolve the issue without involving the police any further. Unfortunately, this 
cannot be known with certainty since the police reports do not always explicitly mention the 
reasons as to why the case has been filed.  
All remaining factors are significant and have a positive indication, except for when the 
suspect is using an alias or calling from a withheld number, which the test classifies as case-
limiting factors. The solvability factors identified are: witness present; police officer at the 
scene; suspect information provided either by the victim, witness or by a third party such as 
a bank; suspect is known to the victim; evidence collected from the scene – including 
documents handed over by offender to persuade for legitimacy; other items seized; victim 
completing a MG11 report; suspect’s gender is known; physical description; suspect’s phone 
number known; offence location is known; suspect personally attending the location; VRM 
details; suspect bank account details and CCTV footage.  
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Reason for Fraud 
Furthermore, useful investigative leads can be collected by understanding suspect’s 
intentions. Is the suspect after the personal details of the victim or prefers to deceive victim 
to transfer money into own account? In the second scenario, the bank details of the suspect 
are known so the police can ask the offender’s bank to disclose the information of the 
suspect, such as name, registered address or phone number. The findings, displayed in 
Figure 3.6-E, demonstrate that if victims comply with suspect, the less likely the offence to 
be solved. That is true irrespective of whether victims disclose their own personal account 
details or transfer money directly into the offender’s account. This is due to the suspect 
being able to immediately use victim’s details to extract funds or generate a money trail that 
it is really difficult to put a stop to. As discussed earlier, this is especially evident when 
considering how long it usually takes for the police to allocate the case to an officer.  
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Payment Methods 
Figure 3.6-F demonstrates the various payment methods that are used to facilitate fraud and 
examines which ones contribute in the identification of the suspect. Use of bank cards, in 
shops and cash points as well as use of cheques are more prevalent in detected cases. Paying 
in cash also has a positive indication. As we found this odd, we examined the cases where 
cash is the preferred method of payment. Most cases involved petrol stations and retail 
frauds. In both cases, it is possible that the offence has been witnessed by someone so there 
is a physical description of the suspect as well as CCTV footage. Furthermore, the tests 
indicate that when online banking or online payment services such as, PayPal, are used or 
funds are transferred using MoneyGram or Western Union, it is less probable that the case 
will be cleared.  
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Method of Contact 
Figure 3.6-G demonstrates that, in isolation, any method of contact apart from personally 
meeting the suspect, incommodes fraud investigation. This is to be expected since the victim 
has no idea who the offender is149 and there are no witnesses. Therefore, any information 
relating to the suspect’s identity need to be requested and collected from third parties.  
 
                                                     
149 Unless there is an online retail sale; in which case the victim may have an indication as to who the offender 
is; but the fraudster can always use an alias name or the account of a third person; e.g. by hacking.  
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3.4.1.2  Effective Size Estimates 
In addition to statistical significance, it is important to account for the magnitude of the 
relationship between detected and undetected cases. In other words, just because a factor is 
statistically significant, it does not necessarily mean that the difference between the two 
outcomes, solved and unsolved, is large enough to be of practical importance. To that 
extent, an effect size analysis is performed.  
The Hedge’s G statistic is estimated for each factor in our sample. It captures the difference
between two means, expressed in standard deviations units. The larger the difference, the
stronger the relationship between the examined factor and solvability. A negative statistic
indicates that in the absence of that factor, the likelihood of solving the case decreases.
Likewise, a positive estimated difference in means indicates that factor presence has a
positive impact on unsolvability. Typically, an effect size of 0.8, either negative or positive, 
is considered as a large effect size (Cohen, 1988). For instance, an effect size of 0.9 indicates
that means of detected and undetected cases differ by a standard deviation of 0.9. Figure
3.7 presents, in a forest plot, – including lower and upper 95 percent confidence intervals –
factors with an effect size of 0.8 and larger.
The solvability factors identified are: fraud being linked to another crime, prior victimisation, 
if there is a witness, and who is able to provide information about the suspect, if there any 
suspect information available, physical description of the suspect, whether items have been 
seized, offender’s VRM details are available, CCTV footage, offence location is known, 
suspect personally attending offence location and where the method of contact is face-to-
face. On the other hand, case-limiting factors include: suspect calling from a withheld 
number, or when the method of contact for fraud to committed is through a phone call and 
when victims transfer funds into suspect’s account via post office, MoneyGram or Western 
Union. Appendix A.3.4 presents the effective size estimates for all factors being considered. 
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Factor prevalence is also tested in an effort to identify other solvability factors with low 
sample predominance which could, potentially, be used more often during investigation. It is 
estimated as the percentage of cases having that factor present. Prevalence is estimated for 
each factor identified as significant, in the previous two tests, as well as for variables 
believed to capture information not picked up by other factors and thus, have intrinsic value 
in the analysis. The test aims to capture factors which are highly predictive of case solvability 
but they may not be used frequently. Nevertheless, the tests do not classify any other 
solvability factors which are not already been identified by earlier tests. Appendix A.3.5 
presents the results. 
 
3.4.2  Case Clearance without Suspect Information  
From the above factor-identification tests, it is evident that suspect information has 
consistently been one of the main predictors of solvability. This is also in-line with the 
existing literature studying solvability models for other types of crime (Brandl and Frank, 
1994; Burrows et al., 2005; Tilley et al., 2007). Thus, it is interesting to examine, in the 
absence of suspect information, if the factors affecting solvability change conditional on 
there being no suspect. In other words, we want to analyse whether previously insignificant 
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factors are now significant or if case-limiting variables are transformed into solvability 
factors and vice versa.  
We believe this is useful as in many cases of fraud the victim has no indication as to who the 
offender might be. Thus, upon reporting the fraud, the police have to identify other viable 
lines of enquiry to determine if investigation should progress or if the case should be filed 
instead.  
To assess this, the sample is restricted to include only cases without suspect information. 
Then, the above three tests150 are re-estimated using all available factors in the sample to 
answer the second research question posed in this study.  
Indeed, as shown in Figures 8-A and 8-B, four factors are identified as more prevalent in 
cleared than unsolved cases whereas previously, in the presence of suspect information, 
they were insignificant and identified as case-limiting factors. The variables are: suspect 
providing victim with bank account details, victim’s bank being contacted as soon as the 
fraud is realised, if the victim paid via a bank transfer and whether the method of contact 
between offender and victim was through online shopping websites.  
All four indicate that, when the victim cannot provide adequate information on the suspect, 
third parties such as banks, online retailers (e.g. eBay, amazon) can be contacted to ask for 
information relating to the suspect. This information, probably, has to do with the name of 
the offender and registered or delivery address provided when the suspect opened up 
his/her bank or online account.  
Therefore, in the absence of suspect information, the solvability predictors may differ. This 
not only emphasises the importance of acknowledging that suspect information may conceal 
other important determinants that need to be considered in the analysis; but it also 
demonstrates the urgency to create multivariate models rather than examining the 
association of each individual factor with case solvability. All four variables are considered as 
potential predictors for the multivariate regression model developed in Section 3.4.3.  
                                                     
150 Chi-squared tests, effective size and factor prevalence.  
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3.4.3  Empirical Analysis  
Up to this point, factors have individually been assessed to determine their relation to 
solvability. However, each case has a number of factors attached to it and the joint impact of 
presence/absence of factors on solvability needs to be accounted for by building a 
multivariate regression. This introduces the third research question which seeks to answer 
to what extent can solvability be predicted by determinants identified in this study.  
A predictive logistic model is built up to estimate the effect of solvability and case-limiting 
factors on clearance. The dichotomous outcome variable, capturing whether cases are 
cleared or not, is used as our dependent variable. All factors identified to be related with 
solvability in Sections 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.1.2 or which are believed to be of tactical importance 
are considered as possible explanatory variables151. To avoid model bias, correlation and 
multicollinearity tests are examined. Also, different iterations of the model are estimated 
before identifying our preferred model specification which most effectively forecasts 
clearance. The model is built using a randomly assigned half of the dataset, the 
developmental sample152.   
Table 3.7 presents the results. In column (1) a full list of potential predictors, the unrestricted 
model, is estimated whereas column (2) introduces the estimation results of the model 
which only includes factors that are, at least, significant at the 10 percent level; the 
restricted model.  
To decide which model fits the data better, the likelihood ratio (LR) test is conducted. The LR 
test compares the goodness of fit between two statistical models by expressing how many 
times more likely the data are under each model. The null hypothesis states that the 
reduced model has a better goodness of fit. As shown at the end of Table 3.7, the LR test 
suggests that there is not statistically significant evidence in support of the unrestricted 
                                                     
151 In addition to the three aforementioned tests (chi-squared, effective size and factor prevalence), each 
significant factor is included as a regressor in single predictor models to obtain Wald Z scores. Predictors with a 
significance level less than 0.25 are considered for further analysis. This allows us to determine predictors of a 
priori interest, before conducting the correlation and multicollinearity tests.  
152 The other half of the sample, the validation sample, is used to assess the predictive accuracy of the model; 
see Section 3.5.3.  
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model. Thus, the null is not rejected and we conclude that the reduced model fits the data 
better.  
We also consider some mandatory case-limiting factors. These include cases where, the 
offender is believed to reside outside the PFA153; victim refuses to cooperate; victim does 
not want updates; victim reports the crime only for informational purposes and does not 
wish further investigation; victim’s honesty is in question; suspect is dead and finally, the 
bank account provided by the suspect is international.  
If any of these mandatory allocation rules apply then, the case is automatically filed. Thus, 
cases having any of these factors present are dropped from the dataset, and the two models 
are re-estimated. Afterwards, the LR test is conducted to compare the two ‘mandatory’ 
versions of the model; the unrestricted and restricted. The results are presented in columns 
(3) and (4) of Table 3.7, respectively. The test still pinpoints towards the reduced model.  
In addition, although the excluded variables cannot individually predict clearance, we 
acknowledge that if they coexist with other factors then, they may be jointly significant – 
especially if the compilation of factors captures information not covered by other predictors. 
Thus, we examine joint significance by generating pairs of variables that have been shown to 
be unrelated to solvability from earlier individual tests (chi-squared, effective size and factor 
prevalence)154. This represents the compilation model and the results are presented in 
column (6). This model is compared against the restrictive model presented in column (2). 
For presentation purposes and for ease of comparison, the restricted model of column (2) is 
also presented in column (5). This time, the LR test signifies that the compilation model 
performs better.  
Finally, column (7) re-estimates the model, using the same specification as in column (6), but 
also including the four factors that have been identified as significant in the absence of 
suspect information in Section 3.4.2. The LR test demonstrates that the compilation model, 
                                                     
153 The case and all information collected up to that point are forwarded back to AF and then, to the 
corresponding PFA. Thus, in the systems of WWP and WMP, the case is marked as filed.  
154 As with previous estimations, single predictor models are also estimated to obtain Wald Z scores, in addition 
to the three tests, before conducting correlation and multicollinearity tests.  
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in column (6), performs better. Therefore, this becomes our preferred model specification 
and it is the one used in all remaining estimations moving forward.  
Section 3.5.1 presents and discusses, in detail, the estimation results. Additional regression 
diagnostic tests showcasing the validity of the model are presented in Appendix A.3.6. The 
model’s accuracy is tested on a validation sample in Section 3.5.3.  
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3.5 Results 
3.5.1  Regression Analysis 
Table 3.8 presents the results of the multivariate regression analysis, using our preferred 
specification155. Column (1) presents the logistic regression coefficients whereas the odd-
ratios are introduced in column (2). The results are explained through odd-ratios156 as, 
interpreting logistic coefficients does not provide any insightful information. Odd-ratios 
represent the probability of clearance against the probability of a case being undetected. 
Also, it should be noted that negative coefficients (odds ratios under unity) represent case-
limiting factors whereas positive ones (odds ratios above unity) are considered as solvability 
predictors.  
The results indicate that where the case is reported directly to the police and it is correctly 
recognised as a call-for-service, then the probability of case solvability is 2.56 times larger 
than the probability of a case being reported to AF and subsequently, been forwarded to the 
local force for investigation. As discussed, in Section 3.6, it is essential that local forces fully 
assess the information provided and acknowledge the needs of the victim before deciding 
whether the case should be reported to AF. If, during the time of the call, the call handler 
realises that the crime is currently being committed or has recently been committed then, 
the police should take steps to prevent or stop fraud.  
Additionally, if fraud is part of a series, there is a higher probability of clearance. Usually, 
each individual case has limited information attached to it. Thus, if many crimes are linked 
enough evidence can be collected to start an investigation. Especially, for cases where there 
are no apparent investigative leads when case is assessed in isolation. The findings indicate 
that linked cases are 5.90 more likely to be solved.                          
Corporate employee fraud is the only type of fraud that has positive impact on solvability. 
This is unsurprising, since it is more likely that the offender will be known or police is able to  
                                                     
155 As advanced earlier, our preferred specification is column (6) from Table 3.7.  
156 The transformation odds-ratio formula is 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑝) = ln (
𝑝
1−𝑝
). 
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follow-up on investigative leads. On the other hand, banking and credit industry as well as 
computer misuse fraud are less solvable. The estimates show that there is 67% and 69% 
decrease in the odds of clearing these cases, respectively. Although, one would expect 
banking fraud to have a high solvability rate, since the transactions can be traced, by 
delaying the investigative process, the offender is able to move fraudulently-obtained funds 
into other accounts, creating a complex money trail that it is difficult to follow-up. Also, the 
results indicate that where the offence is committed through a phone or where the fraud 
targets specifically an individual, case clearance is less likely.  
In addition, prior victimisation suggests higher likelihood of detection. In fact, cases where 
victims have repetitively been targeted by offenders are 9 times more likely to be solved. 
There are a few reasons as to why this is the case. Repeat victimisation is usually associated 
with higher losses. Our dataset suggests that, on average, victims who suffer repeated 
criminal victimisation lose £10,000 more than victims with no prior victimisation. It is also 
possible that due to repeat victimisation, there is more evidence that the local force can look 
at and investigate. Further, 55% of the cases have a known offender, presumably, making 
investigation easier.  
Knowing the suspect is one of the most significant solvability factors identified in this 
analysis and this is consistent with the literature. Cases, where victim or witness provide any 
indication as to who the offender is, are 44.3 times more likely to be solved than cases 
where no information is provided about the suspect. This is unsurprising, and it has been 
consistent through all previous tests and estimations. Fraud investigation is inherently 
unique and complicated. Therefore, having no investigative leads makes it even more 
difficult to clear the case.  
On the other hand, the analysis identifies the variable capturing whether victim has 
suspicions about who might have committed the offence as a case-limiting factor. Although, 
this might seem strange, this variable only captures whether the victim can recollect the 
circumstances under which the offence has been committed. For instance, consider a case 
where the offender persuaded the victim that he/she was calling from victim’s bank and the 
victim provided own bank information which subsequently have been used by the offender 
to commit a fraud. The victim will have a suspicion as to why funds are missing from their 
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bank account, how and when victimisation took place and whether the offender sounded as 
a male or female. The only other information that can be of any investigative importance is 
by contacting the victim’s call provider and requesting the phone number and personal 
details of the offender to be released. However, if the call was made using a withheld or 
international number, contacting the call provider will be of no assistance to the 
investigation.   
Other factors used during investigatory process which help in the identification of the 
offender include physical description of the suspect, suspect’s VRM details, CCTV footage, 
whether the location of offence is known, and whether the suspect personally attended the 
place of offence. All are statistically positively significant to solvability, except the latter. If 
suspect’s physical description is available, then the probability of clearance is about 12 times 
higher than cases without any. The odds of cases where VRM details and CCTV footage is 
available are about 255% and 186% higher than the odds of cases where these details are 
unavailable.  
Further, the findings indicate that using cash as a payment method, decreases case 
solvability by 89%. Cash payments make it almost impossible to identify who the offender is, 
especially if the offender is unknown. However, even if there is an indication as to who the 
suspect is, it is difficult to prove that the fraud has been committed by the identified 
individual. This finding is different from the conclusions drawn when we individually assess 
the significance of factors on solvability in Section 3.4.1. Therefore, this provides further 
evidence as to why logistic multivariate models are more useful when examining predictors 
on solvability rather than individually examining the effect of each factor on solvability157.  
Moreover, all statistically significant compilation variables included in the model have a 
positive sign suggesting case solvability. Indicatively, cases where an MG11 report is 
completed by the victim and evidence has been collected experience 15.1 times higher odds 
of solvability whereas when suspect’s phone number is known and the call provider had 
been conducted to obtain the personal information of the offender, clearance is 3.67 times 
more likely. Also, in cases where the victim has lost money and the police was able to seize 
                                                     
157 Additionally, Appendix A.3.6 presents the findings from various regression diagnostic tests, providing further 
confidence about the model specification.  
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items that either were provided by the suspect – e.g. a business card – or are proof of fraud 
– e.g. copy of a cheque – are 3.73 times more likely to be solved. Finally, case solvability is 
13.8 larger when the payment was made through a bank transfer and the suspect’s name is 
known. This allows the police to contact suspect’s bank and request more information such 
as, the address registered when the account was opened. Also, the police can check its own 
databases such as, Genie, to test for any records of the suspect or linkages to other crimes.  
Effectively, the logistic model answers the solvability problem by summing the above case-
limiting and solvability factors that might be present in each case. The sum can then be 
compared against a cut-off value to determine whether the case should be allocated for 
further investigation or be filed. Section 3.5.2 discusses how we decide upon the most 
appropriate cut-off point.  
 
3.5.2  Cut-Off Point  
The logistic regression produces coefficients for each solvability and case-limiting factors 
included the model. This allows for predictive case solvability scores to be estimated which 
are then compared against a cut-off value. These scores are estimated by weighting each 
factor by its predictive capability. As solvability factors have a positive sign whereas case-
limiting variables are negative; the higher the score, the more solvable the case is. Cases are 
allocated to an officer for further investigation if the case solvability score is equal to or 
higher than the cut-off value. Alternatively, the case is filed.  
Nevertheless, there is a trade-off that needs to be addressed before identifying the optimal 
cut-off value since two types of error can occur. First, incorrectly allocating a case when it 
should have been filed; type I error; and second, incorrectly filing a case when it should have 
been allocated; type II error. By reducing the probability of one type, the error of the other 
type heightens. That is, to ensure no case is incorrectly filed, many cases will be incorrectly 
allocated as a result. On the other hand, ensuring no incorrect allocation, produces incorrect 
filing of cases that should have been allocated and, potentially, been cleared. Thus, a 
compromise needs to be made.  
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The cut-off point can be optimised either by accounting for limited police resources or by 
identifying a level of balance between case solvability of detectable crimes and wasting 
resources on unsolvable frauds158. Therefore, the objective is to maximise the case-filing 
capabilities of the model while limiting incorrect filing when fraud is solvable. Effectively, this 
approach ensures that the number of victims been let down by police investigation is at its 
bare minimum.  
To identify the optimal cut-off point, different evaluation methods are examined. Table 3.9 
compares different cut-off points, ranging from 0.5 to 0.68, and the errors rates produced at 
each one. Appendix A.3.6 presents the full-range (0.1 to 0.99) of cut-off values considered. 
The number of cases correctly allocated and filed as well as incorrect allocation and filing are 
estimated. This allows to calculate various ratios that help us identify which cut-off point 
best satisfies the set-out objectives. Some of which are: the true-positive-rate (TPR) which 
estimates the percentage of correctly allocated cases; the true-negative-rate (TNR) 
indicating the percentage of cases being correctly filed; the false-positive-rate (FPR) which 
calculates the percentage of incorrectly allocated cases and the false-negative-rate (FNR) 
estimating the percentage of cases being incorrectly filed. The latter two ratios represent the 
type I and type II errors, respectively. 
Further, Table 3.9 evaluates the predictive accuracy of the model at each cut-off point by 
cross-validating case solvability against the predicted values. Further, the Youden Index is 
considered. It determines the point where the TPR and TNR is maximal. Another method 
used to assess the optimal cut-off value is by estimating the ROC159 curve. The predictive 
capabilities of the model to distinguish between positive and negative outcomes is captured 
by the Area under the ROC curve (AUC). The AUC160 is a value that ranges between 0.5 and 
1.0. A value of 0.5 – the reference line – implies that the predictive power of the model is no 
better than chance whereas a value of 1.0 suggests perfect discriminating capabilities. In 
                                                     
158 It is vital that any solvability model is also politically acceptable (Fixsen et al., 2005), irrespective of the 
proposed enhanced investigatory efficiencies. Caution not to damage police reputation should be a priority. 
Public’s perception about and trust to police should not change. Public should not feel discouraged to report a 
fraud due to believing their case will not receive the attention it requires. Equally important, police should 
entrust evidence-based research and not fear being exposed to excessive reputational risk.  
159 ROC stands for Receiver-Operating Characteristic and represents a visual display of the overall performance 
of the model.  
160 Also known as c-statistic or concordance index. 
CHAPTER 3: FRAUD SOLVABILITY MATRIX 
 
171 
 
other words, AUC estimates the overall percentage of correct categorisation. Typically, 
values over 0.8 indicate a strong model. ROC curve is illustrated in Figure 3.10. Graphically, 
the optimal cut-off point on the ROC curve represents the minimum distance161 to the upper 
left corner, where both TPR and TNR are equal to 1.   
As demonstrated in Table 3.9, all three methods indicate that a cut-off value equal to 0.64 is 
optimal162. At this point, the overall predictive accuracy (ACC) of the model is maximised by 
correctly classifying 91.35% of the cases. Specifically, the model correctly allocates 87.45% of 
the reports whereas 95.41% of cases are correctly filed. This further suggests that the error 
rates are minimised; since the number of incorrectly filed cases is minimised while ensuring 
the waste of resources on incorrectly allocated cases is kept at minimum. In turn, this 
ensures that the number of victims been let down is also reduced. The Youden Index and 
AUC support this finding. At the cut-off point of 0.64, the Youden Index is at maximal rate 
whereas the AUC is equal to 97%. This indicates that the model has exceptionally good 
predictive capabilities.  
Although, no direct comparison can be made with other solvability studies, the findings 
indicate that our designed model performs better, in terms of predictive capabilities and 
accuracy, compared to the literature. For instance, the estimated accuracy of Eck’s (1983) 
burglary solvability model is 85%; whereas the model developed by Olphin (2015) correctly 
classifies 67% of non-domestic violent offences.   
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
161 The minimum distance is equal to: √(1 − 𝑇𝑃𝑅)2 + (1 − 𝑇𝑁𝑅)2 
162 Since the provided dataset does not distinguish between cases by severity of harm, we assume that each 
case weights the same in terms of severity.  
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3.5.3  External Validity of the Model: Testing on a Validation Sample 
For our third research question, asking whether factors identified in this study can forecast 
case solvability, to have real validity, it is important to evaluate the predictive capabilities of 
the model on a different dataset than the one used to build it. This introduces our fourth 
research question which asks whether how accurate are the predictive capabilities of the 
developed model, i.e. whether the model is externally valid.  
To answer this, the predictive model developed above is tested on a randomly allocated 
sample, of equal size. This approach not only ensures unbiased estimates, as the model is 
not tested on the same dataset that it was built but it also provides external validation since 
it is the closest to a real-life randomised controlled trial. 
As shown in Table 3.10, the overall accuracy of the model is still very high. At the identified 
optimal cut-off point, the accurate prediction of fraud outcomes, as estimated by the ACC 
ratio, is equal to 89%; with 85% of the cases being correctly allocated and 93% correctly 
filed. As before, the Youden Index and the AUC (min distance) are estimated. Figure 3.11 
provides a graphical representation of the ROC curve. The forecasted estimates are 
extremely encouraging and very close to the findings produced using the developmental 
sample.  
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3.6 Data Limitations and Further Remarks 
Police’s data download tools are designed for investigative purposes rather than for 
research. Thus, data collection was acutely time-consuming. Data had to be requested and 
downloaded from various police systems. Incident reports are not stored in a way that 
supports empirical analysis without a lot of data cleansing and coding. It is, therefore, 
essential that any determinants of solvability are stored electronically, allowing for quicker 
and more effective utilisation of the available information. 
Also, it is unfortunate that we do not know how the NFIB’s Know Fraud database determines 
which fraud cases should be further considered or not. This information is not currently 
available publicly or for research purposes. It should be noted that AF’s system identifies 
links and potential patterns, it is not a solvability model nor does it predict case clearance. 
Nevertheless, it would have been useful to compare the accuracy of the two in terms of 
predictive clearance capabilities and contrast solvability or case-limiting factors considered, 
if any.  
Further, the predictive model developed in this study signifies substantial increases in 
accuracy which in turn, facilitate significant reductions in incorrectly allocated cases. 
Effectively, lower allocation levels can either lead to higher standards of service for correctly 
allocated frauds – and potentially induce higher detection rates – or provide dramatic 
financial and resource savings, as less investigators are involved in cases where not enough 
evidence exist for the fraud to cleared.  
Unfortunately, the available dataset does not allow for a cost-benefit analysis to be 
conducted163. It would have been interesting and insightful to know exactly how many 
officers are assigned for fraud investigation and how many hours are devoted on each case. 
If these were known, the wastage of resources, before and after any increases in efficiency, 
could have been compared. Such analysis enables more informed decisions and suggestions 
to be made.  
                                                     
163 Roman’s et al. (2008) study remains to-date the only cost-benefit analysis of solvability. He studies the 
effectiveness of DNA as an investigatory tool.  
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Additionally, although the accuracy of the model is examined above using various 
econometric techniques such as, performing regression diagnostic tests and testing the 
model on a validation sample, we acknowledge that a randomised implementation trial 
allows for a more comprehensive assessment and testing of the model’s effectiveness in real 
time.    
Despite these difficulties and limitations, this study develops a detailed dataset and conducts 
a comprehensive statistical analysis that helps police understand the optimal use of limited 
investigative resources by identifying solvability and case-limiting factors.  
As part of our future agenda, it is important to recognise that frauds directly dealt by the 
police are more likely to be solved. This might be simply due to taking immediate action. As 
demonstrated in the analysis, in cases where money is lost, it is usually the victim who 
transfers funds to the offender’s bank account. These bank accounts are often opened and 
managed by the fraudsters in the United Kingdom. Hence, there are viable investigative 
leads that the local force can use to identify the offender. However, within 24 hours, the 
fraudulently-obtained funds are typically transferred to various other bank accounts either 
within the United Kingdom but often to a different jurisdiction or internationally.  
This creates a complex money trail that is both difficult and time-consuming to investigate
while bearing a significantly lower probability of clearance. Therefore, the police have a
limited window to act. If the victim is directed to AF, it will take at least 30 days for the crime
report to be allocated to an officer and more days before administering crime investigation
(HMIC, 2015). Thus, not taking immediate action gives the offender an invaluable opportun-
ity to keep the funds while avoiding detection. Thus, to optimise the opportunities of re-
sponse, it is necessary that the police correctly recognises and handles calls-for-service cases 
before redirecting victims to AF.
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3.7 Conclusion 
Fraud and cybercrime victimisation are higher than violent and property crime victimisation 
(ONS, 2017; Action Fraud, 2018); with victims, and the UK economy, experiencing a huge 
financial loss. Therefore, effective clearance of fraud offences is vital. Higher solvability rates 
can not only reinforce public’s trust on whether police are able to maintain order but 
hopefully, it can deter potential offenders from engaging in fraud altogether (Von Hirsch et 
al., 1999). 
However, to understand solvability, it is essential that the optimal use of scarce investigative 
resources is also understood. Ultimately, local forces aim to effectively use their limited 
resources to maximise the optimal outcome, which is higher clearance rates. This is an 
implicit resource constraint condition that needs to be accounted for when identifying the 
optimal outcome since itself is subject to the available police resources.  
A predictive solvability model allows us to understand how the presence or the absence of 
certain variables affects case clearance. Despite analytical models being more rigorous and 
objective than human decision-makers (Kahneman and Egan, 2011); only rarely do police 
forces use statistical models to optimally choose investigative resource allocation (Sherman, 
2013).  
The data used in this research allow for an empirically-based analysis of fraud solvability by
utilising both automated police identifiers and non-electronically recorded predictors using
officer reports and investigation plans. This facilitates high model accuracy and in-depth
precision since the dataset used is more detailed than only automatically recorded variables
were used for the analysis. The accuracy of the model is also externally validated using a
separate random sample.
Although, no statistical model is perfectly accurate, our model performs well. Using the 
developmental sample, the predictive model correctly allocates 91.35% of the cases. More 
specifically, the model correctly predicts allocation 8.8 times out of 10. Even more 
importantly, 9.5 out of 10 cases are correctly filed; ensuring very little wastage of scarce 
resources. Thus, we recommend use of predictive models to aid human decision-making.  
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Appendix A.3 
A.3.1  Fraud Reporting  
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A.3.1.1  Types of Fraud  
As most frauds are self-reported, even though the type of fraud is available in the dataset, 
for some cases, there is no guarantee that type of fraud chosen by the victim is the type of 
fraud that the victim has experienced. Since it is not updated by AF or the PFAs. Thus, a 
substantial amount of time was spent on assigning the correct type of fraud to each case, as 
per NFIB’s fraud counting rules.  
Identifying the type of fraud for each case is of twofold importance. First, different types of 
fraud require different investigation methods to ensure solvability and second, inherently, 
different types of fraud are more difficult to investigate and subsequently, more difficult to 
solve. Each one of these statements is explained in turn.  
Including the type of fraud as a solvability factor in the logistic model makes sense since 
each type of offence allows for different investigative possibilities to be explored. Consider, 
for example, a fraud involving a stolen credit card. Police can investigate whether the credit 
card has been used and if it has, examine how it has been used. If it was used to withdraw 
money from an ATM then, CCTV footage may be available. If it was used to get a refund for 
goods and/or services that the offender did not get, or to buy goods and/or services directly 
from other suppliers then, a CCTV enquiry can be made. If, however, the payment was made 
online, the police can contact the online supplier (e.g. eBay, amazon etc) and request the 
delivery address of the offender and the name used to complete the transaction. If, 
however, the card has been used in another crime, that adds another amount of 
information.  
On the other hand, in case of phone frauds, police can ask the victim to disclose their phone 
provider which will then be contacted to request a list of phone calls been made at the 
victim’s landline. Given the time-interval in which fraud took place, police can identify the 
phone call(s) that are likely made by the offender. Then, the police can request, from the 
victim’s phone provider, more details such as, the exact phone number used, who it belongs 
to, the bank account attached to it. If the offender’s name and/or personal details cannot be 
identified at this stage, the police can go directly to the bank and request that information.  
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These are just two simple examples demonstrating the lines of enquiry that are available to 
local forces, depending on the type of fraud committed, and which can then be pursued 
further to identify the offender and ensure, case clearance.   
However, the type of fraud may be correlated with some of the other solvability factors 
considered in the model. For that reason, correlation and multicollinearity tests are 
conducted. Section 3.4.1 discusses in detail the steps taken to avoid model specification bias 
due to multicollinearity among regressors.  
Further, as explained above, AF “records NFIB fraud and cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent 
crime164, such as Computer Misuse Act offences like hacking […] through its contact centre 
and online reporting tool” (Home Office, 2018). For that reason, we specifically requested 
from AF the NFIB fraud categorisations. These were provided for each case available in the 
sample.  
Obtaining this information was of importance as we wanted to examine whether assigning 
the wrong type of fraud to a case has a negative effect on solvability. Unless the victim is 
deemed as old and/or vulnerable, in which case the officer is the one completing and 
submitting the online form on victim’s behalf, the victim self-reports the fraud and provides 
the details on the incident via AF’s online portal. However, usually, the victim is unaware of 
the differences between the various NFIB fraud counting rules, resulting in the wrong NFIB 
code been assigned to the case or in empty entries.  
Thus, to account for the possibility of incorrect fraud classification and estimate its effect on 
solvability, if any, we create a dummy variable for each one of the 63 NFIB fraud types and 
we classify each case to one of these categories. Table 3.1 provides a complete list of the 
NFIB Fraud counting rules.  
In effect, this enables us not only to include different types of fraud in the solvability model 
and examine whether certain types of fraud are more likely to be solved than others, but it 
also allows us to create a variable capturing whether the victim correctly specified the type 
                                                     
164 Action Fraud is only liable to record NFIB fraud and cybercrimes. If other notifiable offences are apparent in 
a case, the victim is referred to its local force. Similarly, for non-NFIB recorded frauds – such as Other Fraud and 
Forgery – and cyber-enabled offences – such as blackmailing through social media – police is still the one 
responsible to record them (Home Office, 2018).  
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of fraud committed against him/her. Thus, we are able to examine whether false fraud 
categorisation minimises the probability of clearance.  
Fraud categorisation becomes even more complicated when more than one types of fraud 
can be attached to each case. In these instances, the most serious offence is used to classify 
the case. Home Office’s NFIB counting rules define each type of crime in detail as well as 
explain the procedure to be followed when multiple fraud offences have been committed. 
 
A.3.2  Outcome Variable 
In the literature, various outcome measures are used. US solvability studies employ arrest as 
an outcome variable just as often as UK studies use detections (Paine, 2012). That is due to 
both countries requiring a prosecutor to approve arrest. However, arrest is not a fitting 
outcome variable for the UK, since for a suspect to be arrested, the police needs to only 
make reasonable justifications as to who the offender might be. This results in many arrests 
but not necessarily to formal sanctions. Another alternative is conviction (Williams and 
Sumrall, 1982). Despite conviction being the outcome of a criminal trial, proving whether 
suspect is guilty of the crime being accused of, there are various reasons preventing 
offender’s conviction, other than lack of evidence. Thus, conviction may be a misleading 
measure of solvability.  
Effectively, most studies in the UK literature, use sanction detections as an outcome 
measure (Burrows et al., 2005; Donnellan, 2011; Paine, 2012). A sanction detection is 
attached to any police-recorded crime where an identified suspect is declared as the person 
responsible for the committed crime. As a result, an official sanction is issued, and the 
offender is made aware of the full implications of his/her actions. Over the years, critics have 
argued that non-sanction detections are susceptible to manipulation (Bloch and Bell, 1976) 
or bias (Greenwood, 1970). Their argument is that some cases with the same amount of 
evidence attached to them, are not sanctioned. However, this is only true for a small number 
of cases.  
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A Home Office (2011) report shows that non-sanction detections only include cases where, 
although sufficient evidence exist, either the offender is deceased or, it was not deemed 
appropriate to prosecute the offender even though the police was able to do so. The 
evidential requirements for each one of these ‘labels’ are the same in every case being 
examined; so at least there is a sense of uniformity. In addition, as explained above, as of 
April 2013/14, Home Office implemented a positive outcome approach to determine crime 
detection. This method avoids any of the aforementioned concerns and provides the most 
rigorous and thorough outcome measure available. Thus, this empirical analysis employs 
positive outcomes as an indication of case clearance.  
 
A.3.3  Continuous Variables 
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A.3.4  Effective Size 
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A.3.5  Factor Prevalence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: FRAUD SOLVABILITY MATRIX 
 
190 
 
A.3.6  Regression Diagnostic Tests 
To ensure the model specification is valid, further regression diagnostic tests are estimated; 
see Table 3.8. First, two goodness-of-fit tests are employed: the Pearson and the Hosmer-
Lemeshow. Both compare observed and expected observations of outcome events; with the 
latter creating subgroups of the data – within each group, cases have a similar predicted 
probability of the outcome event. Failing to reject the null hypothesis indicates that the 
model is a good fit to the data. Second, the model specification is tested using the Link Test. 
It evaluates whether the current model is an adequate fit of the data – the null hypothesis –, 
or a different specification is required – alternative hypothesis. As shown in Table 3.8, below 
regression results, all three tests provide support to the current model and specification.  
Further, the Pregibon Delta-Beta, dbeta, is an influential statistic which is estimated to 
assess whether inclusion or exclusion of a specific case, or a covariate pattern, affects the 
estimated coefficients. Small dbeta values, typically less than unity, indicate no influential 
patterns in the dataset whereas large values of dbeta, usually greater than unity, suggest 
that individual or covariate pattern is influential. Figure A.3.6.1 illustrates the estimated 
influential statistic. As demonstrated, dbeta values are less than 0.15. This indicates that the 
absence of influential points; which is reassuring.  
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It is also important to test if the model, built using the developmental sample, is a good fit on 
the validation sample. The goodness-of-fit tests are re-estimated using the second randomly 
allocated sample to assess the model’s calibration. The ROC curve, estimating the model’s 
discrimination capabilities (between positive and negative outcomes) in the validation 
sample, is also produced. Both tests provide satisfactory evidence on the validity of the 
model.  
In addition, although the above regression diagnostic tests suggest a good fit overall, they do 
not ensure correct classification of individual predictions. Thus, a threshold probability, i.e. a 
cut-off point, estimated based on the individual profile of each case’s covariate is more 
useful, since it informs police as to which cases should be allocated or filed. Section 3.5.2 
explains how the most effective classification is selected. 
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A.3.7  Cut-Off Point 
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Conclusion 
Deteriorating labour market opportunities can shift an individual’s incentives to engage in 
legitimate or illegitimate acts. In the first two chapters we assess the link between monetary 
economic indicators, using a panel-data model, for the U.S. and England and Wales, 
respectively. We believe that benefit measures capture incentives for individuals’ crime 
incentives as advanced by theoretical models, it is the expected illegal and legal returns that 
motivate an individual’s decision making.  
In the first chapter, a dynamic model is estimated to assess to what extent business cycles 
affect the rate of burglary. To approximate business cycles we use two economic indicators: 
unemployment and income benefits. The model also controls for criminal justice factors. 
Both internal lagged values and external instruments are used to address potential 
endogeneity issues. Also, by exploiting a mitigating mechanism implemented by the U.S. 
government during the latest recession, we are able to examine how unemployment benefit 
extensions affect burglary rates.  
The empirical results indicate that at-the-margin individuals positively respond to increases 
in income benefits as they increase the opportunity cost of offending and thus, they are less 
likely to engage in criminal activities. By re-estimating the model during the latest recession, 
undoubtedly the most severe economic downturn among the three business cycles 
examined, we find that the size of the effect is larger. Our interpretation is that the greater 
the economic depression, the more effective are the increases in income benefits.   
On the other hand, unemployed individuals also respond to lengthening the time when they 
can claim unemployment by committing crimes. This is evident by re-estimating our model 
during the latest business cycle where eligible unemployed recipients were provided 
benefits for an extended duration, leading to prolonged periods of unemployment. This, we 
argue occurs as lengthening the period of benefits lowers the incentive to look for work 
which may also reduce the opportunity cost of crime.   
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The second chapter empirically assess the relationship of economic indicators and different 
types of crime, in England and Wales. Our contribution is threefold. First, the crime-
inequality link is re-examined by developing a novel Gini coefficient using individual-level 
data. Second, specific economic indicators capturing the incentives of the unemployed and 
the economically disadvantaged are used. Third, we explicitly account both for the dynamic 
nature of crime and potential endogeneity of economic and law enforcement factors in the 
crime equation.  
In line with the literature, we find that violent crimes are not affected by economic 
incentives. Rather, violent criminals are more responsive, both in short- and long-run, to 
changes in the probabilities of apprehension and sentence lengths than property offenders. 
Property crime is more likely to be induced by financial motives, our findings are consistent 
with that indicating significant effects of economic indicators on crime, with the effect being 
more prevalent during the long-run. We find that lower unemployment and income benefit 
payments and higher levels of income inequality increase financially motivated crimes.  
Key policy implications are derived from these essays on the effect of economic incentives 
on crime. Both studies demonstrate that increases in legal earnings of disadvantaged groups, 
as measured by assistance payments, can reduce financially motivated crimes. This is due to 
facing higher opportunity cost by participating in illegitimate activities.  
Finally, the third chapter undertakes an empirical analysis of fraud solvability. The rapid 
expansion of digital technology has allowed fraudsters to commit traditional crimes in a 
larger scale while also developing new types of crime altogether. Unsurprisingly, fraud and 
cybercrime victimisation are higher than violent and property crime victimisation. Although 
fraud is hugely unreported, there are still numerous cases being investigated by local police 
forces with minimal probabilities of clearance which in turn stretches the already limited 
investigative resources available. Thus, effective allocation of limited resources is vital to 
maximise clearance rates.   
The chapter builds a predictive model which identifies solvability and case-limiting factors of 
fraud and computer misuse crimes by utilising preliminary investigative information from 
cases referred to Warwickshire and West Mercia Police. This is the first study to develop a 
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solvability model for fraud to increase investigatory efficiency by addressing the implicit 
resource constraint.  
Further, we evaluate optimal cut-off values, between case filing and allocation, by 
minimising the trade-off between incorrect filling and false case allocation. The model is 
externally validated by testing its predictive capabilities on a separate dataset. The findings 
indicate that local forces can effectively utilise investigative resources when adopting 
statistical allocation models that capitalise on information collected during preliminary 
investigation.  
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